Decentralised land governance : case studies and local voices from Botswana, Madagascar and Mozambique by Satgé, Rick de
Rick de Satgé and Karin Kleinbooi, with  Christopher Tanner
decentralised 
land governance: 
Case STUDIES  AND 
LOCAL VOICES 
from Botswana, 
Madagascar and 
Mozambique
Decentralised Land Governance: Case Studies and Local Voices 
from Botswana, Madagascar and Mozambique
ISBN: 978-1-86808-725-9
Published by the Institute for Poverty Land, and Agrarian Studies, School of Government, EMS 
Faculty, University of the Western Cape, Private Bag X17, Bellville 7535. Cape Town, South Africa
Tel: +27 21  959 3733. Fax: +27 21 959 3732. E-mail: plaas@uwc.ac.za 
Website: www.plaas.org.za
June 2011
All rights reserved.
Authors: Karin Kleinbooi, Rick de Satgé with Christopher Tanner
Copy-editing and proofreading: Prem Egert
Supervising editor: Rebecca Pointer
Cover photograph: PLAAS Regional Workshop, 3-7 May 2009, Maputo Photographer: Sabine Pallas
Maps: John Hall
Design and DTP: Design for development, www.d4d.co.za
Printers: CREDA Communications
iChapter 1: decentralised land governance
Table of Contents
Contributors ii
Acknowledgements iii
Preface iv
Tribute to Tessa Cousins v
Introduction 1
Chapter 1: Decentralised land governance 3
Chapter 2: Botswana by Rick de Satgé 14
Chapter 3: Madagascar by  Karin Kleinbooi 48
Chapter 4: Mozambique by Christopher Tanner 83
Chapter 5: Lessons and reflections 99
ii Decentralised land governance: Case studies  and local voices from Botswana, Madagascar and Mozambique
Contributors
Rick de Satgé has been involved for almost 20 years 
in the NGO sector in South Africa, Zimbabwe and 
Botswana. He has worked on the ground as a rural 
fieldworker, living and working in remote rural areas 
and played a central role in the founding and manage-
ment of two NGOs and in the establishment of local 
and regional inter-sectoral learning networks. He is 
currently a development consultant and a partner in 
Phuhlisani Solutions, based in Cape Town and is an 
Associate of the Institute for Poverty Land and Agrarian 
Studies (PLAAS) at the University of the Western Cape 
in Cape Town, South Africa. He has been an independ-
ent consultant for more than 15 years as a development 
specialist in land, livelihoods and capacity development, 
with comprehensive experience in rural and urban 
development and adult learning .
Karin Kleinbooi is a researcher at PLAAS and holds an 
MPhil in Land and Agrarian Studies at the University of 
the Western Cape. She has been involved in research 
work on existing and emerging land policy issues, farm 
labour and dweller land reform and  women’s land 
rights, and has monitored and evaluated land reform 
implementation in South Africa.
She co-ordinates learning that enables key practitioners 
and scholars in the land sector to share experiences 
and derive policy-relevant lessons from practices, 
articulating the benefits and limitations of decentrali-
sation in southern Africa, i.e. people-led (but state-
supported) approaches to land reform in the Southern 
African Regional Land Programme funded by the 
Austrian Development Agency of which this case book 
is a major output.
Christopher Tanner is a FAO Senior Technical Advisor 
on Land and Natural Resources Policy, who currently 
works in Mozambique in a programme to train com-
munity level paralegals and local government officers in 
the use of Mozambique’s progressive legal framework 
for land and natural resources management.
His work on land issues began with a PhD at Cam-
bridge University, researching childhood malnutrition 
and household reproduction in North-eastern Brazil.
Since the early 1990s he has focused increasingly on 
land issues in Portuguese speaking African countries.
After doing field research and rural development work 
in Mozambique, he was appointed to lead FAO support 
to the Mozambican Inter-ministerial Commission to 
Revise Land Legislation in the mid-1990s and has since 
been overseeing the development of a programme 
to support implementation of the 1997 Land Law and 
a range of related legislation covering Environment, 
Forests and Wildlife, Territorial Planning, Tourism, etc. 
Through this programme, implemented by the Centre 
for Juridical and Judicial Training (CFJJ) of the Ministry 
of Justice, he has been directly involved with several 
projects which have used the devolved management 
and decentralising elements of the Mozambican policy 
and legal framework to promote an inclusive and 
participatory rural development process.
iiiChapter 1: decentralised land governance
Acknowledgements
Ruth Hall is a senior researcher at PLAAS and project 
manager of the Southern African Regional Land pro-
gramme. She completed her doctoral dissertation, The 
Politics of Land Reform in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 
1990 – 2004: A shifting terrain of power, actors and 
discourses, at the University of Oxford. We would like to 
thank Ruth, who was an advisor on this project, for her 
immensely generous and knowledgeable contributions 
and detailed comments on the drafts over an extended 
period.
Professor Ben Cousins is the DST/NRF Chair in Poverty, 
Land and Agrarian Studies Institute for Poverty, Land 
and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS). His decades of experi-
ence of land reform in Southern Africa and beyond 
greatly enriched this project.
Tessa Cousins, Phuhlisani Associate and rural commu-
nity expert, played an instrumental role in the concep-
tualisation of the book and the development of the key 
questions that framed the case study research.
PLAAS would like to thank all the people from Bot-
swana and Madagascar who participated in this project 
and agreed to be interviewed. We also acknowledge the 
people  whose experiences have been documented in 
the Mozambican case study. 
PLAAS also thanks the following organisations: 
DITSHWANELO – The Botswana Centre for Human 
Rights – for support, contributions and assistance 
during the research of the Botswana case study; HARDI 
– Madagascar,  the non-governmental organisation 
based in Antananarivo, for field work and logistical 
support;  and AWARD – The Association for Water and 
Rural Development in Mpumalanga Province - who 
provided organisational support to Tessa Cousins in 
conducting the South African case study in Craigieburn 
which due to her untimely death had to be omitted from 
this publication. The partnership and collaboration  
with these organisations was an important feature of 
this initiative:  to outline the nature and impacts of 
policy processes. Their experiences of obstacles to, and 
innovation in ‘land governance from below’ provided 
the relevant understanding of the context in which land 
governance is decentralised.
iv Decentralised land governance: Case studies  and local voices from Botswana, Madagascar and Mozambique
Preface
The Southern Africa Programme on Land, managed by 
PLAAS and supported by the Austrian Development 
Agency (ADA), has sought to develop a learning culture 
through documenting  land reform practices and 
experience. This book examines the experience of three 
countries in their attempts to decentralise the govern-
ance structures and systems for recording, allocating 
and managing land rights and reflects on the lessons 
learnt.
We started out with a team of three 
researchers
•	 Karin	Kleinbooi	from	PLAAS,	who	managed	the	
project and researched the Madagascar case 
study; 
•	 Rick	de	Satgé	from	Phuhlisani,	who		worked		with	
the staff of DITSHWANELO – The Botswana Centre 
for Human Rights, to research the Botswana case 
study and think through lessons learnt;
•	 Tessa	Cousins	from	The	Association	for	Water	and	
Rural Development (AWARD) in Mpumalanga 
Province, who started to research the case study 
and develop a toolkit to assist with local processes 
of decentralised land governance.
We had begun to develop a conceptual approach to the 
complex issues contained within the rubric of decen-
tralised land governance, and had started with field 
research at the different sites when Tessa was killed in a 
climbing accident in Scotland on 31 May 2011. Her role 
in the planning and thinking about this publication was 
pivotal. Her tragic death brought our work to a halt for 
a period as we tried to come to terms with this loss. We 
have felt Tessa’s absence keenly and it has inevitably 
diminished what we have been able to achieve without 
her. Sadly, the case study she was working on was 
incomplete at the time of her death. 
We would like to thank Chris Tanner for coming to our 
assistance at very short notice to provide a case study 
from Mozambique and to ADA for their patience and 
understanding of the challenges we have faced in 
completing this important work.
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Tribute to Tessa Cousins
In her professional life Tessa was a listener and a 
creator of conversational thinking spaces that gave 
voice to many different people and provided the impetus 
for dialogue, and the interrogation of problems and 
practices, which generated both practical solutions - 
and further questions.
Knowing Tessa, many images of her come to mind. For 
me, as a fellow facilitator and researcher it is the tools 
of her trade: the emerging lines of enquiry and the 
kokis, the coloured cards, the matrices, the maps and 
ideograms – the means to record thoughts and ideas, 
to ground concepts and to leverage different interpreta-
tions and meanings.
From the many deeply thought and felt tributes which 
family, friends and co-workers have written and shared 
since her death, it is clear that Tessa has made a lasting 
imprint on many lives. 
We do not have to search hard to discover the patterns 
and trends that represent Tessa’s life. They are writ 
large. As Robert Chambers, Tessa’s Participatory Rural 
Appraisal (PRA) mentor, has advised, we must take 
comfort in her life, what she did, what she started and 
who she influenced -and in this way, we can add to the 
legacy that she leaves behind.
Rick de Satgé
Tessa in discussion with a resident of Craigieburn
September 2011
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Decentralisation has been on the Southern African de-
velopment agenda for a long time. It is a concept which 
appears deceptively simple. The principle of subsidiarity 
holds that decision making about local development 
priorities needs to take place as close to the people 
locally involved as possible. Decision making about land 
access and resource allocation is a key component of a 
broader decentralisation agenda.
However, on closer examination, discourses around 
decentralisation are complex. They combine pre-
and post colonial histories, changing development 
trajectories, and understandings about tenure and 
governance systems. They are set against major shifts 
in global and local balances of power and fast changing 
socio-economic relations which further marginalise the 
poor and deepen inequality.
Goals of the book
The purpose of this project was to develop an acces-
sible book for policy makers and practitioners which 
locates selected country case studies within a broader 
theoretical and practical discussion on decentralised 
land governance in the context of increasing commer-
cialisation of rural land. 
The book sets out to give voice to local people, land 
rights activists and decentralisation practitioners 
in Botswana, Madagascar and Mozambique and to 
stimulate collaborative conversations among different 
INTRODUCTION
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sets of actors in the land sector in order to reflect on 
the different approaches and practices of decentralised 
land governance in the region. 
The three cases aim to: 
•	 contribute	to	a	shared	understanding	of	changing	
local country contexts;
•	 identify	emerging	country	trends,	highlighting	
the increasing competition for resources and the 
implications for the rural poor; 
•	 examine	the	evolution	of	approaches	to	decentrali-
sation and the roles of state and non- state actors 
and institutions in the process; 
•	 explore	gender	differentiated	impacts	of	decentral-
ised land governance initiatives; and
•	 identify	approaches	which	practically	strengthen	
rural people’s rights and ensure that their voices 
are heard in decision making process which impact 
on the changing use and management of land.
Overall we seek to:
•	 facilitate	debate	among	rural	communities	and	civil	
society organisations about how to best respond 
to their fast changing environments and engage 
in collective action to balance power relations and 
secure their rights;
•	 contribute	to	improving	capabilities	to	support	
communities affected by tenure insecurity and 
deals involving land which communities depend 
upon for their livelihoods; and 
•	 provide	space	for	reflection	on	practice.
The book is divided into three sections:
1. An introduction to decentralised land governance, 
which sets the scene, provides contextualisation, 
and presents a brief review of the different ap-
proaches to decentralisation and their respective 
institutional and operational frameworks.
2. In depth country case study reviews.
3. A reflection on the issues and trends arising  from 
the different country experiences which can inform 
an agenda for action.
The three case studies are located against the backdrop 
of changing land governance, tenure policy and 
legislation in each country. The case studies examine 
how power and authority over decision-making and 
resources or functions is distributed between central, 
regional and local levels of governance.  They explore 
the roles and perspectives of other actors such as 
non-governmental bodies, traditional governance 
institutions, user associations or village committees, the 
private sector and other organisations of civil society. 
Local voices identify lessons for policy and practice and 
highlight advocacy actions required to secure the land 
rights of vulnerable people in poor communities. 
The cases collected in this book represent an important 
resource for researchers, policymakers, land reform 
practitioners and organisations working to strengthen 
democratic and downwardly accountable governance of 
land and natural resources.
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Introduction
Customary and statutory land tenure systems still oper-
ate side by side throughout much of southern Africa. 
These dual systems have their roots in the colonial 
era and the land reforms in the last three decades in 
Southern Africa, which were aimed at increasing land 
access through land redistribution and improving land 
tenure through formalising customary tenure. 
Despite decades of attempts to formalise land tenure 
systems during both the colonial and independence 
eras, just 1% of land in Africa is registered under the 
formal system (Commission for Africa 2005, 231). 
Evidently, the centralised, top down formalisation of 
land is not working (Easterly 2008). 
Our focus is on land which is owned by the State and to 
which citizens claim rights through diverse customary 
tenure systems. In such systems access and entitle-
ments are mediated by multiple policies and institu-
tions.  These land tenure and governance systems are 
highly dynamic. Change is driven by relations of power 
between different land users and has been shaped by 
major policy and institutional shifts over time. 
CHAPTER 1: decentralised 
land governance
by Rick de Satgé and Karin Kleinbooi
PLAAS Regional Workshop, Maputo. Photographer – Sabine Pallas, ILC
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Setting the scene
Mounting pressure on land held under 
customary tenure systems
The country case studies provide valuable indicators 
of how the tenure and land rights security of the poor 
is becoming increasingly precarious and subject to 
powerful forces within an increasingly globalised 
economic system. Realignments in global resource 
equations have contributed to a sharp spike of interest 
in arable land and natural and mineral resources by 
foreign corporations and governments. Resource rich 
land held under customary tenure systems, which 
until recently was deemed to be outside the economic 
mainstream, has acquired new value as a commodity 
and is increasingly being regarded as a strategic 
resource and potential source of wealth waiting to be 
‘unlocked’ by external investors. These tenure systems 
are complex and have been influenced ‘by a century 
or more of contact and interference by governments’ 
(Cotula et al., 2004: 2).
The increasing commercial interest in opening up ‘new 
land’ for commercial production is driven by a complex 
array of factors including:
•	 the	implications	of	the	global	peak	oil	scenario,	
coupled with growing concern about carbon 
emissions and climate change which has led to 
a massive expansion in land under sugar cane, 
maize and other crops destined for ethanol produc-
tion or bio fuel;
•	 rapidly	increasing	global	per	capita	consumption	of	
meat and related demand for grain as animal feed;  
•	 concerns	about	national	food	security	in	countries	
with fast growing populations and inadequate 
agricultural land to meet domestic needs; and 
•	 rising	global	food	prices.
As agricultural land under customary tenure acquires 
new value, deals struck between foreign investors and 
powerful local elites stand to radically alter rural land 
access and social relations. The political and economic 
impetus driving these transactions threatens to fast 
overwhelm the limited protections afforded by local 
tenure systems, which are often underpinned by weak 
land governance institutions and poorly supported by 
law.  
The global expansion of land cultivated for bio fuel 
production and non- food agricultural commodities 
has been significant in the last decade. Deals of this 
nature involve long term leasing of large tracts of public 
or communal land by foreign, regional and domestic 
companies or governments. An additional, but separate 
category (with a much longer history) is mining, as 
this fundamentally alters existing land use and quickly 
sweeps aside those who had prior rights to the land. 
The acquisition of land for expanded commercial 
agricultural production in Southern Africa has involved 
investors from the Gulf, South Korea, India, China and 
other countries who often enter into partnership with 
local elites. This can represent a major threat to the 
livelihoods of poor local land users, while simultane-
ously providing enormous opportunities to those who 
are better off. The scale of some of these land deals is 
enormous. One of the contributory factors to the recent 
political turmoil in Madagascar was the government’s 
decision to lease 1.3 million ha, approximately half the 
country’s arable land, to Daewoo Logistics to grow 
maize and palm oil for export to Korea. 
It is often claimed that the land earmarked for such 
deals is ‘vacant’ or unutilised. But this has been chal-
lenged by analysts who argue that ‘existing land uses 
and claims go unrecognised because land users are 
marginalised from formal land rights and access to the 
law and institutions’ (Cotula et al., 2009: 6). 
While there was initially some optimism about the 
potential for bio fuels to ‘revitalise land use and liveli-
hoods in rural areas’, this quickly gave way to concerns 
about the impact of investment in bio fuels on the land 
holdings of the poor, particularly in conditions where 
land tenure was insecure and not recognised in law, 
which would result in ‘poorer groups losing access to 
the land on which they depend’ (Cotula et al., 2008: 2, 
von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009). 
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Even where policies, laws and institutions are in place 
to protect the rights of local land users, these type of in-
vestments involve ‘strong power asymmetries’ and ‘they 
are likely to achieve little if they are not accompanied 
by sustained investment in building people’s capacities 
to claim and secure their rights’ (Cotula et al., 2008: 
4). Large-scale land allocations for the development 
of monocrop estates contribute to the dissolution of 
existing rural social bonds and in worst case scenarios, 
can lead to displacement of entire communities. 
A rapidly changing context
Any discussion of decentralised land governance also 
has to take into account how members of rural house-
holds are increasingly dispersed – many migrate to the 
cities and others move across borders and continents. 
This increasing social fragmentation, movement of 
people and changing household composition has 
major implications for rural livelihoods, land uses and 
resource management and involves complex flows 
of people, cash and goods. The precarious nature of 
the livelihoods of the urban and rural poor results in 
a dynamic relationship between town and country 
characterised by ‘circular migration of people and 
movement of capital between rural and urban areas’ 
(Whande, 2009: 2). 
The rate of urbanisation taking place in Africa is 
currently the highest in the world.  Current projections 
are that by 2050, the continent will have an urban 
population of 1.2 billion, accommodating nearly a 
quarter of the world’s urban dwellers (United Nations 
Human Settlements Programme, 2008: xi). But in most 
instances, this urbanisation is accompanied by limited 
development, taking place against the backdrop of 
a ‘weak agricultural sector; poor national economic 
performance, the absence of secondary cities... leading 
to the growth of megacities with poor economic bases’ 
(Cheru, 2005: 4).
Those who remain in the countryside, as well as many 
of the poor who have migrated to the cities, continue to 
depend on access to land and natural resources which 
play an important role in their livelihood strategies. This 
land is also used to grow the food required to feed the 
populations in fast expanding urban centres. Rural peo-
ple require secure access to land for housing, cropping 
and grazing. Rural land also represents a key retirement 
asset for many who have gone in search of work and 
livelihood opportunities in the cities. These factors and 
relationships underscore the importance of rural land 
as an essential component of nation social safety nets, 
as well as local and national food security.  
Decentralisation and land governance 
While foreign interest in agricultural land grows, many 
foreign donor agencies are taking a renewed interest in 
funding decentralisation initiatives, ostensibly designed 
to strengthen local governance and land rights man-
agement in African countries.
In order to understand and compare contemporary 
initiatives and approaches to decentralisation, they 
need to be located within their respective historical 
contexts. The relationship between states, international 
multilateral agencies and rural land users on the com-
mons has undergone a number of important transitions 
since the 1960s when decolonisation started to gain 
momentum in Southern Africa. Within colonial and 
post colonial states there is a long history of antipathy 
to customary tenure systems. For a long time both the 
systems and the ‘traditional’ leaders and institutions 
which administered them were regarded as ‘backward’, 
‘feudal’ and a brake on investment, modernisation and 
agricultural development. 
In the immediate post colonial period, some newly 
elected governments sought to implement wide 
reaching measures to fundamentally change the 
way in which land was held, allocated and governed 
(Economic Commission for Africa, 2004), while others 
‘simply re-entrenched and sometimes expanded, the 
scope of colonial land policy and law’ (Okoth-Ogendo, 
1999: 3). How to understand and address the legacies 
of these ‘bifurcated systems’ has remained a massive 
challenge. Large questions remain about the legitimacy 
of hereditary leaders in the countryside and about what 
authority and role they should have in a democratic 
society.  
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As table 1 highlights, decentralisation initiatives have a 
long history in Africa. Decentralisation encompasses a 
number of different, but related concepts and ap-
proaches (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2007). The different 
types of decentralisation have been shaped by political, 
ideological and development shifts in the agendas of 
both states and donors in recent decades (Larson and 
Ribot 2005).
The history sketched above highlights the slippery 
nature of the concept of decentralisation, and of its 
deployment to serve diverse agendas ranging from 
increased state control to the promotion of democrati-
sation and downward accountability. 
Defining decentralisation
The European Commission observes that there is no 
universally agreed definition of ‘decentralisation’ and 
that ‘one risks getting lost in a jungle of expressions 
and terms’ (European Commission, 2007: xi).
From the perspective of this book, decentralisation 
refers to the redistribution of power and authority over 
decision-making and land and resource management 
functions between central, regional and local levels 
of governance and other actors, including traditional 
institutions, user associations or village committees, 
together with other organisations of civil society and the 
private sector. 
In its broadest form, decentralisation seeks to change 
relations of governance between central government 
agencies and legitimate, democratic and downwardly 
accountable local institutions to enable greater partici-
pation by local land users in determining decisions over 
resources; these include the responsibility for planning, 
management and allocation of such resources (UNDP, 
2002a). 
Institutional co-responsibility for governance  between 
formal and informal, official and non-official, and state 
and non-state institutions at the central, regional and 
local level, creates a platform for more effective deci-
sions by ‘the lowest level or most local level of authority 
competent to deal with such matters’ (Agrawal and 
Ribot, 1999). Hence decentralisation involves delegating 
decision-making authority away from a central authority 
to local authorities - whether public, private, community 
or traditional - who are presumed to have better access 
to information and to be more accountable to local 
Box 1: Forms of decentralisation 
Political decentralisation refers to situations where political power and authority is transferred to sub-
national levels, such as elected village councils and state level bodies. 
Fiscal decentralisation involves some level of resource reallocation to allow local government to function 
properly, with arrangements for resource allocation usually negotiated between local and central authorities. 
Administrative decentralisation involves the transfer of decision making authority, resources and 
responsibilities for the delivery of selected public services from the central government to other lower levels 
of government, agencies, and field offices of central government line agencies. 
Divestment involves a transfer of responsibilities from government to entities outside the sphere of 
government and is often regarded as the privatisation of planning and administrative responsibilities. 
This transfer can take different forms, including ‘contracting out’ or ‘public-private partnership with 
communities, NGOs, or private business.
Source: UNDP 2000; MacLean, 2003.
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Table 1: History of decentralisation initiatives in Africa
Period Decentralisation approaches Land tenure and governance
Pre 1945 Those  countries without settler populations 
were governed through systems of ‘indirect 
rule’ which represented ‘rule by a few colonial 
officials with the aid of the most compliant 
traditional rulers’ where local administration 
comprised a native court system, a local tax and 
a treasury; (Olowu, 2001: 4).
Customary tenure was deemed ‘to lack 
security of title and hence to fail to 
provide incentives for investment and 
modernisation’ (Peters, 2004: 271)
Phase 1: 
1945 – early 
1960’s
A post war shift by colonial administrations in 
Anglophone and Francophone Africa to develop 
local government structures which increasingly 
involved elected local councils that started to as-
sume responsibility for local service delivery – a 
period which has been described as ‘the golden 
age of local government in Africa’(Hicks, 1961).
The perceived lack of tenure security and 
recognition of individual rights led some 
countries to promote individual or family 
titling.
Phase 2: Early 
1960s – late 
1970s
The post independence period was dominated by 
Cold War geo-politics which saw the majority of 
newly independent states embark on processes 
to centralise planning and political power(Hicks, 
1961, Mawhood, 1983).
Many countries adopted a socialist ideology and 
single party political systems, which ‘tried to 
forge local administrations that were essentially 
instruments of control within the framework of a 
one party or military state’ (Olowu, 2001: 5).
Mawhood (1983: 8) highlights how a ‘deconcen-
trated administration was left in charge of the 
locality similar to but weaker than the colonial 
one.’
Post independent states were hit hard by a 
global economic crisis, driven first by bank 
lending on the back of vast oil revenues, followed 
by a collapse in primary commodity prices and 
rising interest rates which created a massive 
debt crisis. The IMF and World Bank responded 
with structural adjustment programmes which 
enforced economic and political liberalisation.
In many countries there was a post inde-
pendence backlash against customary 
institutions. ‘In the years after independ-
ence, socialist regimes in Tanzania, 
Ethiopia, Burkina Faso and Mozambique 
condemned ‘traditional’ and ‘customary’ 
organization and law as ‘feudal’’(Peters, 
2004: 273).
At the same the World Bank argued that 
customary systems did not provide the 
necessary security to ensure agricultural 
investment and productive use of land 
(ibid). Promotion of individual prop-
erty rights through titling programmes 
continued. 
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Phase 3: Late 
1970s – late 
1980s
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
enforced state spending cuts and encouraged 
decentralisation ‘to reduce central and local 
government expenditures and size’ (Olowu, 2001: 
8). 
Reduced expenditure on public services drove 
up poverty. 
Decentralisation was associated with a new 
focus on districts and district planning.
While there was a continued push to 
formalise property rights systems accom-
panied  by  ‘the possible individualisation’ 
of common property resources (Boone, 
1998: 2), new research highlights that 
contrary to received wisdom, customary 
tenure per se, did not prevent investment 
and that individual/family rights were 
adequately catered for within these 
systems. 
This research also illustrates how earlier 
titling programmes ‘encouraged specula-
tion in land by outsiders’ and often 
displaced the people they were intended 
to protect (Peters, 2004: 274).
Phase 4: 
1990s
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signalled the 
end of the Cold War and rapid globalization of 
capitalist market systems.
 Decentralisation initiatives reflected a new 
impetus towards ‘democratic decentralisation’ 
as a key component of ‘good governance’ 
programmes. 
However there is increasing recognition of how 
decentralisation was also a ‘political mechanism 
by ruling groups to neutralise, contain or seek 
compromises with regional elites’ (Crooke and 
Manor 1994 in Olowu 2001: 11).
World Bank and donor agencies revise 
their negative thinking about customary 
tenure which is now recast as adaptive 
and inclusive (Deininger, 2003). 
This is accompanied by a revalorisation 
of the ‘traditional’ and the local.
New approaches encourage the identi-
fication of local solutions to secure land 
access and rights. 
However this revised approach frequently 
overlooks the new alignment of forces 
between international and local elites and 
the global moves to secure control over 
productive land and natural resources. 
Increasing commercialisation of produc-
tion and alienation of land ‘which usually 
occurs with the collaboration of leaders 
at community level’ (Amanor, 1999: 19).
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populations. Borras and Franco (2009) emphasise that 
it is the institutional arrangements from above (govern-
ment action and policy) that influence what happens 
from below (autonomy and capacity). 
In practice the nature of this redistribution varies 
considerably, as shown in the different forms and 
processes of decentralisation summarised in the boxes 
below.
While some governments are increasingly transfer-
ring functions to local institutions, others maintain 
hierarchical accountability with deconcentration of 
responsibility and authority to regions, provinces or 
districts. However the various types and forms of 
decentralisation often occur simultaneously, follow 
upon one another, or are combined. Decentralisation 
varies in the quantity and the combinations of function, 
responsibility, resources, and administrative, political 
and fiscal autonomy that are vertically transferred to 
either regional, district, municipal governments, or 
other actors (MacLean, 2003).
Since the 1990s, a number of countries across 
Southern Africa have initiated reviews of land poli-
cies and legislation, introduced new approaches to 
land administration and embarked on institutional 
reform towards greater devolution. Increasingly, the 
discourses on land management in the sub-region have 
emphasised decentralisation to the local level in order 
to address governance problems raised by tensions 
between state laws and institutions, on the one hand, 
and ‘customary’ rules and practices, on the other.
Decentralised land governance therefore involves a 
process of negotiating and restructuring power relation-
ships between local people and the state regarding 
access to, control over, and use of land resources. The 
presumption is that local land tenure institutions have 
a greater sensitivity to local circumstances and are 
better able to respond to local land needs because they 
are nearer to local communities and have mandated 
responsibility, and accountability to the whole local 
population (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). 
Democracy, participation and 
accountability
The effectiveness of decentralisation hinges on three 
linked and strongly associated issues: democracy, 
participation and accountability. Democratic decen-
tralisation and community participation often stand at 
Phase 5: 2000 
to the present
The European Commission (EC) observes that 
‘whether by own choice or as a result of external 
pressures, the large majority of third countries 
are currently involved in some sort of decentrali-
sation with varying degrees of commitment and 
success’ (European Commission, 2007: x).
The EC argues that the new reform agenda 
focuses on (i) devolution of power to elected 
local governments as a distinct set of state ac-
tors; (ii) local governance (based on principles of 
participation, transparency and accountability); 
(iii) a new paradigm of local economic develop-
ment; (iv) a rediscovery of the importance of 
territorial (regional) planning; and (v) the overall 
modernisation of the state (ibid)
Rising inequality and differential access 
to land and resources.
Increasing tendency for state institutions, 
including those regulating access to 
land, to serve personal agendas of power-
ful and well connected people.
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Box 2: Processes in decentralisation 
- Devolution is generally considered the broadest form of decentralisation and is often referred to as 
political decentralisation, or democratic decentralisation. It involves the full transfer of responsibility, 
decision-making and resources to an autonomous, local-level public authority that is politically and 
operationally controlled by locally elected officials (lower levels of government). In a devolved system, 
local governments have some degree of political autonomy that is substantially outside direct central 
government control, yet remains subject to general central policies and laws (USAID 2000; MacLean 
2003).  
Deconcentration and delegation are considered to be two types of administrative decentralisation 
(Maclean 2003):
- Deconcentration is the most limited form of decentralisation and is sometimes the first step in a de-
centralisation process. It involves the redistribution of decision-making authority and responsibility over 
policy implementation from one level of government to another – i.e. local units of centralised agencies. 
These structures do not act independently, and central government retains control over resources. 
Hierarchical systems of accountability from local to central government remain intact (Litvack et al 
1998; Gregerson et al 2004).
- Delegation involves transferring responsibilities and authority to organisations that are accountable to 
the central government but are not totally controlled by it – i.e. semi-autonomous authorities.
the centre of an agenda of good governance and can 
be defined as the transfer of powers to elected local 
authorities to enable effective participation of local 
communities in decision-making (Ribot and Larson 
2005; Ribot, 2004). Truly democratic institutions are also 
accountable to their electorate. Local institutions may 
be held downwardly accountable to their constituencies 
through genuine participation of local populations 
(Ribot, 2004).
One of the strongest arguments in favour of decen-
tralisation is that it will increase democracy and result 
in increased participation in civil society activities, as 
people respond to opportunities that enable them to 
make decisions that affect their lives. However the issue 
is whether or not democratic decentralisation leads in 
practice to genuine participation of the poor. On the 
one hand, there are numerous critiques of participation 
(Ranhema, 1993, Cooke and Kathari, 2001, Slocum et 
al., 1998) which highlight how the potentially insurgent 
nature of the concept has been domesticated and main-
streamed. These argue that concepts like ‘community 
participation’ and ‘empowerment’ have degenerated 
into de-politicised ’tools of the trade for governments 
and establishments such as the World Bank’ (Miraftab, 
2004 : 239)  On the other hand, the debate has often 
overlooked the diverse ways in which local people, and 
in particular marginalised citizens, use the opportuni-
ties provided by democratic decentralisation to engage 
local authorities and demand accountability (Dauda, 
2006). Clearly, we need a more critical perspective on 
how ‘community participation’ unfolds under demo-
cratic decentralisation, and why in some cases, it has 
proved to be detrimental to marginalised groups and 
particularly to women and in others, has strengthened 
their access to resources. 
In many rural areas where levels of education are low 
and civil society organisations are weak and poorly or-
ganised, there is a strong risk that transfers of authority 
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and resources may lead to an abuse of power and 
increased vulnerability or marginalisation of individuals 
or groups (Ouedraogo, 2005; Agrawal and Ribot 1999). 
In situations where power is shared, conflicts can arise 
between local and national interests, whether it is 
between government structures or between government 
and other actors such as traditional authorities. The 
danger that each will act in their own narrow interests 
is then all the greater, and how ‘democratic’ the govern-
ance structure really is, then becomes questionable. 
How has decentralised land reform 
worked in the region?
Case studies in the southern African region illustrate 
the complex and dynamic process of decentralisation 
in land governance. Policy reforms in countries such 
as Botswana and Tanzania (where land administration 
is supposed to be carried out by autonomous institu-
tions), suggest that decentralisation has the potential 
to improve land access and security of tenure for the 
poor and to increase gender equity in land rights. 
Practical experience, however, suggests that enormous 
challenges exist around creating local capacity, 
allocating adequate resources, preventing elite capture 
and exclusion, and overcoming the reluctance of 
central government to transfer real authority (Wily, 
2003). Other countries like Madagascar, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Lesotho are moving towards 
greater devolution of powers to give effect to local land 
governance, but concerns are often expressed about 
the capacity of local institutions to fulfil these functions 
effectively.
Introducing the case studies
The three countries selected as case studies have very 
different histories and experiences.
Botswana
When Botswana gained independence from Britain in 
1966 after a peaceful transition from colonial rule, it was 
one of the poorest countries in the world. However, the 
discovery and mining of diamonds provided a stream 
of revenue which has helped the economy to grow 
and diversify, enabling Botswana to achieve the status 
of a middle income country. However this economic 
growth has also been shadowed by rising inequality. 
This inequality has also become a feature characteris-
ing access to, and management of land and natural 
resources. Botswana has experienced uninterrupted 
democratic rule, albeit by the same political party, with 
de facto power held by a small elite. A decision soon 
after Independence led to the establishment of Land 
Boards as local land management bodies. 
The case provides a history of land and agricultural 
policy and a critical analysis of the Land Boards and 
their effectiveness as institutions for decentralised land 
governance. The case focuses on the Chobe District, 
where people occupy portions of land which are 
sandwiched between three protected areas: the Chobe 
National Park, Chobe Forest Reserve and the floodplains 
of the Chobe River. It examines key issues impacting 
on local land governance and land rights management 
from a variety of different perspectives and draws out 
key lessons from the Botswana experience.
Madagascar 
Madagascar has experienced a complex and turbulent 
history, combining resistance and accommodation to 
French rule prior to independence in 1960. Madagascar 
has experienced volatile post colonial politics, including 
socialist policies and economic nationalisation, govern-
ments toppled by military coups, a period of structural 
adjustment, and large political swings. The most recent 
political crisis in 2009 saw President Ravalomanana top-
pled by troops loyal to Andry Rajoelina, who cancelled 
a deal which had been negotiated to lease 1.3 million 
hectares on which to grow maize and establish palm oil 
plantations. 
In March 2004, the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock 
and Fisheries initiated the National Land Programme, 
referred to as the Programme National Foncier (PNF), 
as the main framework for improving  land manage-
ment in the country. This led to the establishment of 
local land offices. The case provides a background on 
Madagascan land governance and decentralisation 
policies, and profiles two rural communes, examining 
the decentralised land governance system in action.
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Mozambique
Mozambique experienced a long history of Portuguese 
colonial occupation and was a major slave trading 
centre in the 18th and 19th Centuries. The Portuguese 
initially lacked the resources to run its colony and 
leased out large portions of the territory to commercial 
trading ventures before assuming direct rule in 1932. 
The Mozambican liberation movement FRELIMO 
undertook an armed struggle to free Mozambique 
from colonial rule, which was achieved in 1975, and 
to establish a socialist republic. Within a short time 
after independence, the country was caught up in an 
externally sponsored conflict which escalated into a 
full scale civil war, displacing an estimated 6.5 million 
people. In 1989, following the collapse of the Soviet 
bloc, Mozambique adopted a multiparty political system 
through which FRELIMO has been returned to govern-
ment in every election held since then.
In 1995 Mozambique developed a new land policy, 
followed by a Land Law in 1997 and Land Regulations 
in 1999. The country put in a place a policy and strategy 
for bio fuels in 2009, an indicator of mounting foreign 
interest in land deals. 
The case highlights how the current market and 
political context tends to favour a national elite in 
partnership with foreign interests seeking to invest in 
‘unused’ land in a setting where there is a progressive 
land law but weak institutional capacity for effective 
decentralised land governance.
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Introduction
When Botswana gained independence from Britain in 
1966, it was one of the poorest countries in the world 
with less than 5 kilometres of tarred roads and just 
three secondary schools (Clover, 2003). The discovery 
and mining of diamonds the following year provided 
a stream of revenue which has enabled the economy 
to grow and diversify, enabling Botswana to achieve 
the status of a middle income country. However, this 
economic growth has also been shadowed by rising 
inequality. Access to land and particularly key range-
land resources is increasingly the preserve of large and 
well-connected livestock farmers. This is despite policy 
and legislative commitments which guarantee citizens 
the right to land in tribal areas, which have been 
expanded from 49% at independence to 71% in 2008 
(White, 2009).
This assessment of decentralised land governance in 
Botswana is divided as follows:
•	 Sections 1 and 2 provide an overview of chang-
ing land policy in Botswana with a particular 
focus on resource tenure and decentralised land 
governance.
•	 Section 3 examines the situation in Chobe District 
where tribal land is allocated by the Chobe Land 
Board and where DITSHWANELO, the Botswana 
Centre for Human Rights runs a land rights 
programme, with case studies in Section 4.
CHAPTER 2: Botswana
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•	 Sections 5 and 6 summarise key issues and 
lessons for decentralised land management which 
emerge from the Botswana experience.
•	 Section 7 provides concluding remarks.
Land policy in pre-independent 
Botswana
During the pre-colonial era, Tswana polities known as 
morafe, or chiefdoms were presided over by hereditary 
dikgosi. The morafe were divided into wards adminis-
tered by a ward head appointed by the kgosi (Ngcongco, 
1989). Tswana society was socially stratified in a number 
of different ways. Digkosi accumulated cattle and ‘lent 
them out’ to ‘commoners’ through the mafisa system 
(people without cattle providing herding labour to those 
with large herds in exchange for benefits such as milk 
and some calves), which commentators argue enabled 
them to ‘create a client class’ (Datta and Murray, 1989: 
60). 
The morafe also incorporated a number of minority and 
subject groups including the Basarwa, the Bakgalagadi 
and Bayei and the Kalanga. The mafisa system also 
played an important role in their incorporation but was 
unable to erase the deep social and economic differen-
tiation which persists in different forms today. 
The British established the Bechuanaland Protector-
ate in 1885 and set about moulding the morafe into 
‘tribal’ reserves and the dikgosi into ‘chiefs’, mirroring 
policies of indirect rule practised elsewhere in Africa 
(Mamdani, 1996). While the British administration kept 
pre-colonial governance structures largely intact in the 
early period of the Protectorate, a number of changes 
were introduced through the process of colonial 
incorporation. 
The colonial era created new means of accumulation 
for chiefs who were entitled to take ‘10 percent commis-
sion on the hut taxes collected for the administration’ 
(Peters, 1994: 38).This enabled them to diversify their 
income streams, while remaining the largest cattle 
owners.  At the same time the spread of education 
and the creation of opportunities in the administrative 
structures of the colonial state created a new modernis-
ing elite which provided the foundation for subsequent 
challenges to chiefly rule and colonial control.
People were able to graze their stock on the commons, 
but the land overseer appointed by the Chief played a 
role in managing the grazing land, in consultation with 
the land users. For example the land overseer ‘might 
suggest that in times of drought people with bigger 
herds should move somewhere else. And they might 
consult with neighbouring land overseers to coordinate 
this move’ (ibid).
Before the 1930s, the extent of the grazing range was 
confined to those areas with seasonal surface water, 
or where the water table was high and wells could be 
Historical land governance in Botswana
 In both the precolonial and colonial periods rights in tribal land were vested in the Chief who had both the 
right and the obligation to allocate land to their tribesmen. There is in customary law a right of avail. You have 
a right to a share of the tribal land. You have a right to build your residence and the right to a piece of land 
to plough. You also have the right to establish a cattle post somewhere and to pasture your animals on the 
commonage. But that right was somewhat modified by the fact that you had to get the approval of the land 
overseer, who was the chief’s man on the ground who had to agree that there was space for you. He would not 
agree to that until he had consulted the other users of the commonage of that particular area.
Your rights to a dwelling site and arable land are exclusive. Once these rights have been allocated you may 
fence the land. You had other rights too. If you wanted to dig a well you had to ask the land overseers’ consent.’
 (Richard White, former chair of the Kgalahadi Land Board interview, 2011)
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dug. Much potential grazing land remained beyond 
the reach of stock owners because of the unavailability 
of water. From the 1930s state money was invested 
to develop deep boreholes with motorised pumps to 
tap into groundwater sources. Improvements in these 
technologies in the 1950s enabled livestock farmers to 
expand into the sandveld. Subsequent borehole invest-
ment was made by the state together with syndicates 
of cattle owners and individuals with large herds. Given 
that access to water was the key factor enabling the 
utilisation of rangeland, the grazing around these new 
water points came to be exclusively utilised by the 
borehole owners. 
The overall thrust of land policy in Botswana post inde-
pendence has been to increase the area of tribal land 
at the expense of both state and freehold ownership.
(Adams et al., 2003: 2). However, as we discuss  below, 
the expansion of the tribal land area conceals the fact 
that much of the grazing commons has effectively been 
privatised through leasehold arrangements.
Land policy post-independence
Decentralising land governance?
The history of independent Botswana is characterised 
by contested narratives about decentralisation. Official 
accounts highlight orderly processes of devolution, 
deconcentration and delegation from Central govern-
ment to district and local institutions. For example a 
recent African Development Bank report describes the 
process of decentralisation in Botswana as follows:
Decentralization in Botswana involves three 
major processes of devolution from central 
government to Local Authorities and Land Boards; 
de-concentration within the central government 
ministries; and delegation from the ministries to 
other agencies and parastatals. The devolved Local 
Authorities are rural and urban local government 
bodies, that is, District Councils, Town Councils, 
and City Councils, which derive their authority and 
functions from the District Councils Act (1965) and 
Townships Act (1955). 
A major boost for decentralisation for local 
development and capacity building was the 
establishment of the District Development 
Committees (DDCs) and Village Development 
Committees (VDCs) in 1970. The weaknesses 
of decentralised local government include lack 
of human capacity and problems of retention of 
qualified, competent and experienced staff. The 
local government authorities have, nevertheless, 
adequate financial resources allocated to them 
through the national budgeting process.
(African Development Bank, 2008: 4)
However there are strong counter narratives which 
question the success of Botswana’s decentralisation 
process, particularly in relation to the Land Boards. 
Some studies argue that ‘the establishment of tribal 
land boards has enabled local elites to centralise 
decisions about land to their own benefit’ (Peters, 1994: 
191).  Peters cites Werbner (1982), who argues that 
the Land Board in North Eastern Botswana actually 
‘replaced a highly decentralised system’ characterised 
by locally negotiated rights and claims.
With independence in 1966 a number of measures were 
taken by the new government to change policy relating 
to land allocation and governance. These included a 
battery of new laws and the establishment of a range of 
new institutions.
The new laws included:
•	 The	State	Land	Act,	1966
•	 The	Chieftaincy	Act,	1966
•	 The	Tribal	Land	Act,1968
•	 The	Customary	Law	Act	1969.
At independence, about 49% of the national land area 
was tribal land, less than 4% was freehold and the bal-
ance was state land (Adams et al., 2003). The promulga-
tion of the Tribal Land Act (TLA) in 1968 marked a major 
shift in the land governance and management system 
while continuing to keep key aspects of customary law 
intact.
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The new modernising political leadership which spear-
headed the drive for political independence set out to 
put in place a new system. Ng’ong’ola (1992) recalls the 
view of the first President of Botswana that customary 
land administration systems could not incorporate 
‘modern concepts and practices in land use’.
The basic premise underpinning land law and policy in 
Botswana is that land itself remains vested in the State. 
The State allocated citizens land through different 
mechanisms including certificates of customary rights 
and common law leases. The rights on the land can be 
transacted, as opposed to the land itself. For example, 
‘The lease on the land can be sold through the property 
market based on the value of the improvements to the 
land, rather than exchanging ownership of the land 
itself’ (Ditshwanelo, 2007).
New institutions were put in place to implement 
the post independence approach to land rights and 
governance.
Democratically elected district councils 
comprising local government were introduced in 
Botswana only after independence in 1966. Before 
independence, tribal councils headed by traditional 
leaders (digkosi) performed limited local 
government functions. These councils included 
some members nominated by the chief and 
some elected by the Kgotla. After independence, 
democratically elected bodies established by 
statutes of parliament replaced these tribal 
councils.
(Sharma, n.d: 3)
The key thrust of the TLA and the Chieftaincy Act was 
to recognise the institution of the digkosi but to limit 
their powers, particularly with respect to the allocation 
of land (Morapedi, 2010). From the 1960s, legislation 
sought to address the ‘imbalances’ resulting from the 
operation of the customary land allocation system 
during the colonial period. There are different views 
about the nature of these imbalances. One highlights 
widespread and systemic imbalances in both rural and 
urban areas:
The system under the Chiefs was very, very 
imbalanced...because once you are nearer the chief 
and once the chief has appointed you to oversee 
the allocation of land you will normally go there 
and designate some areas for your own self. So it 
was full of imbalances. And an average Motswana, 
a moderate Motswana would not get plots, would 
not get land and would not think of even going 
out there to look for land because they were 
suppressed. 
(Ministry of Lands interview, 2011)
In the other view, such imbalances were restricted 
to particular peri-urban areas, but that in most rural 
settings people were able to access land without much 
difficulty.
The extent to which the new system has addressed 
these imbalances remains questionable. New institu-
tions such as the District Councils and the Land Boards 
were established to give effect to the new land admin-
istration system. Comaroff (1982) in Peters (1994) has 
argued that the Land Boards simply ‘became a vehicle 
for further accumulation by a landed elite.’ 
At a broad institutional level Ng’ong’ola  (1992: 140) has 
observed ‘the  persistence of the  gap  between the law 
in the statute book and law in action.’ He notes that 
Land Boards particularly have often failed ‘to supervise 
land dealings and transfers’ (ibid) in peri-urban areas. 
This reflects the acute pressure on land in these areas, 
the existence of informal land markets and the mis-
match between peri-urban land needs and the assump-
tions underpinning Tribal land application procedures.
In the new system the digkosi were rapidly ‘stripped 
of much of the formal authority’ which they enjoyed 
under the Protectorate (Peters, 1994: 47). A House of 
Chiefs was established as part of the post independ-
ence governance structures, but this was primarily an 
advisory body. The dikgosi were recast as paid function-
aries of the State. ‘Kgosi is now a civil servant receiving 
instructions mainly from the government.’ (Mgadla 
and Campbell, 1989: 56). The fact that Seretse Khama, 
the first President of independent Botswana was also 
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the paramount chief of the Bamangwato people was 
an important factor in helping to push through these 
reforms.
As might be expected many dikgosi did not welcome 
the new institutions and the changed approach to 
land management and governance which diminished 
their powers. As an official in the Department of Lands 
observed:
Well after the Land Boards came into operation it 
was a little bit of a problem --- let me say it was a 
huge problem to get the chiefs to understand why 
these Land Boards had been created.
(Ministry of Lands interview, 2011)
The implementation of the Tribal Land 
Act
The Tribal Land Act recognised the land rights which 
people could acquire in terms of existing custom and 
practice. As Richard White explains:
The Tribal Land Act ...did not touch customary 
law. It left it intact. What it changed was who 
was responsible for administering it. It took that 
power away from the Chiefs and gave it to the 
Land Boards which were decentralised. The first 
Land Boards had two District Councillors to make 
sure that there was democratic accountability. The 
Chief was a member which was to minimise the 
chief’s opposition to having the land allocation 
function taken away. Most of the balance of the 
members were appointed by the Minister on the 
recommendation of the District Commissioner 
whose interests were to have a Land Board which 
operated efficiently and fairly because then 
disputes and complaints would not end up on his 
desk.
The TLA provided for ‘the issuing of certificates as 
evidence of customary grants of individual rights for 
wells, borehole drilling, arable lands and individual 
residential plots. The Act also provided for the granting 
of common law leases with the consent of the Minister’ 
(Adams et al., 2003: 4).
The TLA started to be implemented in 1970 and in the 
early years, the Secretary of the District Council acted 
as ex officio Secretary to the Land Board. This effectively 
located the Land Board functions within the District 
Council, but as more skilled people became available 
in the 1980s, the Land Boards began to operate as 
independent entities as envisaged by the legislation. 
Tribal Grazing Land Policy
The TLA was followed by new land use policies which 
aimed to accommodate ‘more modern practices of land 
use, such as more exclusive allocation and utilisation of 
tribal grazing ranges’ (Morolong and Ng’ong’ola, 2007: 
146). 
The enclosure of the commons gathered momentum 
in 1975 with the introduction of the Tribal Grazing 
Land Policy (TGLP). Ostensibly this aimed to address 
rangeland degradation through allocating exclusive 
rights to groups and individuals on land designated for 
commercial ranches.
 As Hitchcock (1980: 2) observes: 
It appears as if the planners have a clear notion of 
the traditional system that must be changed. But it 
is striking that the features most often mentioned 
are negative; a lack of something or a condition 
somehow unrestricted. Above all, government 
reports insist that the traditional system of land 
tenure is structured in such a way that individuals 
lack the incentive to conserve the range.
The approach to rangeland management underpinning 
TGLP reveals the influence of Garrett Hardin’s (1968) 
article ‘The Tragedy of the Commons.’ Hardin’s thesis 
was echoed by Botswana’s first President Sir Seretse 
Khama in 1975 when he stated that ’there is a growing 
danger that grazing will be destroyed by uncontrolled 
use of communal grazing areas by ever growing num-
bers of animals. ... And under our communal grazing 
system it is in no one individual’s interest to limit the 
number of his animals. If one man takes his cattle off, 
someone else moves his own cattle in’(Frimpong, 1995). 
Despite Hardin’s later assertion that the title of his ar-
ticle should have been ‘The Tragedy of the Unmanaged 
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Commons’, an enduring narrative was generated about 
the inevitability of overgrazing and mismanagement 
of communal rangeland which continues to dominate 
rangeland management policy and practice in Bot-
swana today. 
The TGLP tried to address perceived rangeland degrada-
tion by encouraging ranching through the allocation 
of exclusive rights to groups and individuals on newly 
designated farms, which stock owners could access 
through a nominal common law lease. The new policy 
direction was given effect through a World Bank funded 
programme to promote a ‘modern’ cattle ranching sec-
tor.  A substantial portion of the communal grazing land 
was designated for commercial ranches and allocated 
to individuals on 50 year leases (Mathuba, 2003). 
Today there is widespread acknowledgement that the 
enclosure of the commons has effectively instituted a 
system whereby those people who have been allocated 
TLGP farms have acquired dual rights on enclosed 
ranches and on the commons. 
A former District Officer in the Ministry of Lands notes 
that:
Initially the TGLP farms were being rented out 
at 4 thebe hectare. The standard farm was 6400 
ha (8x8 km) and at 4 thebe a hectare this was 
virtually nothing. So ...big cattle owners received 
an additional piece of land which could only be 
accessed by themselves while still having access to 
the communal grazing.        
(Former District Officer interview, 2011) 
Despite the tragedy of the commons thesis there is 
widespread agreement that the allocation of TGLP 
farms has done nothing to improve grazing manage-
ment. If anything the retention of dual rights has 
provided a perverse incentive to accelerate the pressure 
of available grazing. 
An official in the Ministry of Lands expressed concern 
that: 
Mismanagement (on the enclosed farms) is still 
going on. People are over grazing their farms and 
a later stage they take out their livestock to the 
communal areas. This still persists even today.
(Ministry of Lands interview, 2011)
Solway in Datta and Murray (1989) argues that the TLGP 
accelerated the privatisation of land and cattle while 
increasingly limiting the access of the poor to pastoral 
resources - a process which has contributed to the 
growing polarisation of Botswana society. 
The role of the Land Boards
The TLA established Land Boards for specified ‘tribal 
areas’ that corresponded with the original nine ‘native 
reserves’. The Land Boards in each of these areas 
exercise a variety of functions. They allocate land. They 
are responsible for the development of land use plans 
in the areas under their jurisdiction. They approve 
changes in land use as well as land transactions and 
transfers between individuals.  However it is important 
to note that for land use plans to have legal effect they 
still had to be approved by the District Council.
All the land use plans, although they may have 
been developed through the Land Board officially 
have to be adopted by the District Council. If the 
land-use plan has not been adopted by the District 
Council, strictly speaking the Land Board is not 
entitled to allocate land on the basis of that plan. 
(Former District Officer, interview, 2011)
At the same time District Councils took control of 
taxation and stray cattle (matimela) - former functions 
of local kgosi. (Morapedi, 2010, Peters, 1994). 
Subsidising decentralised land 
management services 
The Botswana government has made a significant 
investment in decentralising land management over the 
years. For the average Motswana most of the services 
which the Land Boards provide on tribal land are free. A 
Ministry of Lands official explained that:
You don’t pay anything because the government 
says customary rights are common to all so you 
have the right to own a piece of land across the 
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board. So it’s a free service unless you want to 
change that (customary land light) into a common-
law entity where you want to go to the bank 
and get money and build something there. But 
naturally, customarily every Motswana has a right 
to own a piece of land. So it is a free service. 
(Ministry of Lands interview, 2011)
Revenue sources
Apart from their budgetary allocation from central 
government the Land Boards do have some forms 
of independent revenue. This includes income from 
common-law leases where people pay for commercial 
plots and ranches. Mines also pay an annual land rent. 
However it appears that revenue from such sources 
consistently falls below the costs of keeping the Land 
Boards operating efficiently. This has raised questions 
about the extent of public subsidy required and the 
sustainability of the continued provision of free land 
management services
Changing structures of management 
and representation on the Land Boards
There have been a number of approaches to manage-
ment and representation on the Land Boards since 
their establishment. The membership of the board was 
initially made up of: 
•	 two	members	of	the	District	Council,	elected	by	
the council from amongst its own members to 
represent it on the board;  
•	 the	Chief	of	the	tribe	whose	land	the	board	
administered; 
•	 up	to	12	members	appointed	by	the	Minister	acting	
on the advice of the District Commissioner (the 
number of members varies from one board to 
another); and 
•	 two	ex	officio	members	to	represent	the	Ministries	
of Agriculture and Commerce and Industry (White, 
2009).
However, as time went by steps were taken by the State 
to remove the digkosi and their representatives from the 
Land Boards altogether. This was followed by a period 
where Land Board representatives were elected at 
District level. However this was replaced by the current 
system where people apply to sit on the Land Board and 
are appointed to their positions by the Minister.
The preferred approach has been to professionalise the 
management of the Land Boards. This is consistent 
with the dominant governance approach in Botswana 
which has been characterised as an ‘Administrative 
State’ in ‘which the social order is indistinguishable 
from the administrative order’ (Gundersson in Picard, 
1979). At present the decisions and priorities of the 
Land Board are tightly guided by the Land Board 
Secretary in consultation with the appointed members 
of the Board.
However since 2010 there have been moves to reintro-
duce chiefs or chief’s representatives to the Land Board 
(Molebatsi interview 2011). This can be interpreted as 
Changing representation on the Land Boards
In the early years the kgosi sat on the Land Board. However as time went on there was deemed to be a conflict 
of interest between the kgosi’s continuing role in presiding over customary courts to resolve local disputes and 
their role in land allocation. The Chief was then taken out of the Land Board. 
Other members of the Land Board have at various times been elected through District processes, but this gave 
rise to government concerns that the functioning of the Board was becoming ‘politicised’. This system has 
subsequently been abandoned and replaced by periodic calls for persons to apply to sit on the Land Board. 
Applicants are subsequently selected and appointed by the Minister of Lands and Resettlement.                 
(Richard White interview, 2011)
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a measure to retain the political support of the dikgosi. 
This is consistent with moves by ruling blocs across the 
region to re-emphasise the administrative and political 
role of traditional authorities which Oomen (2005) refers 
to as a process of ‘retraditionalisation’.
Establishment of Sub Land Boards 
It was quickly found that the Land Boards could 
not cope with the volume of work involved in the 
registration of customary land rights. Initially they 
delegated the work back down to headmen, but this 
was unsatisfactory as the whole point of introducing 
the TLA was to democratise the land allocation process. 
The overextension of the main Land Boards led to the 
establishment of subordinate Land Boards in 1973 
to allocate land under customary law for residential 
purposes, ploughing, grazing cattle and other stock 
and for other ‘communal’ uses (Griffiths 2010). This has 
been an ongoing process as Government has tried to 
respond to persistent complaints about the slow pace of 
registration and transfers.  
Applying for a customary land rights 
certificate 
The customary land right application form is repro-
duced below. The applicant must complete the form 
and obtain the signature of the land overseer.
The certificate is accompanied by a sketch map of the 
plot, but as a former District Officer in the Ministry of 
Lands observes: 
One of the major shortcomings of the system to 
start off with was that there was no cadastral 
survey. It really complicates matters. Because 
we don’t have a very strong written history and 
everything is verbal when the older generation 
slowly falls away we have great difficulty in trying 
to recall what was happening and where things 
were. 
(Former District Officer interview, 2011)
White, adds:
Your neighbours and the land overseer are 
supposed to know where (the plot) is but it does 
not always work. One of the big issues is to set 
up a system where you spatially define what 
everybody has. Before the Land Board were created 
allocations were verbal and there are still a lot of 
people occupying land which was allocated on 
this basis who have never felt the need to go to 
the Land Board to obtain a certificate. Without 
the certificate it is possible that people can be 
dispossessed.
(Richard White interview, 2011)
Managing land disputes
Werbner (2004) notes that until 1995 the Land Boards 
still referred appeals which people brought against 
Board decisions to the Minister. But as the volume of 
cases increased, it became clear that an independ-
ent system for managing land related disputes was 
required. While the customary courts were empowered 
to deal with small local disputes, a Land Tribunal was 
established to rule on contested land allocations and 
cases of conflicting and overlapping rights. 
Between 1996 and 2005 an appellant was able to have 
a case heard by the Tribunal at no cost. However in 
recent years the policy has shifted to allow the Tribunal 
to award costs against an appellant who brings a case 
to court and loses. This risks undermining the effective-
ness of the Tribunal as in a land dispute those with the 
resources to hire lawyers are likely to intimidate those 
who cannot afford such services and who fear that if 
they lose they will be saddled with crippling legal costs.
Regulating land leases
A Presidential Commission on Land Tenure report in 
1983 recommending that: 
•	 Commercial	and	industrial	leases	issued	on	tribal	
land should be allocated for a period of 50 years. 
•	 Common	law	leases	could	be	sold	to	another	
citizen without the Land Board having to provide its 
consent for the transaction. 
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Full names of applicant
Postal address Tel: No
5 Man/woman*
Are you a citizen of Botswana Yes/No* ID number
Marital status Married/Single/Divorced/Separated/Widowed*
If married full name of spouse
Name of place where plot applied 
for is
Present use of plot applied for
Size of plot applied for
Proposed used a) Residential b) Ploughing
c) Cemetery d) Others: Specify
Is land applied for debushed?
List in full the names of people you have consulted who hold land bordering the plot for which you are 
applying
List any other land rights you possess anywhere in the Country
Are all the sites mentioned above developed? Yes/No*
I (full name of the applicant) .................................................... state that the above information is complete and 
correct. I understand that the discovery of incorrect or false information on the application shall result in the 
rejection of my application and/or prosecution and/or forfeiture of the plot if already granted to me
Signature of Applicant Date
I (Full name of Land Overseer) confirm that the plot applied for above:
a) has been allocated/not been allocated*
b) its allocation will interfere/not interfere with other people’s rights*
c) the proposed land use will/will not conflict with the land use in the area*
Signature of the Land Overseer Date
*Delete words which do not apply
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•	 Common	law	leases	for	residential	plots	on	tribal	
land should be extended to 99 years to provide suf-
ficient security to enable the owners of residential 
dwellings to apply for mortgage finance. 
•	 If	the	leaseholder	died	his	leasehold	rights	could	
automatically pass to his descendants.
The recommendations recognised a de facto land 
market in land leases which further accelerated after 
their adoption by Government and a further amendment 
to the Tribal Land Act ten years later, which stated that a 
person does not have to come from a particular area to 
apply for land there. 
This has given rise to a situation where people, 
particularly those well versed in the functioning of the 
Land Boards, have been able to acquire plots of land in 
several different areas.  To date there appears to be little 
effective restriction on the acquisition of multiple plots.  
In peri-urban settings this has fuelled fronting and infor-
mal transactions around the transfer of residential plots 
which are in high demand. This has led to a burgeoning 
informal land market which tends to benefit those who 
already have access to resources. As Mathuba  (2003: 
13) has observed:
The laws stipulate the requirements for transfer 
of land rights. However, landholders often find 
ways around these requirements and transfer 
undeveloped land. Transfer of land is rarely ever 
done in favour of the poor or the disadvantaged 
groups. Like fronting, the transfers are mostly to 
those who have the means to buy the land and 
not those who need it - thus creating skewed 
distribution of land.
This has its roots in the recommendations of the Land 
Tenure Commission and has contributed to widening 
inequality and mounting social tension in Botswana 
society.
Enabling women’s independent access 
to land
In its original conception the TLA ‘bore all the hallmarks 
of a patriarchal institution’. Until 1971, husbands 
retained absolute power over their wife’s property 
and estate. (Kalabamu, 2006: 240) Historically, land 
rights were vested in men. Original drafts of the Tribal 
Land Act referred to the land rights of ‘tribesmen’. 
However the increasing prevalence of households 
headed by single women in Botswana prompted NGOs 
and women’s advocacy groups to press for the legal 
recognition of women’s land rights. This issue started 
to gain momentum in the 1980s and became increas-
ingly prominent in the 1990s.  In 1993 an amendment 
to the Tribal Land Act substituted the word ‘citizen’ for 
‘tribesmen’. This change was far reaching on a number 
of fronts. From a gender perspective, it represented 
an important step towards gender equality before the 
law. However, it should be noted that where property is 
inherited ‘tradition still gives unequal succession rights 
to boy and girl children’ (Ntema, 2011). 
The amendment also did away with the tribal basis on 
which the TLA was premised, which had meant that 
people mostly applied for land in the area from which 
they originated. The new legal order meant that citizens 
could now apply to be allocated land located in a tribal 
land area anywhere in the country, irrespective of where 
they resided. 
Eleven years later the Abolition of Marital Power Act 
(2004) abolished the husband’s power of control over 
family property and the acquisition and transfer of 
land (Griffiths, 2010: 7). The 2006 Demographic Survey 
(Government of Botswana, 2009: 26)records that 64.6% 
of the population has never married and that 46.6% of 
the households in the country are headed by women. 
Contemporary research by Griffiths (2010) in Kweneng 
District demonstrates that women are acquiring land 
in their own right through the acquisition of customary 
certificates and leases. Between1999 to 2009, 2 063 
out of 4 041 land certificates and leases issued in the 
District were registered in women’s names (Griffiths, 
2010). DITSHWANELO confirms this trend but cau-
tions that while women may now be able access land 
in their own right, inheritance practice continues to 
discriminate against women and minors. Kalabamu 
also sounds a caution concerning the ‘mutative nature 
of a patriarchal gender system’(Kalabamu, 2006: 244) 
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and its persistence in limiting married women from the 
control and ownership of land.
National Policy on Agricultural 
Development
The National Policy on Agricultural Development 
(NPAD) which was issued in 1991 restated the assertion 
of the TGLP that the growth in livestock numbers on the 
unmanaged commons had caused significant overgraz-
ing and rangeland degradation. This was based on an 
assumption that livestock and vegetation were in equi-
librium and that grazing stock in excess of the carrying 
capacity calculated to maintain this equilibrium would 
result in long term rangeland damage.  Non equilibrium 
approaches to rangeland management (Behnke and 
Scoones, 1992) which hold that ‘rainfall has more 
impact on rangeland productivity than  livestock does’, 
never gained official support in Botswana. 
The NPAD proposed acceleration of the issue of 
exclusive rights over much of the Tribal Land Area 
as a solution to this problem. This was based on the 
assumption that individual livestock owners would 
manage the grazing on ranches which they had been 
allocated more effectively.
Land on the commons in the vicinity of water points 
owned by individuals or syndicates  (de Queiroz, 1993) 
was targeted in terms of this policy, which sought to 
allocate fenced ranches after land use plans had been 
prepared and had been approved by Land Boards. By 
2003 a further 552 ranches had been demarcated under 
NPAD (Mathuba 2003).
With the predominant focus of rangeland management 
policy being on the enclosure and privatisation of the 
commons, critical questions have been raised about 
the impacts this has had on the sustainable manage-
ment of land and natural resources in the remaining 
communal areas and the livelihoods of small scale 
livestock farmers. As noted above, policy awarded dual 
rights to the large ranchers allocated exclusive access 
to ranches and TGLP farms, who continued to be 
able to exercise their customary grazing rights on the 
commons, running their stock there until the grazing 
was exhausted before moving their stock on to private 
land for fattening. Small scale graziers on the com-
mons were left with poor quality grazing for their stock 
which rendered them particularly vulnerable in times of 
drought.
These and other issues were to be addressed as part 
of a comprehensive land policy review which was 
undertaken in 2003. However this review, which made 
detailed recommendations on all aspects of land 
management and suggested alternatives to the system 
of dual rights, was never publicly released. This gave 
rise to speculation that the proposals contained in the 
report, recommending that dual rights be abolished, 
were blocked by large cattle owners who exercise 
significant political influence.
District Development Plans The Department of Physical Planning does District 
economic planning.
Village Development Plans Individual village development plans are prepared by 
the physical development committees within the differ-
ent villages in consultation with Village Development 
Committees.
District Settlement Strategies The District Settlement Strategy is carried out by the 
Department of Town and Regional Planning.
District Integrated Land Use Plans The District Integrated Land Use Plans are prepared by 
the Land Boards and must be approved by the District 
Council.
Table 2: Plans for district development
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During our research it was reported that Cabinet had 
recently approved a new Land Policy. However, at the 
time of writing in August 2011, this was not yet in the 
public domain.
Land use planning
District land use plans prepared by the Land Boards 
are but one of many plans developed at district level. A 
variety of government institutions are responsible for 
plans of different types. The table below highlights the 
array of plans guiding district development.
The Town and Country Planning Act of 1974 is the key 
piece of planning legislation in Botswana. This Act, 
which is modelled on the British planning legislation 
from 1947, has not kept pace with the planning needs 
in Botswana. ‘The major feature of this Act is that it is 
very much centralised. The Minister of Lands has the 
final say’ (Prof Molebatsi interview, 2011).  While the 
Land Boards feature prominently in the discourse on 
decentralised land governance Molebatsi cautions that:
We have many players but a lot of centralisation. 
When it comes to land allocation yes there are 
many players. But at the end of the day everything 
is centralised. I am not sure that there is much 
decentralisation in the way that land is allocated.        
 (Prof Molebatsi interview, 2011)
Perspectives from Chobe District
Having outlined some of the key features of the over-
arching land policy and governance environment above, 
we now examine how these factors play themselves out 
in the Chobe District setting.
The research in Chobe involved:
•	 interviews	with	DITSHWANELO	staff	responsible	
for the organisation’s land rights programme;
•	 a	meeting	with	the	Chairman	of	the	Chobe	Land	
Board together with the Land Board Secretary;
•	 a	meeting	with	the	Acting	District	Commissioner	
and officials from the State Land Allocation Com-
mittee; and
•	 meetings	in	three	different	settlements	with	the	
kgosi, or subkgosi, the land overseer and members 
of the local community knowledgeable about the 
process of land allocation and governance.
The aim of the research was to hear a variety of local 
voices and to reflect on practical land governance 
practices.
Chobe District is relatively small compared to many 
other Districts in Botswana. People in the District 
occupy portions of land which are sandwiched between 
three protected areas: the Chobe National Park, Chobe 
Forest Reserve and the floodplains of the Chobe River. 
It receives a rainfall of more than 650mm per annum 
and is the highest rainfall area in Botswana, most 
suitable for growing rain fed crops, particularly maize 
and sorghum (Jones, 2002). Some 25 000ha have been 
targeted for commercial agricultural production in the 
Pandamatenga area (African Development Bank, 2008).
Chobe is also a prime tourist destination with tourist 
lodges along the river which accommodate foreign 
visitors who visit the Park and view game from the river. 
The town of Kasane is the hub of wildlife tourism in 
Figure 2: Districts in Botswana
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Northern Botswana (Jones, 2002). Wildlife, particularly 
elephants, is not confined to the Park. They migrate 
between different wildlife areas. Elephants and buffalo 
frequently destroy crops while predators kill livestock.
Tribal land in Chobe constitutes a third of the total land 
area in the District while the remaining two thirds are 
designated as state land – mainly national park and de-
clared forest reserves. There are a number of villages in 
the area including Kazungula, Lesoma, Pandamatenga, 
Mabele and Parakarungu. 
People in the area derive their livelihoods from a variety 
of sources. Subject to land availability, they can access 
plots for arable agriculture through the Land Board. 
The minimum plot size allocated for arable agriculture 
is 12.5ha and the maximum is 39.5ha (Chobe Land 
Board interview, 2011). The Botswana government is 
encouraging what it terms ‘cluster farming’ which 
encourages people to form groups who may apply for 
up to 150ha. People in villages close to the river are 
involved in fishing.
People raise some livestock although Chobe falls into 
a red zone for foot and mouth, a disease carried by 
buffalo (Jones, 2002). This restricts the sale of livestock, 
which can only be sold on local markets. The combina-
tion of foot and mouth disease and tsetse fly limits the 
extent of livestock holdings. In this setting there is a 
significant tension between conservation and agricul-
tural livelihoods.
Some revenue is derived from community trusts 
involved in community based natural resource manage-
ment partnerships with tourism or safari companies. 
Five villages within the Chobe enclave, Kachikau, 
Kavimba, Mabele, Satau and Parakarungu formed 
village trusts that are represented on the Board of the 
Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust, which manages 
wildlife quotas on behalf of local villages (Jones, 2002). 
However, local informants argued that very little of this 
income is finding its way back to realise meaningful 
benefits for people in local communities. 
The Chobe Land Board
The Chobe Land Board is responsible for land allocation 
and management on tribal land in the District. Land 
Board Secretary, GG Moepeng and Board Chairman, 
Nelson Masule provided background on the work and 
structure of the Chobe Land Board:  
We are responsible for land allocation, 
consideration of disputes, complaints, transfers, 
change of use, additional uses, even compliance to 
development because you know we allocate and 
we have to see to it that people comply. Even if we 
have allocated a residential site we have to see to 
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it that the site is used for residential purposes and 
nothing else. So that is our responsibility and we 
have to monitor that time and again. 
(Chobe Land Board interview, 2011)
They explained that the Chobe Land Board is a fully 
fledged Land Board. Because the area of tribal land is 
relatively small compared to the proportion of State land 
in the District, there is no need for a Sub Land Board. 
The Board normally has ten members but in Chobe it is 
operating with eight. Members of the Board sit six times 
a year. They elect their own chairperson annually and al-
locate people to sit on various development committees 
where the Land Board is represented. The Secretary, as 
the Accounting Officer, is responsible for the execution 
of the Board’s mandate and implementing decisions 
made at Board meetings, together with compiling and 
presenting the budget. Board members are account-
able to the Minister and are appointed for staggered 
time periods of three and four years each to maintain 
institutional memory and ensure operational continuity. 
The Board Secretary reports directly to the Permanent 
Secretary in the Department of Lands. People seeking 
access to state land approach the District State Land 
Allocation Committee, which falls under the Depart-
ment of Lands.  
The Land Board combines technical departments, 
including mapping and surveying and administrative 
departments, including records management, account-
ing and supply. The Board operates in terms of the TLA 
and can formulate its own local policies in consultation 
with District Council.
In the day to day execution of its tasks, the Land Board 
works closely with the Department of Physical Planning 
(DPP) which is based in the District Council. The Land 
Board prepares a holistic land use plan for different 
areas under its jurisdiction while the DPP is responsible 
for preparing the detailed layouts. 
The Chobe Land Board currently employs 77 staff. 
Central Government has delegated human resource 
management responsibilities for staff on lower salary 
scales, to the Land Board Secretary who is responsible 
for hiring, firing, training, transferring and promoting   
junior and lower level management staff. However, the 
appointment and management of more senior posts 
remains the responsibility of the Ministry.
With regard to the role of digkosi on the Land Board, the 
Secretary confirmed that once again, ‘according to the 
new appointments to Board we will either have chiefs 
or their representatives on the Board’. This would seem 
to confirm the resilience of the digkosi in Botswana, to 
which Nyamnjoh (2003: 96)  attributes a ‘fascinating 
inherent dynamism and negotiability that guarantees 
both resilience and renewal of its institutions.’
Local level co-ordination
The District Commissioner who reports directly to the 
office of the President acts as the district coordinator 
for all development activities planned in the district. 
Development co-ordination takes place in a number of 
fora including: 
•	 a	Plan	Management	Committee	where	the	District	
Council, the District Commissioner, the Land Board 
Secretary and the Tribal Administration meet; 
•	 District	Development	Committees	where	all	
the authorities are represented and the district 
development plan is discussed; and
•	 a	District	Land	Use	Planning	Unit	which	brings	
together a range of other departments. 
Contrary to the concerns expressed by other actors 
about lack of co-ordination in development planning, 
the Land Board Secretary was of the view that:
Here the system is working very well. Things must 
be scrutinised thoroughly before they are being 
implemented. The District Commissioner plays 
a key role in that process to ensure coordination. 
Some of the things we do are visible and others are 
invisible. For example with regard to development 
you can see a village growing up slowly, slowly. 
Even though it is not fast they have still have the 
opportunity to grow. People really understand 
the procedures and regulations although we still 
encounter some lack of lack of understanding 
here and there. Things are going well because 
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Land allocation processes managed by the Chobe Land Board
The Board Secretary described the processes of application for customary and common law land rights:
Each and every Motswana has the right to tribal land. If you are 21 years and above you have the right to apply. 
If you are below that you need to have reasons to substantiate your request to be given land at that age. You 
would need to complete an application form. We have customary and common law application forms. So it’s 
up to the person to choose which one. But basically they mean the same thing because you are applying for 
the same land. For the customary one the applicant has to consult with the land overseer who is the repre-
sentative of the chief. The land overseer is not a paid official. but they receive some compensation for their 
time from the land board. But when we have these pre-demarcated plots there is no need for this consultation. 
After the person has met the requirements set out on the form, the application is submitted to the Land Board 
where it is registered. Normally a period of 21 days is given before the applicant is invited for an interview. The 
purpose of the interview is to extract more information from the person, confirm the availability of land and 
commit the person to ownership of the land. The person who takes ownership of land also acquires some 
responsibilities in terms of the Act. The plot must be demarcated within six weeks of being approved and, if it 
is a customary application, it should be developed within five years. If it is a common law application the land 
must be developed within two years. Common-law applications are usually for business premises, hence the 
stipulation that the property must be developed within a shorter time frame.
So after the interview, because of the schedule of the Land Board, sometimes it takes two or three weeks 
before approval. Then there will be a site visit if the plots are not already demarcated. If the plots are already 
demarcated then people are simply allocated as we have the layouts on the table. People have to go and be 
shown their plot. Thereafter they are given their certificate. Customary certificates must be signed by the 
Board Chairman or the Secretary while common law leases must be signed by the Minister.
For commercial leases people pay a lease rental which is calculated according to the size of the plot. There is a 
formula which is being applied for this purpose. But as for the customary certificates there are no fees. That’s 
where we get the distinction between the common law and the customary because customary you don’t pay 
and it’s for an indefinite period, while the lease you pay and it is for a fixed period. The lease period for residen-
tial sites is 99 years and for commercial it is 50 years, but the period can vary according to the class.
There are also applications for noncitizens which are part of our jurisdiction. They follow the same procedure, 
but after the Land Board has considered they have to make recommendations to the Minister so that he can 
consent to that. That’s when we prepare the leases. 
(Chobe Land Board interview, 2011)
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people are being consulted. Where they don’t 
like they indicate. We also see that there’s a lot 
of preservation of wildlife and because of the 
coordination we’re having we maintain that in 
existence. And of course we are enjoying the 
outside world admiring us. Even the land itself – we 
don’t give it out just like we are issuing some 
sweets. Consideration is made.  So I take it these 
are our achievements.
 (Chobe Land Board interview, 2011)
The Chobe Land Board also acknowledged a number of 
challenges. These included:
•	 a	shortage	of	land	which	required	the	Land	Board	
to negotiate for the release of the portion of the 
forest reserve to enable people to access land in 
certain areas;  
•	 some	constraints	with	regard	to	lack	of	resources	
for monitoring that land awarded is properly 
utilised.
DITSHWANELO’s Land Rights 
Programme
DITSHWANELO (The Botswana Centre for Human 
Rights) is a Botswana human rights organisation 
established in 1993. It established an outreach office in 
Kasane, following a direct request from the Basarwa/ 
San community in the area. However Richard Kash-
weeka, the manager of the Kasane office explained that 
the services of the programme have been extended to 
all marginalised people who ‘lack self esteem to be able 
to confidently interact with land authorities and who 
do not have a clear understanding of procedures to be 
followed to access land or protect their land once it is 
allocated to them’ (Richard Kashweeka interview, 2011).
DITSHWANELO land rights programme officers, Musha-
nana Nchunga and Onalethuso Ntema described how 
the programme combines local level interactions with 
villagers and processes which engage directly with the 
authorities. DITSHWANELO have organised a variety 
of programmes, seminars and conferences to raise 
land rights related issues with government officials and 
other actors.
DITSHWANELO points out that officials often have a 
limited understanding of the needs and concerns of the 
poor. They observe the changing context characterised 
by accelerating social inequality and the progressive 
commodification of land (Peters, 2007). Overall the 
programme seeks to provide protection against the 
‘greed amongst those who are well off which results 
in the grabbing of land and related resources from the 
poor’ (Richard Kashweeka interview, 2011).
DITSHWANELO argues that in the Chobe district there 
is a particular need to balance conservation with socio 
economic rights and development. Many people have 
very limited access to land because they are trapped 
between conservation areas and commercial farms. In 
this context DITSHWANELO provides support as part 
of the Technical Advisory Committee to assist Com-
munity Trusts to get maximum benefits from the wildlife 
resources they are allocated. They lobby to degazette 
portions of the forest reserve to ensure that people can 
access sufficient land to meet their needs. They also 
try and find ways to mediate the animal/human conflict 
which contributes to an increase in the poverty of poor 
households whose livelihoods derive from cropping and 
livestock. 
Richard Kashweeka
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In Chobe elephants can walk anywhere they like. 
Government gives land, seed and tractors, but once 
people have ploughed and planted and their crop is 
grown large game comes and wipes everything out.
 (Richard Kashweeka interview, 2011)
The land rights programme focuses on the socially and 
economically marginalised. DITSHWANELO places 
particular emphasis on Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR) methodology which they argue is well rooted in 
Tswana society. ADR is premised on getting parties in 
dispute around the table to talk matters through and 
jointly identify mutually acceptable solutions by means 
of facilitated discussion. 
We start by assisting people to find local solutions. 
If this fails then we explore other options. The other 
option is to go to the Kgotla – the traditional court. 
If people are not satisfied we can take matters to 
the Customary Court of Appeal. If they are still not 
satisfied and people require a lawyer, we refer them 
to the legal clinic at the University of Botswana or 
we assist them to identify a human rights lawyer 
who charges a low rate.  Sometimes the matter has 
to go to the High Court – particularly in cases of 
inheritances.
 (Richard Kashweeka interview, 2011)
In the case of land disputes where the Land Board’s 
attempts at resolution have been unsatisfactory, 
DITSHWANELO assists parties to appeal to the Land 
Tribunal and if necessary, from there to the higher 
courts.
Richard Kashweeka (interview, 2011) observes that:
Most people don’t want to go through court 
system as it is too expensive. If the matter involves 
land we will involve the Land Board, the Social 
and Community Development Officers from 
Council together with somebody from District 
Commissioner’s office. 
DITSHWANELO has also been involved in action 
research related to land problems and has played a role 
in policy development and review, including reviews of 
land, tourism and community-based natural resource 
management (CBNRM) policies and the development of 
the first forest policy in Botswana. 
In everything we are doing the main thing is that 
the marginalised are protected and their rights are 
promoted. Protection and promotion of the land 
rights of the marginalised to us is key. Our goal is 
to make sure that land is equitably distributed and 
not skewed toward the rich. It is a great challenge.
 (Richard Kashweeka interview, 2011)
Village voices
We visited three separate villages with very different 
histories and located in different settings:
•	 Kazungula	–	a	peri-urban	village	close	to	the	ferry	
crossing to Zambia at the confluence of the Chobe 
and the Zambezi rivers;
•	 Pandamatenga	–	a	village	close	to	Zimbabwe	
border and the Matetsi Safari Area; and
•	 Mabele	–	a	village	accessed	through	the	Chobe	
National Park on the Chobe River and adjacent to 
the Chobe Forest Reserve and close to the Namib-
ian border. 
We held focus groups discussions in Kazungula and 
Mabele with the kgosi, the land overseer and local 
residents. In Pandamatenga, we were only able to 
conduct an interview with the local kgosi.
Kazungula
History of the area
Members of the Kazungula focus group traced the ori-
gins of the village to the activities of WENELA, a South 
African mine recruitment agency which set up an office 
there in the 1930s. However, development only started 
to happen in this area after the 1960s when Botswana 
became independent. As tourism activities expanded in 
Chobe so jobs were created and more people settled in 
the area. Mr Balemogeng estimated that the population 
of Kazungula was currently about 3 000 people. No 
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Figure 4: Kazungula village
Mr Balemogeng: Deputy sub-chief 
Kazungula village Kazungula Land Overseer
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accurate information was immediately available about 
the number of households.
Declining role of agriculture
Informants reported that agriculture had played an 
important role in local livelihood strategies in the 
past, but small scale agricultural activity has declined 
sharply over the years. A key factor contributing to the 
decline of small scale agricultural production was game 
encroachment. Currently, households derive their most 
of their income through poverty alleviation programmes 
and household members in formal employment. Many 
people in Kazungula now regard themselves as urban 
dwellers although some people continue to keep stock 
and are involved in some agricultural activity. 
Access to natural resources
People also have access to the Forest Reserve to collect 
firewood and harvest medicinal plants, but only if these 
are for personal use. Commercial harvesting requires 
paying for a permit which is issued by the relevant de-
partment for a set fee. The land overseer reported that 
he played no role in such things which he said were 
the responsibility of forestry and wildlife officials. While 
local residents are supposed to derive benefits through 
the community trusts which have been established 
as part of the broader CBNRM initiative discussed 
above, people stated that the benefits were erratic and 
unevenly spread. However some examples were cited, 
where the Trust had identified destitute people and 
constructed shelter for them. Money from the Trust was 
also used to maintain local community facilities. 
Land allocation processes
Land allocation in Kazungula village almost exclusively 
involves residential sites. In 2010 the land overseer 
reported that about 600 applications had been received 
and forwarded to the Land Board. All applications were 
for residential stands. In the previous 18 months not a 
single application had been received for agricultural 
land. The kgosi and the land overseer were reluctant 
to estimate the gender breakdown of the applications 
for residential stands. They stated that no local records 
were kept of applications. These were held by the Land 
Board which kept all data on land. They confirmed that 
applicants were not required to pay anything as part 
of the application process. The land overseer reported 
receiving an honorarium of 170 pula per day (US$25) 
when allocating sites. 
Generally the kgosi and members of the focus group felt 
that the dikgosi and local people had little real power 
when it came to the allocation of land: 
The Land Board has been given power by the 
government to allocate the land. We kgosis we 
don’t have any power. If they do anything we just 
look on them only.
Some people keep cattle and small stock which graze 
nearby – in the village and surrounds. The focus group 
members said that they had applied to be allocated 
grazing land but that this had not been approved as 
yet. People stated that a land shortage might require 
degazetting a portion of the forest reserve.
The land overseer stated that the government is 
encouraging cluster farming and that Kazungula 
residents had come together to acquire land to plough, 
but the Land Board had told them that they should go 
and plough at Pandamatenga which is far from where 
they stay. Apparently the Land Board had stated that 
land adjacent to the community has been set aside for 
other purposes. People felt that the land use plan was 
not taking into account their needs and that it was not 
clear how they could influence this.
Land Board performance
In their discussion about the performance of the Land 
Board, residents of Kazangula noted that waiting 
periods could vary substantially from person to person. 
It was stated that some people seemed to have the 
connections to get their applications to the front of 
the queue. Concerns were also expressed about local 
people fronting for others to enable them to gain access 
to residential stands which were quickly resold.  
Pandamatenga
Pandamatenga village is sandwiched between the 
Zimbabwean border and a commercial farming area.
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The surrounding area has been the target of various 
government programmes to increase cereal produc-
tion since the 1980s when some 25 000 ha were 
initially allocated to ‘farmers associations’.. However 
the prevalence of flooding in the area and the lack of 
roads and drainage infrastructure meant that much of 
the land was never brought in to production (African 
Development Bank, 2008). 
A large infrastructure development worth about US$70 
million was launched in September 2010 to construct 
a water drainage system and a new road network 
to improve access to the farms in the area, and will 
cover more than 27 500 hectares of farmland. (African 
Development Bank, 2008). The project area has been 
divided into three separate blocks: 
•	 Central	farms	–	16000	ha
•	 Southern	farms	–	9000	ha
•	 Small	scale	farms	–	2500	ha.
Figure 5: Padamatenga village
Figure 6: Pandamatenga Commercial farming area (African Development Bank, 
2008: Annex 1)
34 Decentralised land governance: Case studies  and local voices from Botswana, Madagascar and Mozambique
In the new plan, 245 households will access the areas 
set aside for small scale production while 21 farmers 
will have access to the remainder. According to the 
African Development Bank (ADB), the Project will en-
courage the Chobe Land Board to promote a preference 
toward women in the smallholder allocation process.
A kgosi’s perspective
In Pandamatenga we spoke to Kgosi Banika who is 
the kgosi for the area. She explained how the village 
originated in the 1890s when a white trader opened 
a shop in the area. She highlighted how historically 
the area was predominantly inhabited by San people. 
During the 1950s the Colonial Development Company 
developed farms in the area to feed cattle which they 
purchased in Ngamiland before selling them on to an 
abattoir in Northern Rhodesia. 
Kgosi Banika noted that Pandamatenga is one of the 
most diverse settlements in the country, with a total of 
eight ethnic groups comprising the village population 
of 250 households. These include the original San, the 
Bananjwa who came in 1937, Ndebele who settled in 
the 1950s, Lozi from Zambia and Basubiya from the 
other side of District as well as other groups. With the 
opening up of the commercial farms in the 1980s, there 
was also an influx of white farmers into the area.
Kgosi Banika Kgosi Banika provided her perspective on how things 
had changed in Botswana after independence. 
The kgosi and land allocation
The kgosi used to have powers over land. That 
was very important. But then changes in the law 
meant that there were no more tribesmen only 
citizens. During the colonial era a person could 
not move from one area to another without a letter 
introducing him to the kgosi of the other area. 
Nowadays someone can come to stay here and I 
won’t know about it. They can apply for land and I 
won’t even know who they are. The only time I will 
know who they are is when they have a problem 
and they need assistance. This has eroded our 
powers.
 (Kgosi Banika interview, 2011)
According to Kgosi Banika she currently plays a 
minimal role in allocating land and has no relationship 
with the Land Board.
If someone applies for land the application passes 
through the land overseer who is appointed by the 
Land Board as well as the community. Only the 
land overseer has to sign the application. The kgosi 
does not have to sign. Most of the time the Land 
Board predemarcates plots in Pandamatenga which 
are then advertised and people apply.
As the kgosi I don’t have any say in the allocation. 
Also I don’t play a monitoring role - the Land Board 
does that. Kgosis were involved in the Land Board 
up until the 90s. I was once a Board member. Then 
the forms were signed by the kgosi, but then I don’t 
know what happened. There was a directive from 
the Minister taking out the kgosi.
(Kgosi Banika interview, 2011)
Kgosi Banika also reported that land disputes were 
taken to the Land Board or the Magistrate’s Court rather 
than being settled at the village kgotla or customary 
court. ‘I have been in office for 10 years and I have never 
heard a dispute around a land matter.’ 
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Local land shortage
The kgosi described the high rate of unemployment 
in the area, noting that the wages on the commercial 
farms are very low, which provided people with little in-
centive to work there. She observed that it was now very 
difficult to get land in Pandmatenga – particularly since 
the area had been identified to spearhead national 
arable production. She described how 58 ploughing 
fields had been advertised and 3 000 people had applied 
for these plots from all over the country. The people 
who were successful were eventually selected through 
a raffle. 
Land access favours the wealthy and 
well connected
Kgosi Banika argued that the qualification criteria 
which applied to the allocation of the nearby farms 
favoured outsiders with money and resources:
You first have to buy a tender document for 500 
pula (US$72). Then you have to make a business 
proposal and have a financial statement from the 
bank. It is not each and every community member 
who can get a certified financial statement. This 
makes it impossible for the people in the village 
to get a farm. People have to apply like any other 
citizen in the country regardless of whether you are 
staying there or not.
 (Kgosi Banika interview, 2011)
Vulnerability of the poor to downward 
raiding
Because both residential plots and arable land are in 
short supply there is a flourishing local land market, but 
Kgosi Banika argued that this was serving to further 
marginalise the poor.
Some local residents have resorted to selling the 
fields which they have been allocated. This means 
at the end of the day some of our people will end up 
by having not even a residential plot and not having 
a field which she or he inherited from their father. 
Very often people don’t know the value of the land 
which they are selling. They may sell their land 
Fields in the commercial farming area Fields of Pandamatenga villagers
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for 10,000 pula, 5000 pula or 2000 pula – whatever, 
because they need cash for a day or two, and then 
that person is landless... Despite all the attempts to 
control this, the selling is ongoing
(Kgosi Banika interview, 2011)
The situation in Pandamatenga highlights the vulner-
ability of local residents to ‘downward raiding’ - a 
phenomenon impacting on both the urban and rural 
poor. In these settings ‘low income households often 
sell land cheaper because of crisis-sales (as money is 
needed quickly) or because of a greater fear of reprisal 
because they are selling land they do not own’ (Thirkell, 
1996). Currently it appears that there is no system to 
monitor the land sales or to indicate fair market value 
per hectare in any particular area. 
Dysfunctional CBNRM institutions
Kgosi Banika also spoke about how the poor were 
not benefiting adequately from local land and wildlife 
resources. She attributed this to the poor governance in 
local development institutions such as the community 
trusts established to manage funds obtained from 
wildlife lodges and safaris. 
The Trust is not working well. No AGM has been 
held. Sometimes all the money just disappears into 
thin air. A lot of money is going to the community 
trust and the people are not gaining any benefit. 
The money does not go to the community because 
of the people who have been elected by the 
community -- the board members they are the 
problem. The most unfortunate part of it is that 
every two years when they are elected, they elect 
different people, but the same type of people who 
are working for their own pocket. Sometimes we 
just feel like crying. 
(Kgosi Banika interview, 2011)
Kgosi Banika noted that these problems were wide-
spread and had also affected the Village Development 
Committees in Pandamatenga. While it needs to be 
recognised that the situation in Pandamatenga which 
is represented here is largely a representation of the 
kgosi’s perspectives, her views resonate with the 
broader literature and views articulated by other village 
level actors in Chobe.
Mabele
In Mabele we met with Kgosi Yambwa, the land 
overseer, Mr K Tidimalo and a group of local villagers. 
Different informants provided perspectives of the 
history of the village which originated in the early 1900s. 
Figure 7: Mabele village
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Mabele’s proximity to the Namibian border meant that 
in the early years there had been some conflict over 
land with the neighbouring Hereros who had eventually 
returned to Ngamiland.
Changing land allocation and 
governance procedures
Informants described how land was allocated in the 
years prior to the Land Board. In the early years people 
simply identified and made use of land according to 
their needs as there was little pressure on the resource. 
As time went by the kgosi’s permission was required 
before land could be allocated, but informants stressed 
the deciding role of the elders gathered in the kgotla 
and the consultative nature of this process. 
The establishment of the Land Board resulted in ‘great 
changes’. Now everybody had to acquire land through 
the Land Board. The establishment of the Chobe 
National Park and the Chobe Forest Reserve during the 
1960s impacted significantly on local people. Mabele is 
located on a narrow strip between the park, the forest 
reserve and the river. 
Tsheko, a Muchenje farmer with 
DITSHWANELO’s Richard Kashweeka
Kgosi Yambwa and Rick de Satgé 
during the focus grouping in Mabele 
village.
Mabele village – the view from the 
kgotla towards the river and the 
Namibian border
Mr K Tidimalo, Land Overseer for 
Mabele village  and villagers gather for 
focus group session
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This affected our pastoral and arable agriculture 
and restricted our grazing.
(Mabele focus group, 2011)
Informants noted that the Land Board did not auto-
matically issue certificates which recognised people’s 
pre-existing rights in land. In certain instances the 
Land Board repossessed certain pieces of land if its 
uses did not fit with the Land Use Plan for the area 
developed by the Land Board. Informants argued that 
this plan had not been developed with their involvement 
and that they had been consulted after the fact. They 
also criticised the process for registering land rights 
held by families which predated the passing of land 
law. People with long term occupation rights were 
required to go through the same process as those 
people who applied for new sites. Some people stated 
that they were not happy with this approach and had 
not approached the Land Board to formally record their 
rights. DITSHWANELO expressed concern that there 
those households whose de facto land rights were not 
recorded could be vulnerable to land grabs by persons 
from outside the area.
Of key concern to people in Mabele were the implica-
tions of the amendment of the TLA which substituted 
citizens for tribesmen and which gave Batswana from 
all over the country the rights to acquire land in the 
tribal areas irrespective from where they originated. 
Linked to this was the problem that ‘some people in the 
community are selling land without consultation and 
as a community we do not condone this’ (Mabele focus 
group, 2011).
One man spoke about how his neighbour had sold land 
to a businessman who was not from the area without 
following the procedures set out by the Land Board. He 
alleged that ‘Forms can jump over the land overseer and 
go straight to the Land Board.’ He argued that transac-
tions with outsiders can bring problems for local people 
as ‘lodges and livestock do not go together’ (Mabele 
focus group, 2011).
Generally in Mabele, informants expressed scepticism 
about the operations of the Land Board characterising 
it as distant from the people and out of touch with what 
was happening on the ground. People were critical 
about how they had to go to the Land Board to address 
land matters and that officials from the Board did not 
come to them. They said that there were a lot regula-
tions established by government but that very few of 
them were enforced.
Although members of the focus group at Mabele clearly 
recognised and understood the functions of the Land 
Board and its procedures, they expressed concerns 
about how local control over land matters had been 
eroded and bureaucratised and how the current system 
of land governance had opened up access to land in 
the area to people from outside at the expense of local 
needs. Members of the focus group questioned the 
extent to which the Land Board effectively engages 
with local people and whether the process of land use 
planning undertaken by the Board addresses local 
development needs and priorities.
Assessing decentralised land 
governance in Botswana
Meinzen-Dick et al (2008: 1) argue that ‘it is critical to 
distinguish among the reforms that are referred to as 
decentralization according to the type of institution 
to which authority or functions are devolved.’ Their 
typology distinguishes between: 
•	 deconcentration	or	administrative	decentralisa-
tion where authority is retained by the State and 
accountability is upwards to central government;
•	 democratic	decentralisation	to	elected	local	
government; and 
•	 privatisation
Democratic decentralisation or 
administrative deconcentration?
The establishment of the Land Boards in Botswana 
has long been held up as a model of decentralised 
land governance. However, our analysis suggests 
that Botswana has instead put in place a process of 
administrative deconcentration that saw the establish-
ment of the Land Boards as new local State institutions 
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which initially marginalised traditional authorities 
but retained strong upward accountability to central 
government. The accountability of the Land Boards to 
the landholders in their area of jurisdiction remains 
weak. The combination of upward accountability and 
the opening up of eligibility criteria to allow citizens to 
access land irrespective of where a person resides has 
created a space of opportunity for the wealthy and the 
administratively savvy. It renders the poor more vulner-
able to domestic land grabbing in a context where land 
is becoming an increasingly valuable commodity. 
The balancing act
Central government has had to address a range of 
responsibilities to:
•	 give	effect	to	the	national	commitment	to	develop	
a liberal democracy which protects the rights of 
citizens;
•	 secure	the	entitlement	of	citizens	to	land;	
•	 respond	to	the	need	for	transparent	land	govern-
ance and administration;
•	 manage	rapid	urbanisation	and	the	growing	land	
market in urban and peri-urban areas;
•	 recognise	and	accommodate	the	socially	embed-
ded institution of dikgosi in Botswana society; 
•	 address	growing	criticism	from	minorities	that	the	
way in which the institution of dikgosi had been 
constituted in law has privileged  the dominant 
Tswana merafe at the expense of numerous minor-
ity and historically subject groups; and
•	 respond	to	rapidly	changing	household	demo-
graphics which increased the demand by women 
to be able to access land independently. 
Discourses of democracy and 
citizenship
As we have seen, the establishment of the Land Boards 
and District Councils was one of the modernising 
thrusts associated with Independence. Werbner (2004: 
110) identifies a post colonial consensus between 
‘leading politicians, senior civil servants and prominent 
entrepreneurs’ who wanted to overhaul land administra-
tion to bring  ‘the many tribes of the colonial protector-
ate into one democratic nation under an elected govern-
ment.’ Werbner (2004) cites Masire to the effect that the 
new system of land governance would end ‘the arbitrary 
decisions of chiefs’. 
Initially the TLA was a legal codification of a patriarchal 
system of land rights management and governance 
(Kalabamu, 2006). The subsequent amendment of the 
TLA in 1993 to substitute ‘citizen’ for ‘tribesman’ has 
simultaneously strengthened and weakened entitle-
ments to land. Together with other legislation, the 
amendment has enabled more and more women to 
access land in their own right. However, at the same 
time it has opened to door to outsiders acquiring land 
in localities to which they had no prior connection or 
claim. As we see from the Chobe case study this has 
led to sales of land to outsiders without local consulta-
tion, which has the potential of undermining local 
access to resources and eventually diminishing security 
of tenure. Persistent concerns emerging from residents 
in Chobe highlighted the erosion of local control over 
land matters. They highlighted how wealthy outsiders 
were gaining access to land at the expense of local 
needs, sometimes without observing due process.
As discussed above, the system which has been put in 
place ensures that certificates of customary land rights 
on tribal land are freely accessible through relatively 
simple application procedures. There is no restriction 
on the amount of land for which an individual can apply. 
The key question is: Who benefits from a dispensation 
where people can access tribal land in different areas 
across the country? 
Available evidence suggests that it is the political and 
economic elite who are positioned to secure benefits 
through the system by acquiring property portfolios 
of Tribal land and profiting from the developing and 
trading of these assets, particularly in peri-urban areas. 
Likewise, access to grazing land is marked by increas-
ing inequality with a relatively small number of livestock 
producers gaining exclusive rights on large tracts 
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of land – something which favours those who are 
wealthier and better positioned to meet the application 
criteria for ranches and farms allocated for exclusive 
occupation. The absence of a coherent communal 
rangeland management strategy and the retention of 
dual rights by those already allocated exclusive rights 
remain key issues. It remains to be seen how they will 
be addressed in the recently approved, but unreleased 
land policy.
Increasingly skewed access to rangeland and trading 
in residential sites in peri-urban areas are part of a 
broader pattern of rising inequality in Botswana which 
has seen the overall Gini index jump from 54 in the 
1980s to above 60 in the 1990s.  The graph highlights 
the steep rise of inequality in Botswana relative to South 
Africa, Mozambique and Madagascar.
Land policy and governance concerns
Contemporary research is increasingly critical of 
Botswana’s land policy and governance (Cullis and 
Watson, 2005, Werbner, 2004, Peters, 1994, White, 
2009). Researchers track the emergence of winners 
and losers as a consequence of policy directions which 
favour large stock owners and the enclosure of com-
munal grazing. But there is also increasing criticism of 
the Land Boards themselves. Werbner (2004: 109- 112) 
asserts that ‘throughout the country... no state agen-
cies have been more controversial and less loved than 
the Land Boards.’ He argues that citizens frequently 
perceive their actions ‘to be arbitrary, to wind through 
unreasonably long delays between Land Boards and 
Subordinate Boards, to be contrary to prior understand-
ings of the law, and to diverge from expectations of 
public order that is regular and predictable.’ Other 
commentators highlight increasing delays in process-
ing applications and a rising incidence of corruption in 
land dealings (Adams et al., 2003). 
While the land users interviewed display detailed knowl-
edge of Land Board policies and procedures, there is a 
strong perception that the Land Boards are ‘up there’, 
bureaucratically remote and promoting policies and 
practices which seem increasingly out of step with the 
real needs of the poor. Several users spoke of powerful 
Figure 8: Relative Gini rankings per country
Source: World Bank development indicators 2011
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increasingly overwhelmed by informal land occupation 
as a reflection of popular frustration with the slow pace 
of formal application procedures.
These problems are exacerbated by dated and increas-
ingly inappropriate land use planning legislation and 
systems which are out of step with current planning 
needs.
The role of dikgosi in land governance
Initially the Land Boards began by combining dikgosi 
with elected representatives to make decisions in 
the new land management and governance system. 
However, as the Land Boards became institution-
ally consolidated, so the administrators and officials 
exercised increasing administrative power and influ-
ence. A push to professionalise the Land Boards as an 
extension of the administrative state marginalised the 
dikgosi who lost influence and representation.
In 2011 it appears that there are new moves to reincor-
porate dikgosi or their representatives onto the Land 
Boards, which is indicative of changing attitudes in 
Government to the role of traditional institutions in land 
governance and management. Partly, this represents 
expedient recognition of their political weight in Bot-
swana society and the perceived importance of keeping 
them aligned with the ruling party. However it is also an 
acknowledgement of the resilience and adaptiveness of 
these systems and their continuing social significance 
across the social spectrum.
Of particular interest is the growing challenge from 
minority groupings in Botswana who assert that the 
institution of chieftaincy is one which submerged the 
interests and identities of historically subject groups in 
the interests of the Tswana majority. This seems to be a 
growing arena for contestation as minority groups gain 
voice and influence in the political sphere. 
Enabling women to access land 
independently
Improved access to land by women seems to be an 
important achievement that reflects protracted lobbying 
by civil society groupings in Botswana which influenced 
a favourable policy stance within the state. Griffiths 
people having preferential access to the Land Boards, 
of procedural shortcuts and ‘fronting’ activities which 
favoured those with access to resources, and of plan-
ning and allocation practices which did not adequately 
address local livelihood needs.
Although the Chobe Land Board seemed to manage 
the process of application for land reasonably well, 
their capacity to monitor what actually happens on the 
ground thereafter remains weak. Stipulations about 
time periods for the development of land are frequently 
not enforced. Once allocated to an individual, rural 
land is seldom purposively repossessed. Although 
kgosi Banika spoke about the shortage of residential 
sites at Pandamatenga it was evident that there were 
a number of sites which had been occupied at some 
point and subsequently abandoned as families moved 
away. Nationally, information about who owns what and 
the spatial description of land parcels remains weak 
despite significant investment in the development of 
the cadastre. Local land overseers remain important 
repositories of knowledge, but given some uncertainty 
about their powers and roles, such knowledge is in 
danger of being lost. 
As land in peri-urban areas and areas with tourism 
or other economic potential began to acquire market 
value, it exposed the vulnerability of institutions like 
the Land Board which rely on upward accountability to 
persons with the power to exercise undue influence.   
Irregular land sales in peri-urban Gaborone in the early 
1990s involved top ranking government officials and 
led to the forced resignation of Peter Mmusi Botswana 
Vice President in 1991 (Taylor, 2005: 4). More recently 
in Francistown, a Chief Technical Officer in the Land 
Board is alleged to have colluded with businessmen in 
the illegal sale of state land worth in the region of 2.5 
million pula (Gabathuse, 2010). 
But perhaps of more significance than the allegations 
of corruption is the increasing inability of the Land 
Boards to manage peri-urban land in the face of 
accelerating urbanisation which is compounded by the 
‘lack of data on available and allocated land’ (Botswana 
Council of Non-Governmental Organisations, 2002). 
State management and control over land allocation are 
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(2010: 20) makes a compelling argument that ‘women 
in Botswana today are in a much stronger position re-
garding access to resources, including land, than they 
were twenty-five years ago.’ The policy of government 
enabling single women to access land in their own right 
puts in place important social protections. 
While there is mounting evidence that women are 
increasingly able to access land in their own right these 
gains are partially offset by inheritance law and practice 
which frequently overlooks the rights of women.
Lessons from the Botswana 
experience
The case study highlights a number of lessons for policy 
makers and practitioners advocating decentralised land 
governance systems:
•	 Social	relations	of	power	in	a	society	shape	land	
use management priorities and policies and influ-
ence the design of land governance systems.
•	 While	the	Land	Boards	have	brought	the	State	
closer to land users, local people’s involvement in 
day to day land governance has receded.  Local 
management systems have been subsumed by the 
administrative state.
•	 Central	government’s	retention	of	key	powers	and	
decision making restricts meaningful downwardly 
accountable land governance and opens spaces 
for potential abuse of the system.
•	 The	impact	of	the	introduction	of	various	certifi-
cates of customary land rights and common law 
leases has been to regulate new applications for 
land rather than to record existing land rights. 
Many people did not feel the need to formally 
record their existing rights, which rendered them 
vulnerable to dispossession.
•	 The	role	of	the	dikgosi in the land governance sys-
tem – and perhaps in the broader society remains 
unresolved. Everything points to the resilient and 
adaptive nature of this institution. Determining its 
proper role in a democratic and decentralised land 
governance system remains a key challenge.
•	 The	decision	to	enable	people	to	apply	for	land	in	
other areas other than where the applicant resides 
opens opportunities for accumulation by those well 
placed to navigate the land allocation system. Such 
allocations risk undermining local livelihoods and 
resource entitlement and enable concentration of 
valuable land resources in fewer hands. 
Figure 9: Changing roles of dikgosi in the land governance system in Botswana
Dikgosi, kgotla and land overseer administer local 
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• The limited monitoring capability of the Land 
Boards undermines the effectiveness of land policy. 
•	 The	Botswana	case	highlights	how	organisations	
in civil society play a vital role in policy advocacy 
– particularly around enabling women to gain 
independent access to land and in defending the 
rights and entitlements of vulnerable citizens in a 
context of rising inequality.
Conclusion
The experiences of Botswana provide important insights 
into the complexity and contestation inherent in land 
governance and management. These contestations are 
embedded in policy, legislation and living customary 
law and in the power asymmetries between different 
actors including: 
•	 modernising	politicians,	many	of	whom	retain	
interests in livestock farming;
•	 dikgosi who continue to play an important, if 
diminished role in Botswana society;
•	 men and women who seek land for different uses 
and at different scales;
•	 public	servants	and	planning	professionals	who	
govern, serve and mediate between them; and
•	 CSOs	which	monitor	the	policies	and	practices	of	
the State while advocating on behalf of the poor. 
The case highlights the challenges and potentials 
implicit in any attempt to put in place coherent and 
equitable systems of land governance backed by robust 
institutions which are effective and efficient.
As indicated in figure 10, the current balance of forces 
continue to tip the scales against the interests of the 
poor. However at the same time there remain important 
entitlements and areas where real progress has been 
made.
While the expansion of the tribal land area since 
independence remains an important indicator of the 
State’s commitment to ensure land access to all its 
citizens, the manner in which land allocations have 
been managed has failed to address deepening social 
and economic inequalities in Botswana.
Figure 10: Assessing the balance
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Introduction
Madagascar, off the eastern coast of Africa, is the 
largest island in the Indian Ocean.  It extends over 
58 040 km², with agricultural production occupying 
an estimated 5.2% (3.5 million hectares). Large-scale 
plantations dominate the production of sisal, sugar-
cane, tobacco, bananas, and cotton, yet these farms 
comprise no more than 200 enterprises and occupy 
less than 2% of the cultivated agricultural land of the 
country as a whole (Minten, Randrianarison & Swinnen, 
2009). Overall, Malagasy agriculture is the domain of 
small-scale subsistence farmers cultivating mainly rice 
on less than one hectare (0.86ha on average) of land 
(GTZ, 2009). Madagascar’s economic and social charac-
teristics follow most African countries’ colonial legacy 
of high rural poverty (Minten et al., 2009). The political 
instability in the country further exacerbates poverty in 
an already impoverished country (see box below). Both 
public and private investment has virtually slowed to a 
standstill, and lack of budgetary and external financing 
are impeding the delivery of public services, which have 
fallen into a poor state of affairs (World Bank, 2010).
Madagascar at a glance
Madagascar is a developing country. The Malagasy 
society is rapidly transitioning from rural to urban, 
with cities and towns expanding, not only in terms of 
population growth, but also in terms of space. With 
rapid urbanisation, many urban areas are expanding 
and spilling over into the rural areas with noticeable 
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Box 4: Demography and economy 
The Republic of Madagascar has an estimated population of 19,6 million inhabitants (2010 estimate). It ranks 
among the poorest countries in the world with 69.6% of the population living at subsistence level. While there is 
indication of economic growth, this benefits the elite and has bypassed the masses. The incidence of poverty is 
higher in rural areas where 80.1% of the population are living below the poverty line. 35% of rural households are 
food insecure and 48% are vulnerable to food insecurity. 2 million hectares are cultivated by 2.5 million family 
farms: Of the total arable land, 5.03%  is used for wheat, maize, and rice, (replanted after each harvest), 1.85% 
is irrigated  and 1.02% is under permanent crops (citrus, coffee, and rubber that are not replanted after each 
harvest). 
Agriculture contributes 29,1% of the GDP. 58% of the cultivated land area is used for rice farming. In 2003, about 
63% of Madagascar’s households (of which 73% of households are in rural areas) were engaged in rice produc-
tion.  Rice paddies often cover no more than a few square meters. According to the Directorate General of the 
Economy (DGE), all these farms contribute substantially to the incomes of the majority of rural households and 
generate employment since the farming methods are still traditional and require a massive recruitment of hired 
labour.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ma.html, accessed 4 May 2011
Republic Of Madagascar (2005)  Country Strategy Paper 2005-2009. African Development Bank African Development Fund Country Operations 
Department. North, East And South Regions August (2005) HYPERLINK “http://www.afdb.org/” \o “http://www.afdb.org/” www.afdb.org.pdf 
accessed 4 May 2011 
Madagascar 2010 Comprehensive Food and Nutrition Security, and Vulnerability Analysis Mission (CFNSVA), accessed 4 May 2011
Box 3: Politics
Formerly an independent kingdom, Madagascar became a French colony in 1896 but regained independence 
in 1960. The country went through a period ‘economic decolonisation’ in the 60s. In the period following 
independence the country went through multiple revolts as a result of ill-conceived economic policies, coups 
and republics with widely differing stances on land and governance. During 1992-93, free presidential and 
National Assembly elections were held, ending 17 years of single-party rule. In 1997 Didier Ratsiraka, the 
country’s leader during the 1970s and 1980s, was returned to the presidency and adopted World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund led policies of privatisation and liberalisation. The 2001 presidential election was 
contested between the followers of Didier Ratsiraka and Marc Ravalomanana, nearly causing secession of half 
of the country. In April 2002, the High Constitutional Court announced Ravalomanana the winner. His adminis-
tration pursued an agenda that sought to reduce poverty and improve governance, respect for the rule of law, 
economic growth, and market liberalisation. ; Yet while the economy experienced growth, the majority of the 
population remained poor under his rule. Notwithstanding, Ravalomanana achieved a second term following a 
landslide victory in the 2006 presidential elections, but was ousted in a coup in 2009.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ma.html, accessed 4 May 2011
Republic Of Madagascar (2005)  Country Strategy Paper 2005-2009. African Development Bank African Development Fund Country Operations 
Department. North, East And South Regions August (2005) HYPERLINK “http://www.afdb.org/” \o “http://www.afdb.org/” www.afdb.org.pdf 
accessed 4 May 2011 
Madagascar 2010 Comprehensive Food and Nutrition Security, and Vulnerability Analysis Mission (CFNSVA), accessed 4 May 2011
50 Decentralised land governance: Case studies  and local voices from Botswana, Madagascar and Mozambique
encroachment on rural and agriculturally productive 
land. In turn, this forces impoverished rural people to 
move to the cities in search of work as limited areas 
can be cultivated. This situation is increasing concerns 
of sufficient food supply (Madagascar Position Paper, 
2005): 
… the agricultural activities growth is very 
small compared with demographic growth the 
productions increased rate will be absorbed by the 
demographic growth rate… 
(Rasatarisoa, 2009) 
Similar to other countries in southern Africa, the land 
tenure and settlement history of Madagascar has 
combined forms of customary land holding which 
operate alongside the statutory Torrens system imposed 
by the French in a bid to protect colonial land interests. 
Under the principles of the Torrens system, unoccupied 
or unenclosed land was declared State land, and 
individuals could gain secured tenure by the registra-
tion of land rights via a central land registry (instead of 
registering title) (Healy, 1998). With a State guarantee of 
title, all registered owners’ claims to land were enforce-
able against third parties, and owners could lay claim 
to compensation in the case of state expropriation. Only 
20% of land in Madagascar is registered and held in 
private ownership and is mainly held by expatriates and 
the Malagasy elite. This constitutes 172 000 hectares of 
cultivated land. An ambiguous and complex relation-
ship has developed between statutory and customary 
land governance and administration systems. The 
remainder of the land is vested in the State and large 
tracts of land are held and occupied in terms of locally 
legitimate customary tenure systems (Ramaroson et al,  
2010). 
The different regimes and the changes to land tenure 
systems in Madagascar (outlined in Table 1) have had 
detrimental effects on the Malagasy small farmers. 
Since the 1960s, small family farm plots (mainly for rice 
cropping) have remained the dominant feature across 
Madagascar, the majority of these plots being allocated 
and held under traditional tenure systems, which has 
left most of the farmers with limited security of the land 
they utilise.
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Table 3: The different eras of land tenure in Madagascar
Period  Land Tenure and Governance Decentralisation approach
Era of the Mala-
gasy Monarchy 
(1810–1896)
The Malagasy monarchy had a significant influence 
upon land rights. The Monarchy era was marked by 
dispossession and unification of all land by passing 
the 1861 land act (Code des 305 articles de 1861) (Ber-
trand and  Razafindrabe, 1997). A related law in 1896 
acknowledged land that was already used by inhabit-
ants, and from the day of proclamation, land became 
the legal property of the user (Rarijaona 1967).
Two types of land holding upheld:  the 
Malagasy monarchy consolidated all 
land under the monarchy and con-
solidated control over land (Bertrand 
and Razafindrabe, 1997). Ancestral 
land was however later acknowledged 
and was allowed to be inherited, with 
customary heads recognised as a 
vested control (Healy, 1998).
Era of French 
colonisation, 
modernisation of 
land tenure and 
land disposses-
sion (1896-1960)
A new law, Article 85 de 1881, stated that under 
customary law land could not be sold to foreigners. 
The French Colonial Government imposed Torrens 
registration system: the parcelling and individualisa-
tion of land into private holdings (le décret du février 
1911). The first significant move to modify the land 
tenure system was an economic conference in 1919, 
which recommended agrarian reform under the guise 
of land concessions for the colonists and reserved 
land for the Malagasy (Rarijaona, 1967). The result 
of French expropriation of cultivable land held by 
the Malagasy removed almost a fifth of the 5 million 
hectares under crops (Bastian 1967). Soon after the 
initial period of land registration, colonial legislators 
passed another comparable law, décret du 25 août 
1929, introducing the cadastre to the Malagasy 
Nation (Rarijaona, 1967). This legal step attempted to 
enforce the separation between legally occupied land 
prescribed by State law, against legitimately held land 
under traditional oral or written laws. However, this 
cadastral law failed to account for traditional law or 
the testimonies for inhabitants of the land. The result 
was a cadastral system, which was inalienable for the 
livelihoods of most farmers. Land not attributable to 
an individual was seen as communal lan d with legiti-
mate rights of tenure to access and use resources, 
such as pasture.
The land tenure system remained 
centrally controlled for most parts 
under the colonial government. In  
1924 the changed  administration  
gave more power to the chefs de 
province and the local Malagasy chefs 
de canton (District Administrators). 
Under the law of 1926 (declaring all 
land unoccupied or not enclosed as 
the domain of the State), individuals 
could apply to register parcels of land 
within the communal lands of the 
fokonolona (village councils) although 
land remained under central adminis-
tration. Yet traditional rights of grazing 
commons were conserved, and 
lineage or individual customary rights 
were respected in principal. However, 
traditional laws were precarious, 
particularly when faced with expropria-
tion of land for concessions.
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Period  Land Tenure and Governance Decentralisation approach
Era of Independ-
ence and the 
nationalisation of 
land(1960-2002)
The government inherited a mutation of land rights. 
Legislation was passed to protect the rights of both 
public and private land and the 1896 law and the 
décret de 1911, regarding registration of land. Land 
registration was introduced in order to further protect 
public/state lands; land not registered was regarded 
as state land. Henceforth, an owner had only to pre-
sent to the Government an endowment for the holding 
or lot attributed by the fokonolona, under loi du 15 
février 1960 for private lands, without needing to follow 
the procedure of requisition for land registration 
(Gass 1971). The State continued to regard all land 
not registered as land belonging to the State, when 
its attempts to register customary possessions failed. 
In addition, in 1974, the State tried to reinforce this 
policy with the reintegration of under-utilised private 
land into State holdings, and foreign concessions 
were suppressed in favour of taxation of unused land, 
to persuade owners to surrender these areas. With the 
arrival of the Second Republic in 1976, many French 
import-export companies were nationalised under 
a Marxist economic policy. The impact of this led in 
part, to the exodus of the French and the abandon-
ment of colonial plantations in the south-east, which 
were later run as state farms (Brown, 1995). 
In the rural areas,  the Second Republic had a severe 
impact on the small farming communities.
Since independence, the juridical 
framework has been based on State 
monopoly and private property attested 
by title. Parallel to the centralised 
statutory system, Madagascar has a 
tradition of limited village self-rule, 
associated with the institution of 
the fokonolona. After having been 
alternately suppressed and encour-
aged by the authorities, the fokonolona 
was officially revived in 1962 in an 
attempt to involve local communi-
ties in plans for rural economic and 
social development. In 1973 the 
military regime further entrenched 
the self-rule concept by establishing 
self-governing bodies at the local level. 
Government functionaries who were 
formerly appointed were to be replaced 
by elected officials. However it was 
not until 1975 that the fokonolona was 
given constitutional recognition as the 
‘decentralized collective of the state’. 
No land governance mandate was 
officially allocated to the fokonolona.
Era of Land 
policy reform 
(2003-2011)
In 2003, civil society initiated national debate about 
the two parallel land tenure systems (privately and 
traditionally held tenure). It intensified the appeal for 
a revised and simplified registration approach that 
acknowledges land rights based on local allocation 
practices, which ensured secure tenure on land 
held under customary systems. A new land policy 
in 2005 proposed a decentralised land management 
system. This aimed to promote secure access to land 
by creating a more efficient legal and institutional 
environment. The land decree (2005-019, 17 October 
2005-commonly referred to as the land policy letter) 
was promulgated, which changed the principles of the 
statutes governing land in Madagascar.
The new land legislation (2005–2008) 
introduced reforms for the mod-
ernisation of land administration 
and decentralisation of land tenure 
management to local government 
(communes - communes rurales), 
which mandated the legal recognition 
of local land rights. This new system 
was given effect by the creation of 
local land offices with representation 
of elected villagers and a municipal 
appointed official, who are responsible 
for the registering non-titled private 
property and legitimising customary 
holding of land (Burnod et al., 2011).
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The changing approach to land decentralisation in the 
mid-2000s was necessary to address the completely 
unsuitable of the system of land governance inherited 
from the colonial period, which could not cope with 
the magnitude of demand for land rights security 
(Teyssier et al., 2010). These systemic weaknesses were 
magnified by the lack of capacity in the administration 
for land management functions, which contributed to 
the despair and disillusion of users who sought to have 
their rights recognized. The country was also in need 
of agricultural development and rural poverty reduc-
tion against the backdrop of increasing competition 
for dwindling land resources as a result of the rapidly 
growing population, urbanisation, and land degrada-
tion resulting from deforestation - mainly for charcoal 
production, which many people fall back on as an 
off-season livelihood strategy (Liversage, 2010). Former 
Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, Mr 
Harison Randriarimanana holds that:
Madagascar is an agricultural country and 
the second motivation for decentralisation 
was to stimulate local development through 
decentraliation. In rural areas most of the people 
live off the land and the majority of the population 
live as farmers. Both agriculture and local 
economic development needed stimulation and 
development.
(Pers comm, 20 April 2011)
Land tenure systems in 
Madagascar
The two competing systems of land tenure in Mada-
gascar are customary recognition of land rights (a 
long-standing collective recollection of and use) and 
the centralised land registry, recognising registered 
title under government statute. The state system of 
individual land titling system, based on the law of 1960 
which requires registration of land rights, has been 
centrally managed by government. Hence state tenure 
systems are governed by written laws and regulations. 
Communities have clearly defined rules and procedures 
which resolve civil conflicts, as well as disagreements 
over access to and control of resources. 
By the beginning of the 21st century hardly any land 
registration had been undertaken and many farmers 
discovered that their traditional land rights - and their 
interpretation of who possesses rights to land were not 
legally recorded and therefore not statutorily recognised 
(Gezon, 1997).  Similarly, numerous incidents of 
conflicting and overlapping formal and informal land 
rights were identified. Some land under conflict had 
been registered (usually village and urban elites) under 
formal state arrangements individual title but were 
occupied by informal land users under traditional land 
rights agreements. Owners of non-titled land were 
vulnerable to people encroaching on their property and 
to outsiders purchasing the land through transactions 
at the regional land administration offices. The lack of 
administration for rural local land led to parcels of land 
get smaller and smaller as neighbours slowly stretched 
the boundaries of their adjacent fields.
At the local level the registration of land was often 
regarded with either suspicion or indifference. (Evers et 
al., 2006). Land is commonly acquired through inherit-
ance. Land may also be leased through either formal or 
informal channels. These formal leases afford indefinite 
rights to occupy and use the land. In return for leasing, 
the lessee gives one-third of the harvest or something 
of equivalent value to the owner. Under customary 
tenure systems, informal leasing transactions, which 
were under threat of loss when individual titling came 
into play, were not officially sanctioned and commonly 
consisted of a verbal agreement giving the user rights 
to the land. 
Customary land users experienced further increased 
vulnerability with the intensification of foreign land 
sales from the early 2000s. Local transactions were then 
increasingly captured on paper (indicating the identity 
of the title holder, validation of the title by the neigh-
bours, the estimated surface area, information on the 
type of land occupancy and use, and the nature of the 
rights). These local agreements guaranteed a first level 
of security to land users. So an active land market de-
veloped out of a locally developed practice that involved 
traditional authorities, chiefs and headmen – a system 
of land management from below, without notification 
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Box 5: Land reform problems
Over the past twenty years a huge backlog had developed with regard to the recording and processing of 
land titles in terms of the 1960 law. On average, about 1 500 titles were issued per year. In 2009, over 100 
000 submitted requests for land titles were still outstanding. Given the limited resources and the slow rate 
of processing, it was estimated that the backlog would take more than a hundred years to process (Teyssier 
2010). The Government was faced with a mounting land tenure crisis about unregistered occupations - both 
on ‘illegally occupied’ state land, as well as (and often overlapping), traditionally acknowledged land occupa-
tion with no formal state guarantee (Healy 1998). 
to, or engagement by central government.  While these 
local level efforts were being made to register rights, 
government was transacting land that it claimed formal 
rights to. The sale and attempted sales of occupied state 
owned land to external investors led to Government 
initated concession, such as the South Korea’s Daewoo 
Logistics attempted deal to secure a 99-year lease on 
1.3m hectares of arable land -roughly 35% of all arable 
land- largely for planting corn for biofuels in Madagas-
car’s remote west). These initiatives were one of the 
factors in the precipitating the national political crisis in 
2009, which saw the ousting of President Ravalomanana 
by opposition leader Andry Rajoelina who became the 
acting president in 2010. In reforming the land-tenure 
system, Ravalomanana unilaterally risked farmers’ 
customary land rights and land access by seeking to 
expropriate land for land deals with companies close 
to the president, or large multinationals who wanted to 
commercialise land in Madagascar at the expense of 
the population.
Changing approaches to land rights 
and governance
Some suggestions by analysts propose that traditional 
land management was beginning to pull back in the 
face of individualisation and privatisation of land and 
that the Malagasy citizens turned to the State and its 
land tenure service to ensure their land rights (Pelerin 
and Ramboarison, 2006). Before land reform was 
undertaken in 2005, formal land management was the 
mandate of the Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and 
Fisheries in charge of the Property and Land Tenure 
Services Directorate (National Land Program, 2006). The 
national capacity to manage land rights was not well 
developed and relied on the outdated Torrens-inspired 
land management system, which led to inadequate 
central state management, leading to:
•	 a	weak	and	complex	registry	system	(archives	
had deteriorated, land boundaries were ill defined 
and portions were often registered to absent and 
deceased owners); 
•	 overlapping	legal	and	customary	holding	of	land;
•	 under-resourced	institutional	authority;	
•	 land	degradation	(Jacoby	and	Minten,	in	Ramaro-
son 2010);
•	 escalation	in	land	conflicts	over	rights,	which		
created a bottleneck in the courts that were also 
crippled by an ineffective, poorly framed, poorly 
understood and out-dated legal system (Thalgott, 
2009; Rakotobe, pers comm, 20 April 2011); and
•	 the	lack	of	a	strong	land	tenure	system,	and	
ill-defined property rights in general. 
A gradual paralysis in registration the cumbersome 
system for issuing of titles, and the disjuncture between 
actual practice and recorded rights of title necessitated 
change in the land administration and governance 
system.  
The registration of land rights was re-emphasised by 
government. At a local level, formal land registration 
revived traditional mechanisms and rules to define 
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community members’ access and resource use, and 
across the country, was implemented by a local infor-
mal land right certification process which recognised 
rights on the basis of land use. These ‘informal’ certifi-
cates (petit papers) enabled the formalisation of land 
rights at the closest point to land users (Teyssier, 2010). 
In 2003, after a year-long public debate and calls from 
civil society to simplify the registration practices and 
recognise locally developed land use rights systems, the 
Ministry acknowledged these practices and supported 
their gradual recognition. A  multi-representative land 
policy task force was set up and further debate followed 
which recognised communities and local governance 
structures as powerful local decision-makers, that can 
– in the absence of effective central land management – 
take responsibility for the land in their areas. 
These local initiatives of certifying land rights speedily 
and affordably provided a positive alternative to cumber-
some centralised land management. Without explicit 
authority or specific skills, communities managed to 
implement land tenure practices that acknowledge 
ownership being established ‘from the ground up’ 
(Comby, 1998). It was agreed that local municipalities 
should be granted new powers and functions to give 
legal effect to managing land rights and undertaking 
broader management of land under their jurisdiction 
(Teyssier, 2010).  
Land reform 
The Letter for Land Policy of 2005 - also referred to as 
the White Paper on Land Policy - resulted from task 
force deliberations. The land reform mandated by 
the land policy letter sanctioned a fundamental shift 
away from the century old principle of the presuming 
state ownership of untitled land. Until this shift, only 
one category of land – based on the presumption that 
all land belongs to the state - was uniformly applied 
across Madagascar. The law 2005-019 (17 October 2005) 
modified the principles regulating the land statutes in 
Madagascar. From that point on, land that was untitled 
but developed, cultivated and/or built upon by genera-
tions of users was no longer considered as property 
of the state, but rather as private property. The law 
recognised de facto land occupation and land use as a 
form of ownership. It gave effect to land tenure reform 
with the announcement of a combined centralised and 
decentralised land rights recognition system. The cen-
tralised land administration retained responsibility for 
the formalisation of land by titles, while the formalisa-
tion of non-titled property through land certificates fell 
under the jurisdiction of local communes (communes 
rurales) or municipalities. 
However the existence of a variety of different landhold-
ings (based on the presumption that all land belong to 
the Malagasy people), which did not fit into this defini-
tion, required that new land categories were developed 
(Teyssier, 2010). The official land categorisation was 
amended and currently reflects four different categories 
of land: 
•	 untitled	state	land	(mainly	occupied	without	legal	
recognition by the state);
•	 public	state	land	(i.e.	government	buildings,	roads,	
etc); 
•	 private	property	(i.e.	titled	or	cadastral	land);	and
•	 protected	land	(i.e.	forests,	reserves	and	lakes).	
The results of the new legislation clarified that state-
owned land now consists of land registered in the name 
of a government entity or unoccupied land on which 
no claims have been made. Thus the State, via the land 
affairs department (services des domains), can neither 
lease nor sell land that includes or encroaches upon 
titled or occupied land, apart from exceptional cases 
when the Council of Ministers can authorise expropria-
tion and due compensation procedures (Burnod et al., 
2011).
Decentralised institutional 
framework for land governance
Institutional shifts 
Decentralising land administration was a delayed 
response to the overall government drive to devolve 
services to local levels of government. As noted above, 
the process of decentralisation in land governance 
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2003
Public 
debates 
about land 
tenure crisis
2004 
Partici-
tory process in 
preparation of 
a decentralised 
land governance 
programme
2005
Land Policy: 
National Land pro-
gramme launched 
and government 
entity in charge of 
land  reform (PNF) 
established
2006
Establishment of 
local land offices 
at commune level, 
as a decentralised 
administrative 
authority over non-
titled property that 
formerly belonged to 
the state
2007
Land Observa-
tory established 
to monitor and 
pilot Local Land 
Offices; Issuing 
of 1st land 
certificate
2008-onwards
Expansion 
of the 
programme
only got underway with a public debate in 2003 and the 
2005 land policy underwriting land governance devolved 
services subsequently followed from this process.  The 
process can be summarised as followed:
National Land Programme
In March 2004, the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock 
and Fisheries initiated the National Land Programme re-
ferred to as the Progamme National Foncier (PNF) as the 
main driver to improve land management in the country. 
. The entire land administration decentralisation process 
is co-ordinated under the auspices of PNF whose objec-
tive is to strengthen not only the administrative structure 
of land management, but also to provide clarity concern-
ing rights and legal property of land, and to ensure legal 
security on as much land as possible. Firstly, a primary 
objective of PNF in simplifying land registration is to 
create a sound environment for future investments. 
Secondly, PNF is tasked to reintroduce land tax.  Income 
derived from property tax is the least significant and eva-
sion tax remains a significant problem in Madagascar 
(National Coordinator of the National Land Program, Mr 
Rija Ranaivoson, pers comm, 19 April 2011). Lastly PNF 
is mandated to implement the following key land reform 
activities:
•	 Restructuring	and	modernising	land	registration.	
Modernisation involves the digitisation of archives 
and investment in equipment for land services.
•	 Improving	and	decentralising	land	management.	
This axis involves the creation of land administra-
tion at the commune level. Local customary land 
agreements could then be presented to a local pub-
lic institution (the municipality or fokontany¹) for 
certification. These local land offices are authorised 
to issue and manage land certificates according to 
the legal procedures, and where local land conflicts 
exist they are the first point of mediation. 
•	 Renewing	regulations	pertaining	to	Crown	land	
use and land tenure, in order to adapt legislation 
to a principle of decentralisation and to regularise 
former legal status that no longer corresponds with 
current land occupation (PNF 2008).
The programme was aimed at not only lifting the 
country out of the land and property crisis, but also 
developing the infrastructures for local level land 
administration. It gave donors an important entry point 
for supporting pro-poor approaches to land tenure 
security. Madagascar became the first of the poorest 
¹On average there are 10 fokontany (FKT) and 30 fokonolona  (FKL) per commune (World Bank, 2003)
The Malagasy Constitution in 1994 was a precursor 
to the political changes in land administration.  
This was further underwritten by a national 
decentralisation policy in 1994 which demanded 
effective decentralisation and democratisation of 
all aspects of governance.
Figure 11: Decentralised land administration process in Madagascar
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countries to sign a $110 million compact with the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a US foreign 
Aid agency. Under this agreement the four-year Millen-
nium Challenge Account (MCA) was to focus amongst 
other issues, on securing formal property rights to land 
and modernising tenure information in Madagascar. 
The MCC’s efforts to modernise and computerise the 
Madagascan land administration system were regarded 
as much needed and were widely welcomed (Economist 
2005). 
On 7 July 2005 the first Local Land Office was inaugu-
rated. The process of awarding land rights to untitled 
private property was outlined in Law 2006-31 – which 
established the legal framework for the establishment 
and management of the local land offices at commune 
level. In February 2006 the first land certificates were 
delivered (Teyssier et al 2008). However, the different 
axes of the reform did not evolve at the same speed. An 
assessment of the first year’s results of establishing an 
institutional framework and implementing decentralisa-
tion highlighted a number of concerns including:
•	 follow-up/evaluation	of	the	programme;	
•	 the	institutional	integration	of	the	coordination	unit;	
•	 the	role	of	civil-society	in	the	implementation	
process  (he participatory process between civil 
society and government were crucial for the 
implementation of the land policy);  
•	 the	financing	of	decentralized	structures;	and		
•	 how	to	scale-up	this	process
(Pelerin and Ramboarison 2006).
National shifts 
In 2008 PNF was institutionalised under the Ministry of 
Land Use Planning and Decentralisation. On a national 
level new institutions were put in place to implement 
the decentralised approach to land governance. These 
include the National Land Programme (PNF), and the 
Land Observatory. The national government provides 
central authority over all land and consists of the 
Minister of Land Use Planning and Decentralisation 
and other land related departments (see Figure 1).  
Madagascar’s current land administration institu-
tional framework reflects two central pillars under the 
Ministry’s General Secretariat: central government 
land administration and services  included under the 
General Directory of Land Services (concerned with 
titling), and  the National Land Program and related 
directories in conjunction with the Director of Reform 
and Decentralisation of Land Management are respon-
sible for the implementation of decentralisation of land 
governance (concerned with issuing and managing 
land certificates).  The new institutions and the changed 
approached were widely welcomed because it equipped 
a different level of administration with mandates and 
it realigned government agencies to modernise land 
administration. The National Coordinator of the National 
Land Program, Mr Rija Ranaivoson contextualised the 
problem:
One of the big institutional problems was that 
land administration was regulated by different 
departments and we needed to stabilise the 
institutions to ensure the continuity of the national 
land program that was established by the Ministry 
of Agriculture… [who had] no link to the region 
or the commune and all the land administration 
services were centralised. 
(Pers comm, 19 April 2011)
The director of decentralised land management pointed 
out this was an important shift in governance, yet he 
was also of the opinion that it is a long-term process 
and not yet complete. Local land management had not 
been totally devolved. The process is therefore in its 
early stages and viewed as an incomplete process: 
Before the Government embarked on 
decentralisation and land reform the service 
of registration of land was limited to the one 
department of land services (i.e. registration 
of property was compounded in one overtaxed 
ministry). Between 2006 and 2008 new departments 
had been established to address the various aspects 
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of registration of land and land management and 
governance.  In the past,  land surveys and land 
assets (real estates) were not under the same 
minister;  some of the services are still not under 
one directorate but the current processes of 
reforming land management are aimed at bridging 
the institutional divides. Decentralisation is a state 
project and when all the necessary institutions 
are in place this project will come to an end. Some 
directorates will inevitably disappear when its 
objectives of decentralisation has been met. A part 
of the institutional framework has been set up to 
establish the correct regulatory bodies 
(Director of Reform and Decentralised Land 
management, Mr Leon Randriamahafaly, pers 
comm, 18 April 2011)
The fragmented departments contributed to land 
conflicts and lack of co-ordinated services.  With the 
new institutional framework, it was envisioned that all 
the different departments with their different operational 
mandates, would enhance efficiency and effectiveness.
The revised institutional framework further included 
a new regional level, to replace the former provincial 
ministry to which the communes would now have a 
functional relation as the region would be responsible 
for coordinating communes and deconcentrated 
services of development at the local level. The decen-
tralised administration system in Madagascar expanded 
authority and mandates from the central government 
to the regions (where the land management mandate 
begins). These are headed by a state representative (the 
former 12 administrative provinces were absorbed into 
22 regions in 2004), the district (where chiefs are to be 
appointed by the state) and local government structures 
(where mayors and council members of the communes 
are elected) are to hold jurisdiction over local land 
management (including traditional land allocations 
formerly conducted by village heads). Communes 
(municipalities) are divided into villages (fokontany). 
At the local level there are some 11 393 villages. The 
village is the smallest administrative unit, with a limited 
degree of self-rule under village heads and elders. In 
accordance with hierarchical regulation and control, 
both the region and the commune were endowed a 
legal personality with administrative and financial 
autonomy. The latter however is far from devolved in the 
current process. Fokontanys, as administrative sub-
divisions under the control of the districts, depended on 
central government and donors to finance the objec-
tives of land administration, since the region is relatively 
weak financially for responding to commune directives 
(Radison et al 2009). 
The most significant shift in the management of 
lands was in respect of untitled land in rural areas. 
The governance of the rural untitled land was placed 
under the jurisdiction of the commune (municipality). 
Whereas title deeds are registered in a land register, the 
rights to use untitled rural land would now be recorded 
in a commune land use plan (see Land Local Plan for 
Land Occupation PLOF see pages 61-62 under ‘land use 
planning’). 
The Director of Estate (state lands) and land services, 
Mr Petera Ratolorantsoa comments:
The (central) state no longer has direct 
responsibility towards rural land except in respect 
of titled cadastral land and disputes over lands that 
are not resolved at the district level.
(Pers comm, 20 April 2011)
While the process of establishing devolved institutions 
in all districts and communes is still incomplete, most 
local municipalities have established decentralised land 
administration services. This decentralised institutional 
framework is set out in the Table 2:
Local land offices
Local land offices based in the communes and accom-
modated by mayors serve several villages and often 
several communes (where local land offices had not 
been established yet).
Prior to the 2005 land reform, the communes 
(municipalities) had very few authoritive powers 
over land and were mainly concerned with basic 
service delivery.
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(Mr Olivier, General Secretary of the Ministry of 
land Use Planning and Decentralisation, pers. 
comm, 20 April 2011).
All local certification processes are mandated by local 
land offices. For each application, a commission, made 
up of elected representatives of the commune and 
fokonolona, establishes an official report recording the 
asserted rights and possible oppositions. The local land 
office agent then prepares a land certificate (commonly 
referred to as ‘petit papier’) which has to be signed by 
the local mayor. This process has made it possible for 
landowners to reduce their dependence on centralised 
state land-administration processes, and has cut both 
the costs and the time involved in obtaining legal titles.
At least twelve major donors (most notably the MCA) 
were involved in establishing communes, with 90% 
donor funding used to build infrastructure for local 
land offices at commune level. The local land offices 
are accountable to mayors who are mandated to 
appropriate funds for land office-functioning. Financing 
for local land offices is still unresolved and an ongoing 
challenge. Local land offices in the 257 communes that 
received external financing had to take charge of their 
own costs when international donors retreated from 
2009 and extension/technical support services were 
not yet well-established. Therefore since 2009, govern-
ment has been forced to give financial and technical 
autonomy to most local land offices. 
Where donors were involved the implementation 
of the local land offices was supported for the first 
two years. There is a noticeable difference in the 
resources of local land offices equipped, where 
donor funding was involved. Where no donors were 
involved the municipality had to subsidise the 
local land office expenses. Where municipalities 
were unable to support the wages of the local 
land officers, these officials did in some cases not 
receive their wages for a long period of time.
(Mino Ramaroson – Hardi-Madagascar Director, 
pers comm, 18 April 2011)
In the wake of this, two-thirds of the communes had 
managed in 2010 to maintain their land offices, but 
funding for on-going technical support, monitoring 
and training remain crucial if there is to be a sustain-
able and efficient transfer of skills to the communes. 
Through the decentralised process, communes are 
equipped with tools to improve the land administration 
in their areas, predominantly through land tax incomes 
and land rights certification. 
While donor funding was essential to setting up local 
structures, the sustainability of local land offices de-
pends on partial or full state support became inevitable 
when the donor funding came to an end. The additional 
funding to supplement state support was then narrowly 
and problematically linked to the generation of local 
Table 13: Decentralised institutional framework
Source: Ramaroson et al ILC/PLAAS 2010
Administrative subdivision Land management responsibility
Central government Ministry of land and other land related departments
Region (former provinces) Co-ordinating role for the actors in decentralisation process – 
exactly what it should be has not been clarified
District Devolved land management system (land management services)
Commune Communal land management at municipal office/local land office 
(decentralised management system)
Fokontany Elected local recognition committee
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land taxes and the income generated from local land 
certification. However, the incomes of local land offices 
vary and can be a problem, where payments for the cer-
tification process are not easily recoverable and prop-
erty taxes are not properly enforced by the communes. 
Therefore, the main revenue source for local land offices 
is generated from the state fiscus. The fiscal allocation 
received by the commune was upgraded from 9 million 
Ariary (AR) (US$45 299) to 12 million (US$60 399) in the 
2011 financial year for supporting the commune to fund 
the local land offices. The salaries of the two local office 
officials (around 150 000 AR (equivalent to 74US$) per 
month/per official - meant to be covered by the revenues 
raised by land tax and certification) = are increasingly 
the commune’s responsibility although the majority 
of the communes do not have the financial capacity 
to cover salaries. However, communes did not receive 
clear budget prescriptions from central government and 
increased allocations to the communes’ budgets were 
not always allocated to local offices.  Therefore most 
communes did not know that the increase in the budget 
was supposed to benefit the local land office manage-
ment. They were further confused as the communes 
received this increase in state funding irrespective of 
whether they had an existing local land office or not. The 
result was that many local land officers were often not 
paid for long periods.
Only a few communes can manage the local land 
office and most mayors argue they need budgetary 
support to manage and operate local land offices. 
All communes independently decide on the costs of 
land certificates for the recognition of land rights. 
As an elected candidate many mayors do not want 
to alienate their electorate in fear of not being 
re-elected and costs are reduced downwards to the 
detriment of the potential revenue from these land 
taxes. Income from land certificates is also periodic. 
In rural areas many people only applying for land 
certificate and pay for the certificate fees during 
harvest periods when they generate incomes.
(Director of reform and decentralized land 
management, Mr Léon Randriamahafaly, pers 
comm, 18 April 2011). 
Land Use Planning
In 2005 a national land use plan was developed to help 
shape regional land use planning or ‘schéma regional 
d’aménagement du territoire’ (SRAT) for the proposed 
fifteen year period. The SRAT extends a mandate to 
the commune to ensure land use planning or ‘schéma 
d’aménagement communal’ (SAC) and leverages 
interaction between regional and local levels. Each 
commune or municipality needs to develop a five year 
communal development plan or ‘plan communal de 
développement’ (PCD) as a guideline for developing 
its respective land areas. This process is not yet 
internalised and uniformly used by all the communes. 
Only a few of the communes have their respective land 
use document available or are in a position to update 
it. Where municipalities have the five year communal 
development plan, the funding for implementing the 
projects inside the commune development plan re-
mains a hindering factor. Additionally, not many mayors 
have the technical capacity to perform such tasks. 
As an additional tool to assist communes the Local 
Plan for Land Occupation (Plan Local d’Occupation 
Foncière - PLOF³) was introduced. This tool, developed 
through participatory local land parcelling, can assist 
in creating the commune development plan. The 
boundaries of the certified plots are recorded on the 
commune PLOF. This acts as a record of the legal 
status of each plot, its title, and area and by default, the 
local land office under which it falls. The Local Land 
Local land offices have four main functions: they legally empower local communities to defend and protect 
their land rights; they strengthen the role of local government in land management; they provide maps that 
can help to identify land targeted by investors, competition for land use and potential links between economic 
activities (agriculture, cattle breeding, wood harvesting, etc.); and they provide a first recourse to authority in 
resolving conflicts (Burnod et al 2011).
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Hardi was involved in implementing the second local land office in Miadanandriana in Madagascar. The model 
of the local land office based on Hardi’s and CFA’s (Cellule Foncière Alaotra: land centre in Alaotra region) 
experiences helped the National land programme to promote and further develop local land offices. The 
implementation of the local land office in Miadanandriana helped to cement the following steps in setting up 
local land offices:
•	 Constructing	and	building	the	office;
•	 Data	collection	on	the	local	land	use/occupancy	through	the	computerising	of	data	as	a	way	of		record-
keeping and to assist in planning;
•	 The	data	assisted	in	drafting	a	land	use	and	occupancy	plan	or	‘Plan		Locale	d’Occupation	Foncière’	
(PLOF);
•	 Local	land	officials	or	agents	were	trained	on	land	statute	laws;	
•	 Implementation	of	citizen	mapping	(which	is	a	participatory	mapping	on	land	use	and	local	land	owner-
ship recognised by the community); and  
•	 Developing	the	local	land	office	to	look	at	land	as	a	tool	for	local	development	and	how	to	use	the	local	
land office service for local development: help in collecting land taxes, in land planning and integrated 
development schemes
Table 5: The research areas
Region District Commune Category of 
commune
No. of 
villages
Population Areas
Analamanga Ankazobe Fihaonana 2nd category (rural) 18 18 600 382km²
Analamanga Ambohidratrimo Ampanotokana 2nd category (rural) 29 15 757 115km²
Figure 13: The research areas
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³Nearly 300 PLOFS have been developed so far. 
Figure 14: Analamanga Region Figure 15: Ankazobe district 
Figure 16: Ambohidratrimo
Occupation Plan is illustrated using satellite images or 
aerial photographs of plot layouts, or older technology 
such as topography, according to reference marks such 
as roads, rivers, unique trees, rocks, flood banks or rice 
plantations (Teyssier, 2010).
PLOF gives to the mayor a global view of the 
area of land occupation in the commune and this 
is the plan that frames the commune planning 
for development of the commune. PLOF is also 
an asset for the mayor to discuss in his relation 
with the state and the area that can be allocated 
to investment, not that the mayor can authorsze 
it but a dialogue with the commune and the 
state can be facilitated on this basis. However 
the PLOF requires technical infrastructure and 
is not available for all the communes of the 
country because of the costs involved to purchase 
the programme and training on it. It is really 
expensive to update the PLOF because of the lack 
of computerized baseline data, plans that are 
damaged and unfinished land surveys. 
(Former Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and 
Fisheries, Mr Harison Randriarimanana, pers 
comm, 2011). 
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Local case studies  
Fihonana and Ampanotokana Rural 
Communes
Two rural communes in the Analamanga region were 
visited to examine the decentralised land governance 
system in action.
Ankazobe and Ambohidratrimo districts were visited, 
which are situated in the Analamanga region extending 
the North of the capital, Antananarivo. The Analamanga 
region is divided into eight districts and 134 communes. 
It has an area of 17 563 km² and a total population of 3 
324 887 inhabitants.
Interviews were conducted with respondents from the 
local municipalities, the local land offices and the local 
recognition committee. Interviews were arranged and 
set up through a local land rights non-governmental or-
ganisation - Hardi Madagascar - based in Antananarivo. 
Hardi played an instrumental role in equipping the local 
land office officials with technical skills through training 
and information dissemination, building understanding 
of the law and addressing of local tenure disputes. 
Respondents were asked about the current situation 
regarding land access and security of tenure under 
customary land ownership, which was now legislated 
in legal security in the communes of Fihonana and 
Ampanotokana.
The two sites for the field visit were selected on the 
basis of their land context: land holdings are divided ac-
cording to inheritance rules with share cropping and an 
on-going legal process to access land by legal individual 
land titling. Ampanotokana commune is relatively well 
resourced commune, while Fihonana lacked similarly 
adequate resource.
 The two communes included in the study are located 
along the national road which goes to the north western 
part of the country.  Ampanotokana (the commune) in 
the Ankazobe district is situated alongside the national 
road, approximately 30km from Antananarivo. Fihao-
nana, situated on the Ambohidratrimo district, is further 
inland and is approximately 60km from Antananarivo. 
The informality and uncertainty of land ownership 
prevalent today means that poor families in the 
communes have difficulty in transferring property and 
are reluctant to invest in improving the land they farm. 
In addition, many of the poor inhabitants lack other 
personal assets to enable investments, even if they are 
willing to do so; and inadequately recorded land assets 
cannot be applied as loan collateral in formal financial 
institutions. Consequently, producers cannot access 
credit to purchase supplies to expand production and 
reach domestic or export markets. In addition, the 
land registration system through the central system 
was an expensive and slow paper system which was 
largely inaccessible to people living in rural areas, and 
a reluctance to register land parcels are evident. In the 
communes, kinship relations continue to underpin local 
social relations and land holding strongly reflects the 
cultural identity of sharing land and inheritance. There 
is no regulation on the size of land you may hold as long 
as you can prove occupancy. Land parcels are often 
divided between roads that act as boundaries. In both 
communes the average landholding is approximately 
2- 4hectares. The customary land in the communes 
is generally comprised of holdings and commons. 
Holdings consist of rice paddies or agricultural land, 
individual trees, and irrigation canals. The commons 
include pastureland, water resources (in some 
instances irrigation canals), and selected forest lands. 
Underexploitation of agricultural land is evident in both 
communes.  Less than 7% of the territory from the 
Commune rurale
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Rice paddies in the communes Fruit stall
communes is cultivated in ther districts, although the 
areas have potential production development (Radison 
et al, 2007).
The livelihood foundation in the region is predominantly 
agriculture, including rice cultivation in lowland. This 
is also closely reflected in Fihaonana and in Ampano-
tokana where the most important crops are rice and 
potatoes, while other important agricultural products 
cultivated are maize, beans, cassava and sweet pota-
toes, some eucalyptus and wood for charcoal. Villagers 
have only one rice harvest per year. In general the rice 
fields vary from 15ha in the lowlands to an average of 
3ha of highlands. Some granite exploitation also takes 
place. In Fihaonana the established mineral water 
company is a large employer through the exploitation of 
the Eau Vive natural mineral water sources. Ampanoto-
kana is in close proximity to the capital and inhabitants 
are supplementing livelihoods with employment in 
Antananarivo.
Commune/Local government 
At the beginning of 2007, the United States govern-
ment’s Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 
and the World Bank made funding available for the 
establishment of 250 communes and supported 90% 
of the operating costs to pilot the new system (Teyssier 
2010). Before the shift towards decentralisation, no land 
management was conducted on the local municipal 
level. Yet 80% of land disputes were at municipal level. 
The central role of the mayor under the new system 
of decentralised services is therefore to ensure good 
governance of land and hold accountability for it. There 
are currently 312 local land offices for 1 410 munici-
palities in the country. The mayor Louisette Septor-
Rasendravololona of Ampanotokana, also suggests that 
the new land management statutes mandate mayors to 
take up this role: 
Mayors may be political appointments but this land 
management is not a political issue and mayors 
also need to be trained. Not all the mayors have 
all the information and lack the comprehension 
of decentralised land management and this is an 
unhealthy situation. Mayors need to work with 
the agent and control the land and make sure the 
sustainability of local land offices is resolved. It is 
important to provide the basis of decentralised land 
reform. The mayor may exit but the local land office 
and agent is a long-term institution so that the 
process of monitoring the work and enforcement 
is an important factor. To have the system 
sustainable and continuous it is not only financial 
and resources constraints that hamper certain local 
offices but also capacity strengthening, not only at 
the local land office level, but also at the municipal 
level. In terms of the decentralised level it is not 
just about the local land office service delivery 
but it is about the municipal approach to land in 
its jurisdiction. There is still a need to change the 
attitudes in respect of local land management 
and to sensitise citizens because people are still 
cautious and doubting the balanced value of title 
and certificate.                
(Pers comm, 21 April 2011)
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Local land offices
The two communes have one local land office each 
for their areas. The state of the local land office varies 
depending on the financial resources at their disposal. 
It was evident that the local land office in Ampanoto-
kana is far better equipped than the local land office in 
Fihaonana. Local Land Offices (LLOs) are the main tools 
with which the communes deliver land certificates to 
poor farmers. Mayors play a significant role in the state 
of affairs of not only the land management, but also 
the local land offices. The more dynamic the mayor, 
the greater the likelihood that the financial situation 
will be more positive as the mayor, apart from the fiscal 
allocation, leverages resources from other sources such 
as international donors. The mayor in Ampanotokana 
engages Swedish donors to contribute to the operation 
of the commune and a portion of the funding is inserted 
into the operations of the local land office. Thus the 
inequality between local land offices is a remaining  
legacy from donor influence. This is also evident in the 
broader roll--out of the local land offices, where donors 
were involved in establishing the offices. These appear 
to be far more equipped and resourced with technology 
to record land pockets, develop a land use plan and  
keep it updated through computerised data recording, 
etc. Some offices are under-resourced and this is 
evident in Fihaonana, and both communes are overbur-
dened and responsible for larger areas where no land 
office exists yet. Both offices are unable to complete the 
recording of land pockets and further develop land use 
plans as a result of incomplete cadastres. 
The scarcity of resources often hampers the work of the 
local land offices.
Local land office in Fihaonana has no 
electricity and depends on a generator.
The Ampanotokana office is a well-
equipped office
Local land official in Ampanotokana with a map of land use in the area in the 
background
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Local land officer and recognition committee
Each local land office employs two officials, commonly 
referred to as agents by the commune.  These officials 
receive the applications via the local recognition com-
mittee. Depending on whether land is certified or not, 
they would do the recording. When the application is 
registered it is referred to the commune with a request 
to the municipality to recognise the application. 
Once the application is recognised, a public notice is 
issued at the commune and displayed in three visible 
places in the village:
Local recognition committees
The Local Recognition Committees in the villages in the 
two communes combine the local governance at the 
village level (where the chiefs are elected) with the state 
institution at a communal level (where the mayors are 
elected).  These committees (18 in Fihaonana and 29 in 
Ampanotokana) adjudicate the local land rights of the 
villagers under their jurisdiction. These are recorded 
in a Local Plan for Land Occupation (PLOF) setting out 
certified boundaries and land use (Teyssier et al 2008). 
In both communes, members consisting of both men 
and women are elected at the fokontany level, which is 
the lowest unit recognised by government and includes 
land user associations. Their election is based on 
their extensive knowledge of each of the areas in their 
respective villages and they have the ability to do the 
work because they are recognised authorities in their 
villages. The committee has a one year term. 
However since election some local recognition 
committees have not had a re-election. 
(Mayor Louisette Septor-Rasendravololona, 
Ampanotokana pers comm, 21 April  2011)
After the elections the local recognition committee 
receives a once-off training by the PNF officials. Training 
includes information about the land law, how the 
local land office operates, and their role in the land 
certification process. Further active knowledge transfer 
continues as issues arise and with the support of the 
appointed local land officer. The primary role of the local 
recognition committees is to monitor the land owner-
ship at the local village level, justify ownership with their 
knowledge of the land in the area, i.e. that land belongs 
to applicants, record land pockets in respective villages, 
and mediate at local level if there are land and bound-
ary conflicts. 
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Land application
Land application has increased substantially in the 
communes although continued sceptism remains 
about whether the process will provide ‘real rights’. The 
process is however an open and inclusive process: 
The land recognition committee is advised to do 
the recognition process. They are on the field to 
do the survey (measuring the land, register the 
boundaries and what is on the field). This is written 
in a report. When they come from the field they give 
fifteen ) days for people to give opposition, and 
start the application for land certificates. If there 
is an opposition they call the committee and send 
it directly to district councillor. When they receive 
application they are obliged to put notice up at 
three different places. They don’t have linkages 
with the district. If one person doesn’t accept the 
report, that individual has to take it to them.  If 
there is no devolved service in this district, they 
have to go Antananarivo.
(Local land officer, Ampanotokana, pers comm, 21 
April 2011).
The application for certification involves a number of 
costs. 
You have to pay fee for the land because it is still 
state land because it is 500AR [US$0.25] per acre 
[0.4 ha)’
(Local land officer, Ampanotokana, pers comm, 21 
April 2011).
Fees payable to the local land office for application 
depend on the size of the land being applied for: 
•	 From	0	-5	acre	[2.0ha]costs	2000	Ariary	(AR)	
[US$0.25]
•	 6	-15	acre	[2.4-6.0ha]	costs	3000AR	[US$1.49	]
•	 16	-	99	acre	[6.47-40.06ha]	costs	5000AR	[US$2.49	]
•	 Above	one	ha	costs	10	000AR	[US$4.97].	(However,	
the majority of applications are for smaller plots of 
± 50 acre [20.2ha], in line with the dominant small 
scale subsistenCE farming in the village areas).
Notice board at the local land office in 
Fihaonana
Notification of application for 
certification at the Ampanotokana 
local land office
Local Plan for Land Occupation in 
Ampanotokana
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An additional amount of 25 000AR [US$12.44] is 
for the recognition process and a further 30 000AR 
[US$14.92] is applicable for the land certificate and 
notice fee. There are periods where no certification of 
land is requested. This falls together with the harvest 
seasons. Hence for many inhabitants payments of fees 
are problematic. While this varies, communes do make 
concessions and applicants are allowed to pay the total 
amount over 3-4 periods (normally in line with harvest 
periods).
This is a rural area and people depend on incomes 
during the harvest season. The affordability of 
people to do the certification is an endless problem 
and we are looking at options so that it is more 
accessible but people still say they can’t afford it.  
Even if it is free, people will still complain about it.
(Mayor Louisette Septor-Rasendravololena, 
Ampanotokana, pers comm, 21 April 2011)
Land certification
If applicants wish to apply for the certification of land, 
the following should be presented to the local recogni-
tion committee: 
- An identity card.
- Explain the location where land parcels should 
be certified (who are the neighbours, boundaries, 
etc.).
- Produce relevant documents that can verify and 
justify that the land belongs to the applicant, 
including documents that say that the parcels 
rightfully belong  to the applicant by inheritance 
(e.g. documents written and signed by all the 
heirs, a document to prove that he is really the 
son/daughter/family member of the deceased and 
that the land belonged to the deceased, and even 
sometimes, the death certificate of the deceased), 
and receipt of taxes that were paid on the land.
- The sale contract signed at fokontany or commune 
level if the land was bought.
Certification is the main administrative role of the 
mayors who - mandated by a certification act - ensure 
that all procedures are respected and followed before 
certificates are issued. To deliver a land certificate, 
local land officers have to receive the application for 
land certification, register the application with the 
commune, and ensure community representation 
takes place through local recognition committees. This 
entails physical visits to villages. 
Communes appropriate budgets (generally the per 
diem of the recognition committees and other expected 
costs). The local land officers described a system of 
reporting to mayors and using the specific monitor tools 
of weekly meetings to oversee the process (these are 
not always possible in Fihaonana as the responsibilities 
of the mayor often interfere with this compliance tool) 
and report updates. 
The report stipulates:
- when the recognition will be;
- who will be in recognition committee;
- notice about decision;
- when the notice is  going to be issued; and 
- the agent writing a report about conflict and 
process.
The mayors also monitored the duration of the process, 
which concluded following the recognition process 
when the land certificate is signed and granted, the 
land parcel is registered and the land certificate 
released.  In Ampanotokana and Fihaonana   the PLOF 
is electronically updated because of access to the 
topographic software. 
Land certificates allow for immediate formalisation 
of transactions such as land sales, inheritances and 
leases. However the holders of land certificates are 
provided with opposable rights by third parties (i.e. if 
an opposing title exists on the land) or where the state 
implements expropriation (Teyssier et al 2010). 
The process of local land certification has delivered, 
despite the challenges. Previously undocumented 
transactions are now recognised land transactions 
(Ramaroson et al, 2010): 
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In Fihaonana 220 applications were filed and the local 
land office has delivered 77 land certificates since the 
beginning of 2011.  At least 30 of these were certifica-
tions of land applied for by women. In Ampanotokana, 
67 certificates were delivered from 91 applications 
between 2009 to mid-2011.
Customary recognition
In both villages local village heads traditionally held 
virtual control over land distribution. Villagers relied 
upon the opinions of the elders (mostly men) that land 
should benefit the whole community. The division and 
attribution of land were not documented and legitimacy 
was derived from local honour agreements:
Villagers would meet and discuss land requests and 
after conclusion hands were shaken and the deals 
were done. 
(Local recognition committee member at 
Fihaonana, pers comm, 2011) 
This reliance on oral agreements is problematic when 
it comes to being recognized under modern legal land 
registry systems (Evers, 2006). 
Under the new legal framework clarifying existing 
rights in their diversity and giving them legal 
recognition helps with the conception of local 
land rights.  Land certificates now endorsed by 
local land offices are therefore viewed as a long 
term legal innovation, but for the innovation to 
contribute to rural people’s livelihood it is also 
conditional to ensuring and crafting regulation 
institutions that are relevant to the local people.
(District chief, Mr Daniel Rabary, per comm, 18 
April 2011).  
The former first president of the Supreme Court 
(honorary title), Mme Rakotobe, who was instrumental 
in framing the new statute, confirmed that the new 
framework gives recognition to customary practices in 
the law: 
Land certificate: cover Land certificate: inside
Land registers at the local land office
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Social recognition which is the most common form of land holding recognized in customary practices with 
aspects integrated into the reformed legal framework (law 2005-019), through the establishment of the local 
recognition committee (composed by elected and recognised elders and leaders of the community, municipal 
advisors and an administrator)
Verbal agreement with witnesses: a type of verbal contract between two persons, used in case of for example 
leases. However this is a problematic claim as witnesses tend to rarely guarantee the transaction and vouch 
for its legitimacy if and when it was necessary for the social recognition of ownership
Documented right: land certificate/petit papiers (little papers), signed by two parties at commune level, 
represent ownership of land for people at local level
The law specifically recognised the rights of 
individuals and groups to unregistered land and so 
we’re seeing the concretisation of land by the users 
while it gives weight to the ancestor notion [of land 
holding]. The law on land certification recognises 
the rights of people who exploited land on a 
customary basis and provided procedures for land 
registration which had previously been considered 
state land. 
Hence the decentralisation of land management 
and the supporting legal framework recognises 
customary ownership of land which is based on 
local, ancestral custom rules. Locally recognised 
use may now be turned into official land certificates 
and through the local custom system ancestral land 
can now be protect (sic) against those from outside 
the kinship of the village grouping who wants (sic) 
to alienate land. Therefore you can decrease the 
level of conflict like there was before. The law of 
2006 however does not permit grazing land to be 
registered extending this recognition to grazing 
land.
(Pers comm, 20 April 2011)
However, at a local level as portrayed by the commune, 
these where contrasted by a different and sceptical 
response from those who stand to be affected by 
legitimising the customary laws as described by the 
local land recognition committee in Ampanotokana: 
Villagers view rights as derived from the ancestors; 
people therefore believe they already hold 
‘ancestral’ title. Hence for them, the ancestral 
customary rules and practices concerning land 
ownership offer sufficient security and protection 
and therefore they do not see the need for any 
official proof, particularly where there is a threat 
that their customary rights may be at risk of being 
lost where overlapping claims have been made. 
Observing similar patterns in the two communes,  Evers 
(2002) suggests that this may  illustrate that people see 
the downside of land registration, - besides the uncer-
tainty  of  inadequate provision of information about 
land registration on a local level where land had already 
been in use by the same families for generations - as a 
superfluous and expensive tool, which even after land 
registration has been completed will only lead to added 
costs due to a land-tax levied by the state, which may be 
unaffordable to people. 
There are many villagers who do not see the need 
to certify their plots. They may be scared or they 
are concerned about the costs involved. There are 
many poor people in our village and they live from 
the fields.
(Local recognition committee member, Fihaonana, 
per.comm, 21 April 2011)
Figure 14: Types of local level recognition of land rights
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Women’s access to land
The process of decentralisation holds many benefits 
but there are still gaps with regards to women’s access 
to land. Customary land tenure practices traditionally 
resulted in land being passed from father to son. 
Daughters and other relatives inherited land only in the 
absence of sons. Although current law states that male 
and female children have equal rights of inheritance, 
it is still common for land to be given to male children 
(Huntington 1988). Women’s access to land reflects the 
tradition of the various regions, e.g. in the highlands, a 
certain number of women may have the land jointly with 
husbands and there are more women with individual ti-
tles in the central island (four regions). The significance 
of customary practices, which are deeply rooted, and 
widely accepted by local population, shapes whether 
and how women access land. Matrilineal inheritance 
exists within some groups. The law N° 68-012 of 1968 
on Inheritance stipulates that both daughters and 
sons have the right to inherit equally. Where no clear 
will exists to indicate inheritance succession of land, 
it is passed without distinction of sex in a hierarchical 
family order - i.e. to children; followed by grandchildren; 
to fathers, mothers; brothers and sisters; children of 
the brothers and sisters; uncles and aunts; cousins; 
spouses and if the family does not exist, it reverts back 
to the state) (Ramaroson, et al 2010). With a rapidly 
growing rural population, equal inheritance of land may 
increase land fragmentation as land parcels will have 
to be further divided to ensure equity. Therefore, equal 
inheritance is often viewed negatively (Evers et al., 2006; 
Freudenberger and Freudenberger, 2002).
The common practice is that, despite the legal recogni-
tion of women’s tenure security, most rural women 
access land rights through their male relatives, such as 
their husband, father or brother and where they have 
been benefitting through inheritance, there is reluc-
tance to take charge of the responsibility of land,and 
commonly such land is left in the care of brothers when 
they move to the husbands’ villages. Nonetheless, in the 
event of widowhood or divorce, women retain the right 
to reclaim the land nonetheless (Leisz, 1998). Where 
women have land jointly with husbands, Ramaroson, et 
al (2010) highlights that:
 In terms of patrimony and access to land and 
concerning women’s rights in the civil code, it is 
specified that the legal and customary marriages 
are recognized by the law. In the law N° 67-030 on 
December 1967 modified by the one N° 90-014 in 
1990, it is stated that in case of divorce, the wife and 
husband will get the same share. However, because 
of ignorance, the traditional division in thirds is 
maintained. 
The decentralisation process has made an impact on 
women’s land access and there is a noticeable increase 
in women’s access to land. Of the 45 000 papiers 
issued by June 2009, 6 100 (21%) were registered in 
women’s names (Teyssier, 2010). Both Fihaonana and 
Ampanotokana have been proactive and progressive 
on the women’s statute and their rights on land at the 
commune level although the application of women’s 
land rights varies from tribe to tribe. Migrants from 
others part of the country, such as the southern tribes, 
still implement their own customs in their households 
and smaller communities and there are still women 
disadvantaged in security of tenure and accessing 
land independently. There is, however, evidence in both 
communes that the customary practices have evolved 
and the women are able to access and own land equally 
through the inheritance process. 
Gender equity has no link to land applications but 
women do apply. There are many more but not all 
of them have the necessary official documents such 
as their identity documents.
(Local Recognition Committee Member, 
Fihaonana, pers comm, 2011)
Women are still reluctant to certify their rights as 
a result of custom, but we do see women coming 
forward to claim certification, mostly out of fear of 
losing land to someone else in the family.   
(Recognition committee member, Ampanotokana,  
pers comm, 2011)
However, there is still a need to inform some traditional 
authorities about the recent land reforms and statutory 
changes described above, and a great need to inform 
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women about their rights; provide the necessary 
training to negotiate for these rights and encourage 
women to make use of the local land offices (Teyssier, 
2010). The dominant practice of land access and 
secured tenure is still viewed as men’s business and 
between the majority of couples, lands are certified 
and registered in husbands’ names (Mayor Louisette 
Septor-Rasendravololona, Ampanotokana, pers comm, 
21 April 2011). 
Challenges of decentralised land 
management highlighted by the 
case studies and institutional 
representatives
Capacity of communes
According to the directorate on land management,  
land management at the local level should ideally be 
funded 100% by registration fees and land taxation. 
However, the majority of the rural communes lack 
sufficient finances, contrary to the expectations that 
when the land management functions are decentral-
ised, communes would become more self-sufficient. 
Currently over 70% of the resources of communes 
are allocated from central government which means 
communes need to supplement funding with municipal 
revenues. Yet intensifying their own revenues remains 
marginal for most communes. There is a constant 
attempt to balance the revenues with the constituency 
and the payment of revenues becomes a ‘political 
playball’. The commune councils decide individually on 
the fees for certification and consider the affordability 
of this process and re-adjust it as deemed necessary.  
Land tax incomes are still very low and systematically 
under-recovered. This under-recovery is also politically 
motivated. In some communes mayors will retain low 
property taxes to retain their constituency. For decen-
tralisation to work, revenue mobilisation at a local level 
is crucial or else there will continue to be a substantial 
differences between communes, and these local institu-
tions will not be able to upscale local delivery (World 
Bank 2004). The challenge of increasing the revenue on 
land is a contentious issue and under regular debate:
The overhaul of this situation needs a shift in 
attitude and sensitisation on the level of citizenship 
and their obligation. Some of the revenue raised 
from taxes and fees is invested in developing land 
use plans (PLOF), demarcate the land categories 
and pave the way for local economic development. 
So in essence it hampers local development. 
(Mr Eric, pers comm, 2011) 
Rice paddies in Ampanotokana
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The local land offices thus remain under-resourced. 
This is a constraint for local land officers who struggle 
with, amongst other things, mobility and getting to 
communes to be present in land meetings at the village 
level. 
We have to go to villages to meet with the 
recognition committee by foot or bicycle. Some of 
the villages are 25-30 km from the offices. Similarly 
when the recognition committee needs to come 
here, there is not always transport available (local 
land officers).
(Fihaonana and Ampanotokana, 2011) 
Judge Mme Rakotobe warns against the political power 
at play at a local level, in particular the politicisation of 
mayoral powers (Pers comm, 20 April 2011). Similarly, 
both local officials and national officials pointed to the 
danger of this in land administration service and the 
incentives to mayors that enable them to hold on to 
power and authority.
Most official respondents concluded that for imple-
mentation of decentralisation to be effective, laws at 
the local level should effectively mandate total land 
management at commune level, devoid of politics. In 
addition, the capacity of local level communes’ land 
competence varies and needs different intensity of 
investments to bring all of the communes on par. The 
response from central government is to not completely 
devolve all aspects of local level land administration and 
they are reluctant to give up all their powers over land. 
These points have also been highlighted by the Director 
of Reform and Decentralised Land Management, Mr 
Léon Randriamahafaly 2011) and was amplified by the 
Mayor of Ampanotokana:
The decentralised policy would have to reconsider 
the training of the mayors, the chairpersons at 
municipal council level and other councillors that 
are involved in arbitration of land. They need to 
be capacitated, and supported to meet objectives 
or effectively apply their powers to oppose 
registration where necessary. At each level and for 
each group needs training and approach.
(Mayor Louisette Septor-Rasendravololona, pers 
comm, 21 April 2011)
Unresolved land categories  
Municipalities have full or total autonomy over land in 
their jurisdiction with the exclusion of non-titled private 
land. In Ampanotokana 4% of the land is titled, the rest 
is non-titled in excess of 100km². Of this, 30% of the 
land is in a cadastral process while 20% is reserved 
for conservation (forestry). According to the mayor, 
Louisette Septor-Rasendravololona,
There is a specific landscape that gives the 
character to this commune and they want to 
preserve the character of the commune. This may 
create tension as some of the land that should be 
under conservation is already under usage and the 
commune may have to relocate those land users.
(Pers comm, 21 April 2011)
In contrast to Ampanotokana, the picture is relatively 
different in Fihaonana, where the biggest challenge 
is the uncertainty of more than 70% of the land in the 
commune ,due to incomplete cadastre processes. Of 
eighteen fokontany,  eleven  villages have been included 
in the cadastre whereas in the remaining seven villages 
land was part of an unfinished cadastre operation in 
1935. While the cadastre is significantly out-dated, the 
land that has been surveyed cannot be managed by 
the local land office, and is still regarded as state land. 
The commune, with the assistance of Hardi, requested 
the national land authority to be granted a part of this 
land to be managed under the commune jurisdiction. 
However the process is still on-going and remains an 
unresolved issue. The seconded biggest challenge in 
the commune is the private titled land still owned by 
expatriates and colonial industries, many of whom left 
when they relocated back to their countries of origin. 
(Pers  comm, Mino Ramaroson Director Hardi, 17 April  
2011). 
Land and boundary conflicts
Numerous land conflicts emanate from the local level 
due to overlapping rights. These include villagers 
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(commonly referred to as migrants) who urbanised and 
obtained land in the cities while retaining a hold on land 
in the villages. Families of such migrants or villagers 
access large parts of land held in this way through local 
negotiations by obtaining a ‘petit papier’. The first point 
of response to conflict is through the local recognition 
committee who embark on a recognition process of 
land rights verification based on the customary oral his-
tory. When the conflict is not resolved in this manner, 
the local recognition committee reports to the local land 
office agent who is mandated to write a report, and and 
another meeting is scheduled to verify the accounts 
of all the parties involved.  The local land officers try to 
mediate the land conflicts in the same way.. Following 
this process the mayor writes a municipal judgment: 
‘not a decision it is more than that’ ( Mayor Louisette 
Septor-Rasendravololona, Ampanotokana, pers comm, 
21 April 2011).
The mayor further elaborated that in the event of no 
resolution, the conflict is taken to the council members 
of the municipality and the designated councillors make 
a judgment and decide who will win or lose or they try 
to negotiate a win/win situation to both parties.
The local court is led by chairperson of the 
municipal council, two councillors and the local 
land agent who becomes the secretary. It’s a 
local court and the chairperson makes sure that 
no one is linked to the people involved. There is 
no mediation but only judgement based on the 
document of the land officer and the subsequent 
mayor’s conclusion. The process is fair and just and 
the chairperson has to be impartial and avoid links. 
The chairperson is obliged to give a judgment and 
inform the mayor of his/her decision (judgement). 
All the involved parties are given 20 days to make 
an appeal at devolved service level (district) and 
if there is an appeal the parties go directly to the 
district court. 
(Pers comm, 21 April 2011)
If the conflict is resolved, following the 20 day period, 
the mayor will sign a land certificate with the judgement 
of the council chairperson.
The idea behind the decentralisation process is to 
ease the land certification process so we all have to 
respect the process. It is a strategic approach that 
is good for the rural person; it gives willingness to 
access the service at local level and avoid the time 
burden. 
(Mayor of Ampanotokana, Louisette Septor-
Rasendravololona pers comm, 2011). 
In the event that conflicts are not resolved at commune 
level the process is moved to the district; if still unre-
solved, the dispute and legal process around the land 
conflict go to a court of law.
Migrants
Locally, migrants are regarded as those villagers who 
have migrated to the urban areas, most often the 
children of the villagers. They often constitute the 
current affluent portion of the population who left the 
village for fulltime, secured employment i.e. profes-
sionals, government employees, teachers, etc. While 
land had been allocated to these migrants (‘absentee 
landlords’) through the customary inheritance system, 
they have often never, or rarely occupied the land and 
villagers - either without permission or through local 
negotiations - occupied the land. As a result of their ab-
sence, migrants are regarded as ‘outsiders’.  Tensions 
between local villagers and so-called migrants have 
systematically increased with the introduction of local 
land offices. Gradually, more migrants want to secure 
their land and register their land rights (Fihaonana, LRC 
2011). Local occupiers’ security of tenure is threatened 
by this and these are the majority of locals who take the 
opportunity to secure their rights. Their claim is based 
on the Malagasy tradition that by their proven occupa-
tion they have been ‘(i) taking possession of the fruits 
of the land; and (ii) bearing agricultural risk’ which 
according to their view ensures their legitimate access 
to the land, as direct cultivators (Bellemare, 2010).
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Training and information 
dissemination
In general, all the respondents describe the laws as 
good laws and achieving the majority of respondents 
were positive that the objectives of the land decentrali-
sation process are broadly met in its implementation, 
but since these laws are in the implementation stage, 
jurisprudence and adjustments are needed. Therefore 
the practical implementation of laws needs constant 
systemisation. The legal framework is flexible and you 
can make certain amendments as long as the princi-
ples on which the decentralised legal system is 
founded are adhered to.  For everyone to keep up with 
implementation and its lessons, continued training is 
needed.
The lack of capacity and the need to build and 
strengthen capacity at local level is widely recognised 
as enhancing the local level responsibility and ac-
countability. However a retention problem exists with 
land agents at the local offices who, after they received 
training and ,built their experience, leave for greener 
pastures. 
The idea is they have to stay for longer and the 
land program needs to assess compulsory terms to 
retain the skills longer.
(Mr. Zo Ravelomanantsoa, pers comm, 19 April 
2011)
The modernisation process started at a central level 
to ensure the land registry is updated, while at this 
level efficiency is enhanced with technology, local 
level needs to achieve the same level of efficiency on 
a broader base, but this is made difficult because 
resources and skills are not evenly distributed at the 
commune level. Judge Mme Rakotobe argues that land 
management decentralisation is in an implementation 
Local judgments over land
The mayor provides the council chair with training on how to make judgements over land disputes under their 
jurisdiction. Currently 50 judges are looking at the local courts and how they are operating to assess how this 
can be formalised at local level. When there is any ambiguity in judgements, the mayor will intervene to help 
in clarifying issues.
phase and lessons are to be learned particularly where 
legal clarity is needed:
For change to be effective private state land needs 
clarification of laws. What is vague in the law is the 
state’s right to sell land even if there are people living 
on the land (Pers comm, 20 April 2011.  
Cost of decentralisation
Significant expectations were raised about the system 
of land titling in Madagascar, yet various role players 
and analysts articulated concerns about affordability. 
For a system of formal titling to be effective in rural 
Madagascar it would have to be inexpensive, yet cost-
effective to be worthwhile (Jacoby and Minten 2005). 
The co-odinator of the National Programme on Land de-
scribed the challenges of the costs of decentralisation:
At a central level the land reform process by PNF 
is currently 100% donor funded.  The current 
funding situation is not sustainable and requires 
application for new funding supplements at 
intervals. At the lowest level it is a local service 
and if the management of the commune is not 
sustainable, the service will not be sustainable. 
The central state funding remains a necessity. With 
mayor powers there is also a need to integrate the 
notion of good governance. It also includes at local 
level and local authorities to manage their land and 
it is easier at each level to manage their spaces and 
land planning.
(Mr Rija Ranaivoson, pers comm, 2011)
The mayor commented: 
With its inception land offices were funded by the 
donor with the goal to later pass the costs to the 
mayoral budget. It is the mayor who signs the land 
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certificate and his/[or her] budget comes from the 
reserves from land taxes.
(Mayor Louisette Septor-Rasendravololona, 
Ampanotokana, pers comm, 21 April  2011)
The former Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisher-
ies, also raised concerns about the cost-implications of 
the decentralisation process:
The Ministry made a good progress when they 
created a decree that the land office cost was tax 
eligible, but subsequently changed that with a 
decree that land offices must be subsidised by 
the government. Therefore the sustainability was 
about land tax income not about donors. Because 
the NFP was supposed to support communes 
in their local land office demands for at least 1-2 
years. In 2005 the principle donor MCA retracted 
their funding  and you can see, depending on 
the capacity and skills of mayor to manage his 
commune, many land offices are still operating, 
albeit not all effectively and efficiently. The truth 
is that the programme has slowed down because 
the state doesn’t have resources to move forward. 
Creating sustainable revenue to contribute to 
the operation of land office land is possible when 
you have an annual tax every year. It needs to be 
considered as a citizen’s obligation. This has not 
yet happened.
(Mr Harison Randriarimanana, pers comm, 20 April  
2011) 
There is a big debate in ministry about the sustainability 
of land office and the local management of land and 
whether it should be regarded as a public service or as 
a revenue source.  At a local level the cost of land regis-
tration and the time had been reduced. Yet communes 
rely on the revenue from the land office which allows for 
the payment of salaries and increased operations. 
Mr Petera Ratolorantsoa, Director of Estate (domaine: 
state lands) and land services suggested:
It is necessary to go back to the drawing board 
and we need to plan according to resources. On 
the one hand we have a situation where; to get a 
land certificate one must apply so the work of the 
land offices depend on demand but sometimes 
demand is not very big. We have to accept that 
some people will hold on to customary belief and 
not certify land for various reasons. The donor 
issued a lot of funding into the process so the trust 
and communal ownership of the process is often 
not there. The country should now customise their 
own programme and approach to decentralisation 
to ensure sustainable ownership.
(Pers comm, 20 April 2011)
The Deputy Director in the National land Programme: 
Modernisation of land services, further suggested:
MCA implemented the work, not only 
giving directives and plotting the process of 
decentralisatio,n, but were also involved in the 
actual implementation. It should have been 
meeting the communes to allow them to articulate 
and establish their needs. Yet it became a top-down 
process and there is no integration of the process 
by the commune.
(Mr Tiana Razafindrakotohary, pers comm, 19 April 
2011)  
The former Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisher-
ies, Mr Harison Randriarimanana, 2011, commented 
critically: 
Decentralisation at local level has been started 
which is a good basis. But there wasn’t a political 
willingness to do the decentralization further 
down to the village level because it stopped at 
the commune level. The fiscal decentralisation 
should have gone to the region but it didn’t so the 
state and the ministry still hold on to its power. 
All the decisions are centralised at national level.  
When you look closely at it you have a reversed 
pyramid. We have a policy which is not effectively 
implemented at a local level and in a few years we 
will have another bottleneck. 
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Key lessons and reflections 
on decentralisation of land 
governance in Madagascar
National land tenure transition
The Madagascar land context required a transition in 
land tenure - with the strong demand for land titles 
(close to half a million requests for titles annually), 
limited capacity for deliverance services (in the last 10 
years land management staff at central level declined 
by 25%) and an insufficient budget allocation. Only 330 
000 titles had been issued since the creation of the land 
administration in 1896 and only 1 000 titles had been 
delivered in the last 15 years before decentralised land 
management in 2005 (Teyssier, 2010). By 2005, Mada-
gascar was left with only 20% of the occupied land titled 
due to: the lack of familiarity with land laws; complexity 
of the individual registration process which required 
several steps (24 in total); long delays which often 
spanned several years; approximately US$350 needed 
to obtain a title; and the bureaucratic requirements for 
high level validation with too many actors involved
 The increasing demand for land services could no 
longer be held by central government alone. While 
there had been stagnation at a central level, at a local 
level there was an active land market and customary 
practices prevailed in the allocation of land and the 
validation of land use. 
Lessons learned
•	 A	major	change	to	the	legal	framework	took	place	
through a participatory process.
•	 Decentralisation	of	land	management	was	
consolidated and received a favourable reception 
from the public opinion.
•	 The	reform	benefited	from	the	converging	support	
of political leaders and financial partners. At a 
national level, there is better streamlining of institu-
tions, policy and implementation processes.
•	 The	Ministry	of	Land	ensured	that	sufficient	sup-
port was in place, both institutionally and fiscally, 
to roll out decentralised services to the lower level. 
•	 Yet	at	the	end	of	2008,	the	Government	still	needed	
to resolve land rights involving former colonial 
plantations, which it wanted to use to develop 
agribusiness plots for foreign companies and to 
diversify the agricultural economy.
•	 The	level	of	control	over	resources	has	been	
retained, despite the devolution of some services.
•	 The	cost	of	decentralisation	was	underestimated.
•	 High	cost	of	initial	investment:	cadastre,	imagery	
and  IT equipment cannot be sustained and applied 
across a broader base.
•	 Donor	involvement	was	necessary	but	also	had	a	
negative impact on the process of decentralising 
land services. Most donors initiated it as a project 
and not a process.  
•	 Legal	constraints,	linked	to	the	maintenance	of	
old land rights and the status of domains such as 
registered indigenous reserves and unachieved 
cadastral operations, which most communes still 
do not have the expertise to engage with effectively.
•	 The	difficult	relationship	that	exists	between	the	
national land administration and the local land 
offices, with the land offices putting pressure on 
the national fiscus and the tensions between power 
of control (at local level) and power holding the 
resources (at national level).   
•	 The	process	is	viewed	as	an	institutional	process	
from which lessons would have to be learned.
•	 Strengthen	the	on-going	process	of	land	reform	by	
consolidating and expanding the network of local 
land offices.
•	 A	need	to	modify	land	fees	and	land	taxes,	and	the	
way in which they are distributed between local 
governments and the State.
Local land administration
The process of decentralised land management came 
about after a process of political and social mobilisation 
by the poor and civil society at large, with concerted 
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efforts to influence political decision-making about 
land rights and land ownership. Before the process of 
localising land management, customary authorities 
played a decisive role in land allocation. 
The demand was to reconcile the legal and what was 
understood to be legitimate, to merge laws that are 
rarely acknowledged with common practices of ‘little 
papers/informal land certificate’ which acknowledged 
with common practices what had not been legally 
recognized to by the central land management. The 
expansion of land authority within local governments 
provided a basis for taxation. Local land governance 
and the forms of public participation in the economic, 
political and social life of the commune have already 
had tangible and visible impacts.
Lessons learned
•	 For	the	commune	it	increases	their	value,	with	
increased power, but more work and challenges.
•	 The	local	actors	who	can	respond	are	close	to	
where land needs are identified: the recognition 
committee, the representative from the commune, 
and where necessary, the village chief, and all the 
neighbours and affected villagers are considered. 
•	 However,	certification	costs	are	still	an	obstacle	for	
the highly destitute land users, even at the local 
level.
•	 The	communes’	boundaries	are	not	clearly	delim-
ited as a result of the deterioration of land records 
and landmark plans  and this makes it difficult for 
the communes to identify the land covered by old 
titles, identify their areas of jurisdiction and agree 
on the delimitation of boundaries which will enable 
them to manage the land in their areas. It has been 
difficult and costly to obtain complete satellite 
images of some of the areas to create detailed local 
land-occupation plans (PLOF). 
•	 There	are	rural	people	excluded	from	the	process:	
those without birth certificates  and therefore no 
identity cards, are not allowed to apply for land 
certificates without the necessary documentation. 
•	 Collecting	fees	for	certification	is	an	incentive	to	
local government to increase the revenue of the 
communes. This aspect still remains a difficult and 
contentious issue and varies from commune to 
commune.  The study indicates very little improve-
ment in property tax yields.
•	 The	lack	of	communication	and	lack	of	knowledge	
of the law may lead to ineffective implementation at 
the commune level.
•	 At	commune	level	there	is	an	opportunity	for	the	
misuse of the power  given to mayors, i.e. in cases 
of land conflict the procedures are clear but often 
ignored in an effort to prevent the social impact of 
land disputes.
•	 Lack	of	knowledge	may	also	lead	to	corruption	and	
exploitation of villagers.
•	 Weak	ownership	of	the	process	by	certain	local	
land offices. Weak capacity of the communal staff 
to manage the land offices. 
Outcomes
•	 Recognition	of	customary	land	rights	and	greater	
security of land.
•	 A	new	mode	of	recognising	land	rights	at	the	local	
level is accessible. 
•	 Depending	on	the	region	villagers	are	now	able	to	
apply to access  credit with their land certificates.
•	 The	level	of	land	conflicts	has	decreased.	For	many	
Malagasy citizens the land certificate does not only 
provide secured tenure, but also removes the risk 
of conflict.
•	 There	is	a	considerable	reduction	in	resources	and	
time, both on the part of land administration and 
local beneficiaries. 
•	 From	the	24	processes	involved	in	registering	
individual title, the current certification process 
covers a minimum of 2 stages, with the average 
issuing time reduced from six years to 3.5 months 
and the average prices paid by applicants have 
been reduced from US$ 507 to US$ 24.
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Conclusion
Madagascar’s process of land tenure transition is 
a lengthy and statutory process, managed from the 
centre through a National Land Programme in its 
attempt to deliver prerogatives to the local level in land 
management. While levels of deconcentration and 
delegation are evident in local land management, the 
challenge that remains is the effective local governance 
of land by the local communes and their abilities to 
manage their local land affairs without dependence 
on the central government. While there is a legal and 
regulatory framework to implement governance over 
land at the local level the regulatory framework does 
not fully ensure accountability and transparency at local 
level. Notwithstanding the structural impediments to 
the decentralisation process, there are many positive 
lessons from the selected case studies which point to 
the potential of the decentralisation process. 
This study provides insights of the role of civil society 
in leveraging public participation and land reform from 
below. The voices of local government emphasise that 
more can be gained from further simplifying arrange-
ments, especially in respect of land surveys and clearer 
fiscal relationships to ensure sustainability of land 
services at the local level. 
In conclusion, the study highlights voices from central 
officials, policy makers and implementers suggesting 
a need for a greater transfer of the competencies to 
local communes, particularly to increase the limited 
local revenue collection, and to provide continued and 
increased support across rural communes until govern-
ance over all local land has been strongly established.
The case study highlights the continued need for 
developing strong local institutions to implement land 
governance in Madagascar, further reducing central 
state control over local land matters. While the state, in 
its efforts to devolve certain functions of land govern-
ance to the local level, meets this commitment in part, 
advancing local democratic land governance hinges 
on further developing conditions to enable democratic 
local governance of land in Madagascar.
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Introduction
The development of the 1997 Land Law is recognised by 
many observers as an exemplary model in democratic 
and participatory law making (Tanner 2002), which in 
itself establishes the importance of a decentralised and 
inclusive process when it comes to policy making and 
legislative development (De Wit et al 2009).  The land 
management and administration system launched by 
this innovative legislation, including the recognition 
of customarily-acquired rights and the mandatory 
‘community consultation’ is also widely regarded as an 
innovative and progressive model for other countries, 
embracing participation and negotiation between local 
people and outside interests, and providing for the 
devolution of important land and natural resources 
management functions to ‘local communities’.  
Other new legislation has in principle given local 
people a strong role in decisions over development and 
planning at local level. These laws include the 2003 
Local Government Bodies Law, the 1997 Environment 
Law with its related regulations on Environmental 
Impact Assessments which require public hearings 
and provide for legal recourse if local environmental 
rights are jeopardised, and the 2007 Territorial Planning 
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* These case studies were originally written for a forthcoming World Bank publication (Tanner 2011)and have been adapted for the specific purposes 
of this chapter.  The author gratefully acknowledges the permission of the World Bank to use this material here.
Christopher Tanner*
Women paralegals trained by the CFJJ/FAO programme talking to community leaders in Manhica, 
Maputo Province, on land law and development questions. Photographer – Ruben Villanueva
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Law which gives a role to local communities in the 
development of ‘District Land Use Plans’ or PDUTs, the 
Portuguese acronym. 
In an ideal world, all of these measures would of 
course have been conceived and implemented within 
a single blueprint or master plan that would ensure 
their coordinated use and mutually reinforcing use 
in pursuit of a more democratic, equitable, and just 
society.  Notwithstanding the evident goodwill of many 
Mozambican policy makers and political leaders, this 
is unfortunately not the case. In fact, it often seems as 
if each of these ‘decentralisations’ has been thought 
up and implemented by one ministry or department, 
with little regard for other decentralisation or devolved 
management mechanisms developed in other depart-
ments or sectors. 
This chapter looks at the impact of this lack of clarity 
and the competing forms of ‘decentralisation’ on local 
people, using two case studies, and other research 
material produced in recent years.  The conclusion is 
that there is much in Mozambique that is commend-
able, and which if properly used, could result in a 
significantly more democratic, equitable, and eco-
nomically productive process on the ground.  However, 
understanding how to make all the various forms of 
decentralisation work together is a major challenge for 
policy makers and civil society alike.  This is especially 
important at a time when major economic interests are 
lining up to gain access to local land and the issue of 
decentralisation and local community rights is evidently 
something of a constraint when fast-tracking large 
investors onto local land.
Decentralised land management at 
community level 
The fact that most land administration in Mozambique 
is handled by customary structures of one sort or 
another was recognised at the time of the 1995 National 
Land Policy which duly includes recognition of all 
customary rights as one of its key principles (Tanner, 
2002).  These customary structures could in fact be 
seen as the land administration of the country, with the 
formal state land administration being something of a 
bolted-on extra, which is there to respond to the needs 
of a very limited number of land users. These structures 
are by definition ‘decentralised’, at least in terms of the 
number of places and people in positions of authority 
– there is neither a ‘national’ nor provincial customary 
authority.
Whether or not these customary structures are really 
decentralised, internally, viz-á-viz local families and 
individuals, is another matter that will be discussed 
below. But at this point it is useful to set them against 
the other land administration, the state system, headed 
by the National Directorate for Land and Forests within 
the Ministry of Agriculture, and the provincial Services 
of Geography and Cadastre found in the capital of 
each province in the country. Even after many years 
of investment through a range of external assistance 
programmes, the system is weak and under-resourced, 
and has great difficulty in dealing with even the few 
thousand or so land holding units (parcelas) that are on 
official records.  
These two factors together – the continuing pre-
dominance of customary land management and the 
weakness of the public land administration - are the 
reason why the 1995 National Land Policy recognised 
‘the customary rights of access and management of 
the lands of rural resident populations - promoting 
social and economic justice in the countryside’ (Serra 
2007:27). Today these two factors are still important 
features of the land administration landscape. The 
subsequent 1997 Land Law¹ then formally merged this 
recognition into the overall system of land management 
and administration, through several key articles. First, in 
Article 10, it determines that ‘local communities’ can be 
titleholders of the State allocated Land Use and Benefit 
Right (DUAT). Furthermore, all community members are 
co-title holders, sharing the collectively-held DUAT and 
also having the right to participate in how these rights 
are used and disposed of by following detailed provi-
sions in a specified section of the Civil Code.  
¹ Law 19/97 of 1 October. The 1997 Land Law is now officially translated into English (see the government website www.portaldogoverno.gov.mz) and 
six local languages (available through the Centre for Juridical and Judicial Training (CFJJ) in Matola, Maputo Province.
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Secondly, in Article 12, the Land Law states that the 
DUAT can be acquired in three ways :
•	 occupation	by	individuals	or	local	communities	
according to customary norms and practices 
(historically or culturally acquired rights);
•	 occupation	in	‘good	faith’	(occupation	that	is	
unchallenged for ten years); and
•	 a	formal	request	to	the	State	for	a	new	DUAT.
In this way, rights acquired by custom and those that 
are allocated by the State structures are legally recog-
nised as DUATs, and each right is identical to the others 
in terms of its legal weight and validity. 
Thirdly, in Article 24, local communities ‘participate 
a) in the management of natural resources; b) in the 
resolution of conflicts; c) in the titling process [with 
reference to the issuing of new DUATs]; and d) in the 
identification and definition of the limits of the land 
which they occupy’.  The same article then adds that 
‘in exercising these responsibilities’ they ‘use, amongst 
other things, customary norms and practices’ (Serra, 
2007:21). 
The entity which exercises these rights and ‘manages 
natural resources’, the Local Community, is a circum-
scribed territory defined in Article 1, Number 1 of the 
Land Law:  
A grouping of families and individuals, living 
in a circumscribed area at the level of a locality 
or below, which looks after common interests  
through the protection of areas of habitation,  
agricultural areas, be they cultivated or in fallow, 
forests, sites of cultural importance, pasture, 
sources of water, and areas for expansion.
This definition of the local community is tied to the 
underlying notion that rights are acquired by occupa-
tion, by in effect establishing the basic parameters of 
‘occupation’, not in a direct physical sense – cultivation 
or a field or the presence of a village – but by reference 
to the social and agro-ecological system through which 
this ‘grouping’ occupies a given area. It follows that 
once the limits of this system are identified (and if 
necessary, registered), it can incorporate a very large 
area indeed, including land in fallow, communally used 
resources like forests, wetlands or grazing, and even 
‘areas for expansion’. 
These articles, taken together, effectively integrate both 
customary rights and the management systems which 
allocate and administer them, into the formal land 
administration of Mozambique. In one sense, the line 
around the Local Community is the point at which the 
two systems merge. Indeed, it can be argued that within 
the Local Community, local leaders exercise a key role 
of the State, insofar as they allocate what are in effect 
DUATs to local families and individuals  resident in the 
communities, and subject to their specific ‘norms and 
practices’.  This is indeed a highly devolved system, 
and if effectively implemented, should give local people 
considerable control over who can come into their 
midst and gain access to and use land. 
Defining the local community on the 
ground
A Local Community is identified on the ground (and 
then registered in the Cadastre) through a highly 
participatory process called ‘delimitation’ (Tanner et al., 
2009). Neither delimitation nor registration of the ac-
quired rights that are proven and ‘delimited’ in this way 
is mandatory. However it is recommended in priority 
situations, including when a new investment project is 
planned in local community areas (Technical Annex to 
the land Law Regulations, Article 7).  The process also 
confirms the legal personality of the community in a 
concrete and tangible form, including formally register-
ing the name of the community.  A ‘local community’ 
can subsequently enter into contracts with third parties 
(such as investors) and open its own bank account.  
The average cost of a delimitation is around US$7 000 
per community (CTC 2003).  This might seem high, and 
a good delimitation will take some time, but it does 
provide low-cost protection for many households at 
once and for all the members of a community. Delimita-
tion, when well carried out, is also a powerful tool in 
the process of effective decentralisation, as it identifies 
and consolidates a local representative structure that 
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must include 3-9 people chosen by the community and 
which must include women. These ‘Land Committees’ 
(or ‘the G-9’ to use a popular NGO term) do not have 
to be customary leaders, but chiefs are often present 
or delegated younger lineage members who may be 
literate and can deal more effectively with the outside 
world. The process has a strong legal empowerment 
and civic education impact, by making communities 
more aware of their rights and helping them to evaluate 
and plan how to use their resource base. It also offers 
the additional advantage of providing a perfect op-
portunity to draw up a local land use plan, and making 
communities aware of both the potential of their land 
for their own or investment use, and the fact that they 
can negotiate with outsiders over access to this land. 
It is important to note that the Mozambican model does 
not divide the country into ‘community’ and non-com-
munity or ‘commercial’ areas. Indeed, if the definition in 
the Land Law is followed to its logical conclusion, then 
the whole country is ‘occupied’ by local communities, 
This de jure occupation – which by law translates into 
the presence of customarily-acquired DUATs in most 
areas – does not block investment into these areas. The 
so-called ‘open border’ model of a local community was 
formally adopted in a national conference in 1998, and 
establishes the principle that land inside a delimited 
community (or inside a non-delimited one for that 
matter) is available to investors and others from outside 
the community, subject to a community consultation 
being carried out and the District Administrator then 
determining whether or not the land request should go 
ahead. 
The fact that an investor must carry out a community 
consultation is a strong, practical  affirmation of the 
devolved management powers given to communities 
under Article 24 of the Land Law. Notice however, that 
the District Administrator in fact has the final say – the 
community is consulted, but in theory it can be over-
ridden if the Administrator feels that there are good 
reasons for doing so (a project being ‘in the national 
interest’, for example). Although a clear community ‘no’ 
would be hard to ignore, this is nonetheless a clear limit 
on the effective level of power decentralised down to 
community level. 
New rights requested from the state 
and community consultations
While Local Communities continue to manage and ad-
minister the vast majority of land rights in Mozambique, 
the State system does have the key and sole responsibil-
ity for allocating new DUATs to investors. These can be 
nationals who have no social ties to the community in 
which the land they want is located, or foreigners. 
Land for investors has always, in effect, been removed 
from customary control through formal survey and 
registration, going back to colonial times.  The 1997 
law continues this approach. Investors looking for 
land must find an area that has already been taken 
out of customary jurisdiction – today these are old 
State farms, previously colonial plantations, and other 
‘properties’ with their origins in the colonial era - or they 
must find the land they want in areas that are very likely 
to be community-managed under Article 24 of the Land 
Law. 
While land that is already alienated from community 
jurisdiction is mainly a government-investor affair, 
the Land Law obliges investors to get the approval of 
local people in both situations. This is also important 
because many old properties have been abandoned for 
years, and have been progressively re-occupied by local 
residents, who always claim either a previous historical 
right, or a right acquired by ‘good faith’ occupation 
according to the 1997 legislation. The reality therefore 
is that in nearly all cases of new investment projects, 
the investor must initiate a process that begins with 
a community consultation, and if successful, will end 
with them being allocated the DUAT which initially was 
held by the local community. Note however that there is 
no legal guarantee that the process will result in local 
approval if local people need the land themselves or do 
not like the look of the investor. 
The ‘community consultation’ process is laid out in the 
Land Law and its Regulations. It is short on detail how-
ever, and many consultations are in fact poorly carried 
out, with unfortunate consequences for subsequent 
relations between locals and their new neighbours 
and for the real benefits which should accrue to the 
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community (Tanner, Baleira et al., 2006). Concerns over 
the consultation process have resulted in new legisla-
tion recently being passed which strengthens certain 
aspects, but also weakens the decentralised power 
accorded to local people under the original legislation. 
Nevertheless, the procedure is still best understood 
in terms of two nested levels of engagement with the 
community. 
At the first level of engagement, the principal objec-
tive is to ensure that the land being requested by the 
investor is ‘free from (local) occupation’.  However, most 
land is not in this state, if we accept the system-based 
definition of the local community and its subsequent 
‘occupation’, even of apparently unused land.  The 
process then moves on to a second level of engage-
ment, which accepts that the land is occupied and is 
then intended to secure access to the land   through a 
consensual process that determines a ‘partnership’ be-
tween the investor, and the ‘holders or rights acquired 
by occupation’, or in other words, the local community 
and its members (Land Law Regulations, Article 27).
This process is overseen by the public land admin-
istration and the local government of the District 
(or Districts) in which the land is located. All DUAT 
requests must also be accompanied by an investment 
proposal or project, approved by the appropriate sector 
ministry and the Centre for Investment Promotion of 
the Ministry of Planning and Development. But most 
importantly, the application must be accompanied by a 
District Administration statement about the community 
consultation. This should say either that the land is ‘free 
from occupation’, or that the local community will cede 
its rights for an agreed package of benefits. Without 
this, the process cannot go ahead. 
Decentralisation of Public 
Administration 
Since the Land Law was approved in 1997, Mozambique 
has also been going through a long process of admin-
istrative decentralisation, formally set into motion by 
the 2003 Local Government Bodies Law.  This legislation 
has introduced a series of measures to devolve certain 
administrative powers down to district level, and to 
create local representational bodies in the form of 
District and Local ‘Consultative Councils’.  This process 
has also included complementary legislation, Decree 
15/2000 of 20 June, which approves the way in which 
local government bodies and ‘community authorities’ 
interact, the latter being ‘traditional chiefs, village sec-
retaries and other leaders legitimized as such by their 
respective local communities’ (Serra 2007:197). The 
Decree then goes on to say that ‘once legitimized’ (i.e. 
selected by the community), the ‘Community Authori-
ties’ are ‘recognised by the competent representative 
of the State.   They then have a kind of go-between role 
between the State and their ‘local communities’. On 
the one hand, they represent community interests in 
dealings with the State, and on the other, they act as 
a conduit through which state programmes can be 
disseminated at local level and implemented by local 
people.  
The district figures centrally in current government 
policy as the pole of development, and a number of 
other important initiatives have been introduced to 
promote this vision of locally driven development.  
Most significant amongst these has been the Local 
Initiatives Budget, popularly known as the ‘7 millions’, 
which for several years now  has been allocating 7 
million meticais per year (about US$250 000 at current 
exchange rates) to every district in the country. This 
money is managed by the District Government and 
is available to both local government and  the private 
sector for projects to address local infrastructure needs 
and boost the local economy.
As noted above, the ‘Community Authorities’ are not 
necessarily traditional leaders. In rural areas however, 
they tend to be the senior chiefs who head the vari-
ous clans and ethnic groups that are found across 
Mozambique. In most areas these chiefs are called 
regulos, a term dating back to colonial times, but in 
some northern areas they are called ‘sultão’, or sultan, 
reflecting the stronger Arab influence in the north of 
Mozambique. The areas under their control are thus 
regulados or sultanatos, respectively.  Most of these 
senior chiefs are men, and while they are clearly more 
‘decentralised’ than for example, the public land admin-
istration, the way in which they exercise their role is not 
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always that decentralised in practice. Even in smaller 
communities questions can be asked about how much 
internal ‘consultation’ actually goes on between these 
leaders and those they are meant to represent. 
This is very clear, for example, in a recent research 
study of the consequences of a delimitation and 
community consultation process carried out ahead of 
a large forestry plantation initiative in Niassa Province. 
In spite of the best intentions of the investors to follow 
the law and work with local people, it has since become 
clear that the level of internal consultation, especially 
between the ‘community authorities’ and the more 
distant villages within their territory, was very weak.  
Conflict and tension are now very evident as the inves-
tors move in to clear local land and plant their trees 
(Akessön et al., 2009).
The community leadership in the administrative 
decentralisation context is therefore a very different 
creature to the locally elected ‘G-9’ or group of com-
munity representatives who act for the land-rights 
holding community in matters to do with the Land Law.  
To begin with, Community Authorities represent a ‘local 
community’ that is in fact much more of a political or 
administrative constituency, with its own specific legal 
definition:  ‘the groups of populations and collective 
entities found in a unit of territorial organisation, 
namely a locality, administrative post and district’ (Serra 
2007:198). Thus the Community Authority is    a public 
figure, doing public things, and may be quite removed 
from the ‘Local Community’ that is the DUAT holder in 
an area that is subject to a new land claim. Their public 
role is indeed confirmed by their formal recognition in 
a public ceremony presided over by State officials, at 
which they are presented with special uniforms, and 
various badges and other symbols of the State and of 
their office. This formal recognition also compromises 
their independence viz-á-viz the State, and the extent to 
which they are truly able to represent their constituents.
A clash of decentralisations
The distinction between public or administrative 
decentralisation and the land management / land rights 
decentralisation of the Land Law is extremely important, 
and often – indeed nearly always – overlooked. There is 
a clear tendency to mix the two together and for public 
agents – the cadastral service assisted by the District 
Administration - to do ‘community consultations’ 
under the Land Law only with ‘Community Authori-
ties’ recognised through Decree 15/2000. Indeed at 
one point, cadastral service officers were explicitly 
instructed by a previous National Director to carry out 
consultations only with the Decree 15/2000 community 
authorities².  In reality however, the Community Authori-
ties are not necessarily representative of the rights 
holders of a particular land-occupying Local Community 
where a project is proposed.  This is a significant source 
of conflict in areas where local people feel that they in 
fact have not been consulted before investors move in 
(Tanner, Baleira et al., 2006). 
Government has also clearly been concerned by the 
fact that Local Communities in the Land Law context 
are apparently in control of very large areas, which are 
not wholly utilised and under more intensive forms of 
production. It is also evident that many in government 
do not understand the principle of the ‘open border’ 
and are concerned that delimited land with a com-
munity ‘Land Committee’  is somehow taken out of the 
pot of land available for investors. Delimitation, and the 
whole panoply of devolved land management under 
the Land Law is then seen, not as positive elements for 
equitable development, but as obstacles to investment 
and to getting national resources into production. 
One result of this has been recent new tinkering with 
the legislation, introducing revisions to Article 27 of 
the Land Law, for example, giving what is effectively a 
decisive role in the community consultation process to 
the members of the Local Consultative Councils created 
under the 2003 Local Government Bodies Law. These of 
course, are primarily the Community Authorities chosen 
under Decree 15/2000 and formally recognised by the 
State. Therefore, although the Councils are nominally 
‘representing’ local interests, they do not include the 
real leaders of the rights holders affected by a proposed 
project or investment scheme, and in fact introduce a 
² Personal notes of the author, who attended the meeting in question.
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considerable element of State control or at least over-
sight, into the whole ‘community consultation’ process.  
Rather than easing tensions and making consultations 
more effective, these changes risk worsening the 
situation.  
Changes of a similar order have also been made in 
other Land Law regulations, such as revisions to Article 
35, to increase the control over the State over the com-
munity rights registration process, and a new recent 
Ministerial Diploma (No 158/2011 of 15 of June),which 
details how  consultations should be carried out. None 
of these changes has involved the same level of consul-
tation with civil society and stakeholders that character-
ised the original Land Law process and all have caused 
considerable and negative reaction amongst NGOs and 
others who have worked to implement the decentralis-
ing and democratic elements of the Land Law since it 
was approved.
Case studies
Mozambique still offers an excellent policy and legal 
framework for resolving the complex relationship 
between local people with customary land rights and 
investors seeking land for new projects, often with state 
backing. Its rights-based and participatory approach, 
with a significant element of devolved management 
to local level, allows both negotiation and consensus 
building. Implementing this approach has not been 
easy however.    
The two case studies below illustrate the potential for 
success and failure when the model is implemented, 
especially when a weak State system has the prime 
responsibility for making it work. To paraphrase the title 
of the Niassa study referred to above, the question is 
not ‘to decentralise or not’, but rather it is ‘about how it 
is done’.  
The Mahel Game Farm3
The Mahel area in Maputo Province is close to the 
border with South African and is a sparsely populated 
region where local people survive through a mix of 
rain fed agriculture and livestock with grazing over 
large areas.  In 1999, the National Directorate for 
Forests and Wildlife (DNFFB) chose the area for a Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO)-supported Community Based Natural Resource 
Management (CBNRM) project. DNFFB wanted ways of 
involving communities in natural resources conserva-
tion and management and to see how to promote 
investor access to underused resources without 
undermining local livelihoods.
Initial evaluations included inventories of forestry and 
medicinal plant resources and wildlife diversity.  In 
May 2000, an area of 30 000 hectares was delimited 
in the name of the Mahel Community and registered 
in the National Cadastre, and  a Community Manage-
ment Committee was established. The potential for a 
commercial game farm project was then evaluated. 
The resulting report (Anderson and Magane, 2000) 
concluded that: 
- The Mahel offers excellent habitat for game 
farming. 
- Effective commercially wildlife management can 
improve local livelihoods. 
- The community must have ownership of the rights 
to the game farm resources.
- Viable projects should be planned in which inves-
tors form partnerships with the community and 
supply capital and expertise for development and 
management.
A project proposal was prepared, for an area of 13 500 
hectares within the greater community area (Dutton 
2001). A USAID project supporting business initiatives 
in areas around the transnational conservation area 
linked to the Kruger Park - now the Limpopo National 
Park - then supported an ecological, technical and 
financial feasibility study which showed that the area 
could support a project which would raise a mix of 
3 These case studies were originally written by the author for a World Bank publication on investor access to local land, soon to be published.  
Acknowledgement is made for allowing their use here. 
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cattle and introduced game animals - impala, kudu and 
giraffe (Estes, 2002). 
The region was already attracting interest from inves-
tors, but the first concern of the DNFFB Steering Com-
mittee was the legal framework within which a partner-
ship would operate. This was at an early stage in Land 
Law implementation, and new legislation on Forests 
and Wildlife had also only recently been approved.   
The Steering Committee decided that the project would 
test the new laws in a practical setting and establish 
important precedents. A second FAO project at the 
Interministerial Land Commission was then asked to 
propose how a community-investor partnership could 
be established, and work in practice. The following 
steps were identified: 
i. Raise awareness (selling the idea to local people – 
all of them, not just leaders). 
ii. Identify the extent of local use rights and how the 
community manages them.
iii. Do a community land rights delimitation.
iv. Clearly identify the specific area and resources to 
be used by the project.
v. Obtain a title document (título) over this area, 
in the name of the community (i.e. register the 
customarily-acquired DUAT, which requires precise 
surveying and cement border markers, and is 
expensive).
vi. Consider creating a community association/trust/
enterprise to work with the project. 
vii. Create a detailed joint-venture agreement between 
the association and the investor.
viii. Proceed with the investment. 
ix. Provide capacity-building to the community to 
manage and use income generated from the 
investor agreement, in pursuit of local development 
goals.
The FAO report (2003) also identified a series of 
partnership models, which were later discussed in 
several village-level meetings to explain the implications 
of each arrangement. Local people were then given the 
chance to discuss amongst themselves which would be 
the best model for the specific circumstances and exist-
ing capacity to engage with an outside investor, in what 
for them was a very new activity  These models are still 
in use today  (CFJJ 2011:109-111) and serve to illustrate 
the range of different agreements which are possible. 
The community response was clear: it wanted control 
over the process; it wanted to be able to renegotiate 
with, or expel, the investor if things did not work out; 
and they were well aware that they did not have the 
know-how and experience to become joint-venture part-
ners or employ a manager. Most of all, however, they did 
not want to give up their DUAT. After much discussion, 
the community chose what was basically a long term 
rental agreement, which was seen as the most straight-
forward option (DNFFB, 2003). At the same time, the 
inherent weaknesses of the community were also clear, 
and the Steering Committee agreed that funding should 
be found for a community support project that would 
build local capacity to contribute to the agreement and 
to use the new resources it generated.
The assumption by the Steering Committee was that 
the investor would be attracted by not having to worry 
about finding and securing land, a point that has more 
recently been reaffirmed in the context of the ‘Com-
munity Land Initiative’ project which funds community 
delimitations in several key provinces (Cotula et al., 
2010). Most DUAT requests involve lots of paperwork 
and can take years. Instead they would be able to 
focus on the project and their relationship with the 
community. This aspect has been noted in other more 
recent initiatives, such as the multi-donor Community 
Land Initiative (iTC) programme, in which community-
investor partnerships are also promoted. The process 
was also supported by the government agency involved 
in investment applications, the Investment Promotion 
Centre (CPI) of the Ministry of Planning and Develop-
ment, which saw the devolved management and local 
involvement in a new investment project as a way of 
avoiding potential conflicts and generating benefit flows 
for all concerned.  
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At this point the process stalled, waiting for higher level 
consent to move ahead, and the public tender to find an 
investor never materialised. Instead, a firm with Mozam-
bican and South African partners was finally chosen 
after it had approached the local government looking 
for investment opportunities.  This firm presented a 
credible proposal for a community-investor enterprise 
which would include payments to the community and 
commitments to train local people and involve them in 
project implementation (Ralindo, no date). A contract 
was signed between all parties in November 2005. 
DNFFB then helped the community to secure US$33 
000 from a UNDP Small Grants Fund to fence the area 
and set up a force of community rangers (this was also 
seen as a community contribution to the new project). 
Anecdotal accounts indicate that the community lead-
ership was not easy to work with, but it is also clear that 
the firm chosen for the project failed to deliver on their 
promises and the partnership relationship never really 
took off. The community itself rescinded the contract 
in a letter dated 7 June 2007. The International Union 
for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) then entered the 
picture, with resources to secure the fencing and train 
community members.  A new Mozambican investor 
with close links to elite urban interests was offering a 
deal which would pay the community a small share 
of the turnover. But this share would have to cover all 
community costs, including ranger wages, with the 
lion’s share of any income going to the investor.  The 
IUCN plan aimed to boost the community contribution 
and secure a higher share for the community (Sitoe and 
Guedes, 2009). 
Once again however, difficulties between the various 
partners obstructed progress and IUCN eventually 
pulled out in late 2009. At the time of writing, the project 
appears to have become little more than a private 
hunting area for elite interests from Maputo, with the 
local community committee securing some share of 
the gains from selling the meat in the urban informal 
market.
This process illustrates the potential of a decentralised 
form of land management, but also highlights the high 
risks involved where communities are not adequately 
prepared and are faced by external interests with their 
own agendas and in a more powerful position, both 
economically and politically. The role of the Community 
Management Committee and how it performs is critical, 
and if its members become entrenched or are simply 
not up to the job, it is also difficult to work through the 
difficult challenge of reconciling the very different world 
views and needs of a poor rural community, an external 
investor, and a State keen to get resources into produc-
tion.  The legal framework is more than adequate, but 
the skills needed to facilitate this kind of agreement 
and then to nurture and support it to maturity, go far 
beyond those currently available in the land administra-
tion services. The Mahel case clearly shows the need 
for solid and consistent support for both the overall 
process of implementing a decentralised model, and 
the subsequent implementation of any agreements that 
derive from it.
Far more attention must be paid to the process and 
the content of the community consultation process, 
which also offers important opportunities for capacity 
building and identifying possible support options, once 
agreements have been reached. Presently, the usual 
consultation process for most land rights and forestry 
concession applications consists of one meeting with 
local leaders, with the lack of real discussion and atten-
tion to detail being a source of subsequent conflicts. 
(Tanner et al., 2006).  Consultations also fail to involve 
the wider community, provoking a backlash even when 
serious effort has been made to include communities 
from the outset. 
The new provisions for community consultations 
referred to above go some way to addressing this point, 
now requiring that at least two meetings take place, 30 
days apart. The first meeting gives the community infor-
mation about the project and identifies the limits of the 
land required; the second then allows the community to 
give its opinion about the land available for the project 
(MINAG 2011:282). It remains to be seen whether these 
new provisions will make a substantive difference, but 
it is clear that DNFFB and Provincial teams supporting 
the Mahel, and similar processes up and down the 
country, have been learning as they go along, with 
evident goodwill and commitment.  But beyond the 
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technical issues raised above, it is also clear that they 
simply cannot do the kind of intensive work – field 
visits, follow-up meetings with both the community and 
investor, mediation etc - which this process demands. 
They continue to be seriously under-resourced and right 
up to the present moment, they complain that they do 
not have vehicles or a fuel budget that allows them to 
visit the community and support the process.
Coutada 9 in Macossa district4 
Macossa is in the northern part of Manica province. 
Over 70% of the district is made up of two large 
forested hunting reserves (coutadas), which border the 
Gorongosa National Park to the east. These reserves 
are legally protected areas, and therefore fall within 
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Tourism (MITUR). 
One of these, Coutada 9, is the venue for a successful 
community-investor partnership. 
Coutada 9 covers 3 763 km2 and its natural habitat and 
low human population density offers great potential 
for conservation and wildlife management. Inventories 
carried out in 2003 identified many wild animal spe-
cies, but numbers are low after years of heavy illegal 
hunting. Restocking is essential if game hunting is to 
be commercially and ecologically viable. In 2003, MITUR 
issued a management contract to Rio Save Safaris, a 
Mozambican-Zimbabwean safari-hunting business. 
Through this form of decentralised management, 
the state required the investor to restore the animal 
population as part of a conservation management plan, 
manage the overall resource base and the Coutada, and 
produce revenues for State coffers.  
MITUR believed at the time that there were few if any 
local people living inside the Coutada area - and their 
position throughout has been that such communities 
do not have acquired DUATs under the 1997 Land Law: 
as ‘partial protection areas’, coutadas are considered 
‘public domain’ and DUATs are not permitted in such 
areas. The law does provide for ‘economic licences’ 
however, and this is the basis for the Rio Save Safaris 
contract. With or without DUATs, the villages had 
nevertheless been there for a very long time, with estab-
lished leadership and resource management struc-
tures, and Rio Save Safaris quickly found significant 
settlements established inside the Coutada, especially 
in the west where deforestation and agriculture made 
any kind of conservation activity impossible. Through 
what was in effect a kind of delimitation process, they 
discovered that there were five communities inside the 
Coutada boundary, with a total population of around 17 
000. Each has its own leaders, with recognised borders 
between each community. One of them, the Nhaunga 
community, covers most of the land within the Coutada 
area, and its chief has been formally recognised as 
a ‘Community Authority’ by the State under Decree 
15/2000. Villages in the primary forest area to the east 
also relied upon subsistence strategies that combine 
forest use for hunting, medicines and honey, with 
agriculture near seasonal rivers.  Although population 
density was low, these production systems extended 
over many thousands of hectares. 
Notwithstanding the formal legal position, the de facto 
nature of the historical rights of the communities was 
clear, and even if they do not have acquired DUATs, 
constitutional guarantees require that their interests be 
taken into account, and simply moving them out was 
not an option. Rio Save Safaris therefore accepted the 
4 The author has followed this case while providing support to a FAO food security project in Macossa District. This account is based on field notes 
and personal interviews with the investors and FAO community outreach officers working in the district.  
Source: Lazaro Gumende, DNTF (formerly DINAGECA)
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community presence and the need to work with local 
people to find a viable resource management strategy.   
The first priority for the concession holder was to stop 
the widespread illegal hunting if they were to success-
fully repopulate the area with wildlife and run a viable 
safari business. Guards and rangers could come from 
the local community, but policing costs would still be 
high without some form of community involvement that 
would compensate local people for giving up hunting. 
Besides, they needed good relations with local people 
to succeed in a difficult operational environment. Rio 
Save Safaris came up with a pragmatic proposal for 
co-managing the area with the communities. Most 
importantly, they proposed a way for the communities to 
participate in the income generated by the safari busi-
ness, in return for   giving up, or at least significantly 
reducing their hunting. Local livelihoods would not be 
undermined, and Rio Save could implement a viable 
conservation and sports hunting programme. 
The proposal was structured around a de facto zoning 
of the Coutada into areas with different levels of com-
munity participation, management responsibilities, and 
resource use: 
- A core, partially fenced area where the investor 
manages all the resources and which the com-
munities will eventually leave voluntarily; the 
community will stop all hunting and will receive 
25% of trophy fees generated in this area.
- A buffer zone managed jointly by the investor and 
the community for two years, and thereafter by the 
community alone; the community will stop hunting 
here, but due to their greater management role, 
they will receive 75% of trophy fees.
- A third area, away from the hunting and conserva-
tion areas, where local agriculture is allowed: this 
recognizes the reality on the ground, and gives up 
any pretence of preventing agriculture to restore 
the forest.
Rio Save Safaris would also work with the community 
to improve their understanding of conservation issues. 
As well as training local people as guards and rangers, 
they would also provide opportunities for community 
youngsters to learn about conservation.
The firm did their own research into the socio-economic 
and political organisation of the communities. Crucial 
questions in this context were: 
- Who are the communities? 
- Who represents them? 
- What are their rights within the Coutada?
- Do they have a legal personality allowing them to 
enter into contracts? 
The five identified communities each had several 
villages and a single chief (regulo) and management 
structure. Through a process very like delimitation, a 
map was produced of community occupation in the 
Coutada and neighbouring areas and local Natural 
Resources Committees were established to represent 
the communities (Chidiamassamba, 2004: 3). The  
‘Community Authorities’ – the local Regulos complete 
with formal regalia – have since played an effective dual 
role, at one moment representing ‘their’ community viz 
á viz the investor, and at another, acting as an advocate 
for the  model in dealings with the State and its agents.  
These arrangements have enabled Rio Save to talk 
to the right leaders about how the proposed scheme 
should work, and to address problems as they occur. 
The zoning and income-share agreement has since 
grown into a constructive relationship between Rio Save 
Safaris and the local communities which has produced 
significant results.  Rio Save Safaris have trained local 
men as rangers and bush camp staff, and in the first 
year the communities received US$11 000 as their 
share of trophy fees. They have continued to receive 
similar amounts every year and are now used to the 
idea of working with the investor. They have built health 
posts and improved social infrastructure, are better 
organised and more able to assess their needs and 
decide how to use their income. The FAO food security 
project has also played a key role. Income diversifica-
tion and agricultural activities have helped to mitigate 
the livelihood impact of hunting controls, and these are 
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now supported with income from the agreement with 
Rio Save Safaris.  
Although the community-investor relationship is 
working well, there are the inevitable difficulties. Apart 
from the income arising from the agreement with Rio 
Save, under the provisions of the Regulations of the 
Forest and Wildlife Law, the communities also receive 
20 percent of the public revenues generated by the 
company. These are distributed by the district adminis-
tration, which has also taken on the distribution of the 
safari hunting income. These funds are divided equally 
between the communities, and both Rio Save and some 
local leaders complain that not all the communities 
stick to the agreement over hunting and agriculture 
controls. 
Rio Save are looking at how to allocate income in 
relation to the effort made by each community to 
control illegal hunting, by creating an association of the 
various community Natural Resources Management 
Committees to  allow the communities to assume 
greater control over the distribution and use of funds. 
They also hope that this might have some impact on the 
illegal hunting which is carried out by outsiders linked 
to powerful urban interests.
The reluctance of central level institutions to go along 
with the idea of losing control  over state resources 
and development in general is another challenge   for 
devolved land management, where both investors and 
communities have autonomy viz á viz the State and 
can make their own decisions.  Like the Mahel case, 
Coutada 9 also tested the legal framework to come up 
with an appropriate set of rules within which to formal-
ise the community-investor agreement and regulate 
the relationship in the longer term.  Indeed there was 
considerable initial resistance from central level MITUR 
to some of the ideas being proposed, including the 
notion of zoning and downsizing the Coutada.  
However, with legal and community-facilitation support 
from a nearby FAO CBNRM project, Rio Save went 
ahead with its agreement with the communities. They 
then went back to MITUR and succeeded in persuading 
them to agree to a new contract which included the 
main elements of the partnership proposal and land 
management plan. After seeing the scheme working 
in practice, the Provincial Cadastral and Geographic 
Service and the Forest and Wildlife Service finally car-
ried out a formal zoning of the Coutada into core, buffer 
and agricultural areas. Further evidence of success is 
the fact that Rio Save Safaris have been awarded the 
contract to manage the neighbouring Coutada 13. They 
will use the same participatory approach, and now with 
full MITUR support, will zone the new Coutada.  
Has decentralised land management 
and administration worked? 
The two case studies show that the practical application 
of principles of devolved management and community 
empowerment is not easy.   Several different objec-
tives – local development, environmental conservation, 
and the need to get land into production – have to be 
pursued and harmonised at the same time. There is 
also the reality of the limited livelihood choices and 
capacity of local communities to understand and use 
the rights which they now have – to manage, resolve 
conflicts,  and participate in titling, and to negotiate 
deals with investors. 
Even where certain functions and powers are devolved 
to local level, there is also no guarantee that this will 
produce the desired outcome.  The Mahel case in its lat-
ter stages reveals community leaders who have become 
entrenched and are blocking the kind of process that 
would genuinely benefit the larger community. Nor 
can it be assumed that local leaders in the Community 
Authority or even customary leadership context will 
effectively communicate with, and devolve powers to all 
their villages. This is particularly the case in regulados 
which, when delimited, are over 100 000 hectares. Their 
size not only raises concerns in government over the 
area under local control, but as the Niasa study cited 
above shows, it also raises concerns over the effective-
ness of the devolved local management model of the 
1997 Land Law and other related legislation. 
There is no short-cut to the demanding processes of 
capacity building, civic education, and the promotion of 
a decentralised, participatory, multi-stakeholder process 
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at local level.  Centralised institutional hierarchies 
still exist, and the Coutada 9 case effectively reveals 
how tensions between central level MITUR and those 
involved at provincial and local level threatened to upset 
the evolving understanding and agreement between the 
investor and the communities. Indeed, official opposi-
tion to the idea of zoning the Coutada was only formally 
overcome at quite a late stage in the process, while 
the main parties to the agreements simply got on with 
working together and tried to make the Coutada project 
work. Similarly, the Mahel case demonstrates how   an 
intensive, decentralised form of local decision-making 
is the only way to achieve local support and legitimacy 
(in this case the choice of partnership model to follow).
Comparing the two cases also underlines how 
important it is to find investors with goodwill who are 
predisposed to working with local people and dealing 
with the many challenges that this approach presents. 
But even these investors need support – not many are 
experts in community development, and ‘decentralisa-
tion’ is a complex process that requires special skills 
and understanding of how to work at community level. 
In the Coutada 9 case, the role of the FAO CBRNM 
project was a critical and gratefully acknowledged input 
to this relatively successful story.
The case studies also underline how good intentions 
and good ideas can be undermined by very straight-
forward problems. It is difficult to imagine how land 
administrators and local government officers, appro-
priately trained in participatory techniques and keen to 
promote devolved local management, can implement 
any model if they have no vehicles and or the fuel 
needed to visit communities and provide the kind of 
support needed to establish and nurture a successful 
community-outsider relationship.  
The challenge of using both the Land Law and the 
decentralisation programme as they are intended, also 
demands new skills that are not readily available either 
in government or in civil society. These include media-
tion, business and project planning, civic education and 
legal empowerment. The challenge is also immense at 
local level - few local communities have the necessary 
know-how to negotiate and to play their role as local 
level land and resource managers, beyond the immedi-
ate confines of their own customary systems. 
It is also clear that central level structures are very 
wary of the whole question of devolved management; 
and when things go wrong, as in the Mahel case, the 
process can easily be ‘captured’ by interest groups with 
very different agendas. However, good examples are 
so important. This is shown by the way MITUR learned 
from the Coutada 9 case and  today gives full support to 
this kind of initiative – the Ministry now  requires all new 
investors in tourism to include a community participa-
tion element in their proposals. 
The Consultative Forum on Land
Driven by over-arching national development and 
economic growth imperatives, some people in the 
Government and administrative hierarchy advocate 
measures to fast track investment and bypass the kind 
of inclusive, devolved model that is at the heart of the 
1997 Land Law and most other natural resources leg-
islation since then.   Public servants are clearly driven 
by pressures from above to find land for investors, to 
promote development and to facilitate the new project, 
even at the expense of local rights. Faced by these pres-
sures, they are forced to compromise on the underlying 
principles of participation and inclusivity that are at the 
heart of the current legal and policy framework.5
5 Statements from participants in training seminars on land and natural resources law implementation, with local government officers, CFJJ/FAO 
Paralegal Training and District Officer Seminar programme. 
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The reality is that decentralised and devolved models 
are always going to be more challenging, both to 
established interests whose access to centralised 
structures gives them clear advantages, and for 
communities whose basic skills and capacity require 
support and capacity-building. This is especially the 
case when, as in Mozambique, decentralised land 
management functions conflict with, or are even 
undermined by other decentralisation processes in the 
formal public administration arena.  It is also clear that 
to make decentralisation work takes a lot of hard work 
and time.  Meanwhile, Government is concerned about 
huge areas of land not being used to full potential, and 
want to see economic growth and revenues from an 
agricultural economy which has so far failed to take off.  
The attraction of major investors lining up asking for 
land for large scale projects is obvious, but immediately 
puts at risk the whole idea of a more decentralised and 
participatory approach.
In this context, Mozambique is facing new pressures 
to revise its policy and legal framework, in particular 
with relation to the linked issues of the transferability of 
DUATs, and the ability to use formal registered title to 
secure investment credits from the banks.  To deal with 
this new situation, in late 2010 the Government  created 
a new Consultative Forum on Land (CFL), which brings 
together several key ministries dealing with land and 
resources issues, and also provides for civil society and 
other stakeholder participation. Amongst issues already 
identified for Forum discussion are the consultation pro-
cess, the nature of the DUAT as a strong, private right 
under the Constitution, and the vexed question of the 
transferability (through market mechanisms) of DUATs.  
So far, in spite of declarations of openness and 
inclusivity, the new Forum is not achieving the levels 
of participation and devolved discussion and feedback 
that characterised the process over-seen by the 
mid-1990s ‘Land Commission’, when it developed the 
1995 National Land Policy and the current 1997 Land 
Law. One example of this is the way the new decree on 
community consultations was developed without Forum 
intervention and with little stakeholder involvement. 
This reinforces the sense of a government concerned 
with reining in and restricting the decentralised 
processes inherent in the current framework, rather 
enhancing them by providing the necessary resources 
and support they need to reach the potential illustrated 
by the Coutada 9 case above. 
It would be a pity if this is indeed the outcome – the 
land policy and land law offer important and work-
able instruments with transformational potential for 
development, using a range of instruments that devolve 
significant management functions to local people and 
in so doing, build their capacity to engage in and to 
benefit from the development which private investment 
promises to bring. The new Forum must be encouraged 
to look objectively at the good examples which do exist, 
and to reflect upon the benefits of the decentralised and 
devolved model of land administration and govern-
ance. Fortunately there are many in Mozambique - in 
government and in civil society - who understand this 
and value this approach. The 2007 Rural Development 
Strategy (RDS), for instance, implemented by the 
National Directorate for Promoting Rural Development 
(part of the Ministry of State Administration), calls for 
the ‘emancipation’ of local communities   through the 
correct use of the Land Law.  
Emancipation also comes from being given responsibil-
ity, an important lesson to be learned in the Coutada 9 
case, where the agreement between the investor and 
the communities demands for commitments on both 
sides.  Investors too, may be obliged by the state to be 
more participatory. An recent important  example of 
this is the new Resolution by the Council of Ministers 
which requires them to include ‘the partnership terms 
between the holders of DUATs [acquired] by occupation 
in the area required by the investor’, along with their 
investment proposals (Council of Ministers, 2008). 
Conclusion 
The examples provided here show that with hard work, 
support, time, and patience, local management and 
partnerships can happen, producing workable and 
mutually beneficial compromises between local people 
and outside interests. The case studies show how 
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important it is to have good facilitation and community 
development support as essential inputs to a genuine 
decentralisation process.  
With a legal framework that supports a devolved, 
participatory and consensual approach to land manage-
ment and land use, Mozambican communities and their 
rights do not have to be seen an obstacle, but rather as 
partners in  a local development process which meets 
the different needs of all who depend upon land and 
natural resources. The role of the State and how it man-
ages these processes is critically important however, 
especially at a time when major economic interests 
are lining up to get access to land, and concepts like 
decentralisation and local community rights are evi-
dently something of a constraint on fast-tracking large 
investors onto local land. Government and communities 
are both ready to welcome investors; the government 
can tell them what the rules are, promote policies that 
begin with the recognition of local rights, and include 
mechanisms to involve local people, not just as wage 
labourers, but as active stakeholders with a say in how 
local development takes place in their midst.
The Mozambican experience also points to the dangers 
of ‘multiple decentralisations’. Understanding how to 
make all the various forms of decentralisation work 
together is a major challenge for policy makers and civil 
society alike. Overlapping responsibilities, weak local 
government capacity, poorly informed local people, 
and a mix of facilitation and manipulation – ‘facipula-
tion’ – by a range of benign and not-so-benign actors is 
preventing the country from achieving a powerful form 
of decentralised and democratic governance which 
could transform local economies and alleviate poverty 
through a more equitable distribution of the fruits of 
development. Access to local land is seen by all as the 
‘necessary condition’ for development, especially in 
rural areas. Giving power to local people to manage that 
access is the best way to ensure that benefits flow in 
both directions.
Finally, it is to be hoped that the new Consultative 
Forum on Land will fully take all these points into 
account, and draw upon the available lessons, in order 
to improve the policy and legal framework, without 
undermining its equity-enhancing and democratic, 
empowering and liberating potential. 
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Comparing country experiences
The table highlights the complex particularities of each 
country history and development trajectory, contextu-
alises the origins of different national discourses on 
decentralisation.
Trends and issues
Despite the extreme diversity of the country cases, 
a number of crosscutting trends and issues can be 
identified. 
The push-pull dynamics driving 
decentralisation
Despite significant historical differences in the political 
and development directions taken by the three coun-
tries, there are increasing contemporary similarities 
between them: all three espouse decentralisation but 
retain strong centralising tendencies.
The cases highlight the complex relationships between 
foreign donors and multilateral institutions pushing 
decentralisation, at the same time as forces in the 
central state  attempt to pull power to the centre, and 
local actors seek to draw power down to the ground. 
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t.
Po
lic
y 
an
d 
le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 r
ec
og
ni
se
 
ch
an
gi
ng
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 d
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 b
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t m
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is
ed
 th
e 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 to
 la
nd
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
.
Lo
ca
l r
ig
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 b
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at
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 c
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 r
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 p
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 c
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 c
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- b
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- b
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at
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 c
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 c
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 d
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 m
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ra
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re
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 b
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m
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.
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ra
nc
e.
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 d
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t r
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t m
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Links between decentralisation and 
power
Decentralisation initiatives frequently overlook or 
downplay local relations of power. In practice externally 
driven decentralisation and land governance pro-
grammes tend to oversimplify complex local land rights 
realities, which ‘are shot through with power relations’ 
(Ben Cousins, Interview 2011).This raises questions 
about the extent to which the institutions responsible 
for effecting decentralisation are designed to ensure 
democratic decision making and to function in ways 
which are explicitly pro-poor.  
Local institutions are not ‘participatory’ or ‘democratic’ 
by default and may represent conservative and deeply 
entrenched local interests. Democratic decentralisa-
tion can have unintended consequences and create 
opportunities for powerful minorities to capture local 
land rights management institutions and take decisions 
which further privilege local elites. 
Decentralised land governance  as a 
technocratic exercise
Implementation of decentralised land governance 
frequently relies on technologies and capacities which 
are far removed from local resource capabilities and 
practice. Decentralisation initiatives are often cast as 
a technocratic exercise - heavily focused on the detail 
of institutional design and the roll out of sometimes 
elaborate land rights registration programmes, which 
are frequently dependent on foreign funding. 
There is also substantial variation in the way that differ-
ent understandings of decentralisation are interpreted 
and given meaning in the three country case study 
settings. This can result in a widening gap between 
official discourse and the actual processes of local 
implementation.
The importance of strong civil society 
organisations
It is clear that local civil society organisations are 
essential to provide pro-poor oversight of land govern-
ance and land rights management arrangements. It 
is no coincidence that the spike of interest by external 
investors in African land assets is closely associated 
with a global recession and a search for new economic 
opportunities offering good returns on investment. At 
the same time, the recession has adversely affected 
funding streams to southern NGOs. We were forced 
to accelerate our research in Botswana because the 
Chobe office of DITSHWANELO was due to close due to 
funding constraints. The erosion of this important rights 
protection and monitoring function further opens the 
door to potential abuses in the land sector. 
There remains a central need to empower citizens 
through mobilisation, organisation and applied 
research.  Decentralisation initiatives can create spaces 
for local voices to be heard, but without organisation, 
local knowledge and analysis, these institutional spaces 
will remain empty.
The alignment of multiple actors and 
decentralisations
Decentralisation is not a singular undertaking. Local 
governance institutions and local land rights manage-
ment institutions have often been created side by side 
and are overseen by different organs of state, each with 
their own distinct mandate. Both horizontal and vertical 
alignment between initiatives and institutions originat-
ing in different spheres of government has proved 
complex and difficult.
Ambivalence over the role of 
traditional authorities in decentralised 
land governance
Despite the ubiquity of the citizen/subject discourse in 
the literature, which argues that traditional leaders are 
an anomaly in a democratic state, evidence from the 
different country case studies points to the resilience 
of traditional leaders and institutions in rural settings, 
facilitated in part by the need for ruling parties to 
retain their political support base, as well as by local 
support and legitimacy. In some respects the current 
relationship between the State and traditional authori-
ties appears not to have shifted that fundamentally 
between pre- and post colonial periods. The standing of 
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traditional authorities appears to be enjoying some-
thing of a resurgence, despite moves to marginalise 
their roles and influence in the past – particularly in 
Mozambique and to a lesser extent, in Botswana. This 
continues to raise ‘difficult questions about the role 
of unelected traditional authority and inherited power 
in a democratic society’ and presents thorny political 
choices as to whether to ‘abolish, convert, regulate’, or 
otherwise accommodate this leadership strata - locally, 
‘legitimate traditional structures exist and have to be 
involved’. (Ben Cousins, interview 12 September 2011).
Commodification of land held by the 
poor
Land which is legally the property of the State, on which 
poor rural people hold rights in terms of customary 
tenure systems, is increasingly the focus of new foreign 
direct investment initiatives in partnership with national 
and local governments and economic elites. This is 
leading to large scale land deals which place the land 
rights of the poor at risk, particularly in situations 
where: 
•	 central	government	seeks	out	investment	and	
favours large-scale land deals over locally driven 
development alternatives;
•	 the	underlying	land	rights	are	poorly	described	
and supported in law or are trumped by  lucrative 
development opportunities; and
•	 land	governance	and	land	rights	management	
systems are weak. 
In Botswana, such deals are associated with tourism 
opportunities on conservation land, but also on high 
value agricultural land in Chobe District. Such land 
deals are increasingly prevalent in Madagascar and 
Mozambique with a focus on securing land for bio 
fuels, fibre and food production. They highlight acute 
power disparities between local rights holders and large 
foreign companies, and their government and private 
sector partners.  
Land as an asset amidst mounting 
resource scarcity
Attempts to decentralise land governance have to be 
located against the sharp resurgence of interest in ar-
able land and natural and mineral resources by foreign 
corporations and governments. As the President of the 
Asian Development Bank has recently observed:
[...] the entire world is facing a new era of scarcer 
resources is a fact. In all areas – from clean water to 
food to natural capital – scarcity is the new normal . 
      
(Kuroda 2011)
The new economics of scarcity has meant that food 
and agricultural markets have become the focus of 
intense market speculation. A World Development 
Movement report (Worthy, 2011: 6) examines how 
recently ‘financial speculation has boomed, turning 
commodity derivatives into just another asset class 
for investors, distorting and undermining the effective 
functioning of agricultural markets’. This context places 
new value on resource rich land held under customary 
tenure systems, which until recently was deemed to be 
outside the economic mainstream, transforming it into 
a strategic resource and sustainable source of wealth 
waiting to be ‘unlocked’ by external investors who seek 
to externalise the lion’s share of benefits.
Reflections on decentralisation 
practice
Four key questions continue to shape and underpin 
local decentralisation policies and practices:
•	 How	are	rights	defined	and	specified?	
•	 Who	decides?	
•	 Who	benefits?
•	 Who	regulates	decision	making	and	benefit	flow?
All the cases highlight the deep persistence of central 
planning perspectives and the associated retention of 
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power and authority. Decentralised land governance 
involves institutional arrangements and relations 
between different levels and types of body, and related 
decision making processes and questions of account-
ability. While there continues to be an emphasis, as 
part of national and international ‘good governance’ 
agendas,  on democratic decentralisation and 
downward accountability to people directly affected by 
decisions about resources on which they depend, this 
focus on its own is insufficient. Both lateral and upward 
accountability also have to be taken into account as 
they provide essential checks and balances. Insufficient 
attention has been paid to the upward accountability 
relationships. These continue to be important because 
of the essential regulatory oversight provided through 
state bodies in the public interest. Cousins points out 
that ‘You don’t have property rights without authority 
systems to enforce those rights (Cousins interview, 12 
September 2011). 
Debates on tenure systems in Southern Africa may 
be turning full circle. Many governments and multi-
lateral institutions were dismissive of or even hostile 
to customary tenure systems in past decades. In 2002 
the World Bank and USAID called for privatisation of 
land in Mozambique (Hanlon 2002), yet a year later 
the same institutions began to acknowledge some of 
the strengths and adaptive capacity of these systems 
(Deininger, 2003). 
However, in the current context of large scale land 
deals, the legal defensibility of the rights of the poor is 
key for navigating  the new terrain. This has to backed 
by robust oversight mechanisms and the development 
of pro poor local institutional capacity with budgets and 
the human resources to provide legal support, contract 
analysis and management services for representative 
bodies of local rights holders who may be entering 
into negotiations with powerful investors. Developing 
and unlocking capacity for decentralised local govern-
ance and finding the resources to build this capacity 
continue to be of great importance. As Cousins has 
observed: ‘Power imbalances cannot be addressed by 
law alone’ (Ben Cousins, interview 12 September 2011).
Conclusions
Experience in several Southern African countries draws 
attention to the rapidly widening asymmetries of power 
and the continuing imperative to resource democratic 
decentralisation and land governance systems which 
promote downward accountability to resource users, 
while ensuring horizontal and vertical links, and legisla-
tive oversight.  
The impetus for decentralisation and how it is framed 
are reflections of the contested politics that drive it. The 
externally led prescriptions and conditionalities that 
emanate from the World Bank and multilateral institu-
tions embody an inherently conservative perspective 
which promotes decentralisation as part of a good 
governance and market friendly agenda. The alternative 
and more radical view of decentralisation is about the 
need to transfer power (and associated responsibilities 
and capacities) to local people and resource users in a 
bid to democratise society and ensure that the interests 
and the voices of the poor majority remain prioritised, 
in order to counter the intense national and global 
concentration of wealth and power in fewer and fewer 
hands. 
In the current context, increasingly characterised by the 
speculative responses of global capital to the new eco-
nomics of scarcity, pro poor land governance systems 
must appropriately describe and defend the rights of 
the poor. Such systems are essential in order to provide 
support for local actors in  a fast changing economic 
environment, where productive land occupied by the 
poor is rapidly assuming new value as a potentially 
profitable commodity for international investors and 
their local partners.
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Through a range of voices representative of key stakeholders in local land governance, the book aims to 
exchange knowledge of experiences and practices at country-level. Decentralised Land Governance: Case 
Studies and Local Voices from Botswana, Madagascar and Mozambique is a source for land practitioners, 
scholars and policy makers, stimulating informed and evidence-based policy debate – in the relevant sectors 
and, more broadly, in society – about the merits and demerits of decentralised land governance.
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